Indonesia in a reforming world economy: effects on agriculture, trade and the environment by Anderson, K. et al.
Welcome to the electronic edition of Indonesia in a 
Reforming World Economy: Effects on Agriculture, Trade 
and the Environment.
The book opens with the bookmark panel and you will 
see the contents page.  Click on this anytime to return to 
the contents.  You can also add your own bookmarks.
Each chapter heading in the contents table is clickable 
and will take you direct to the chapter.  Return using the 
contents link in the bookmarks.
The whole document is fully searchable. 
Enjoy.
Kym Anderson, Randy Stringer, Erwidodo 
and Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan (eds.)
INDONESIA
IN A REFORMING WORLD ECONOMY:
Effects on Agriculture, Trade and the Environment
UNIVERSITY OF ADELAIDE PRESS
Indonesia in a Reforming World Economy:
Eff ects on Agriculture, Trade and the Environment
Kym Anderson, Randy Stringer, Erwidodo 
and Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan (eds.)
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between CASER (Bogor), CIES (Adelaide), CSIS ( Jakarta) 
and RSPAS (at ANU, Canberra) to examine interactions 
between agriculture, trade and the environment in Indonesia. 
Funded by the Australian Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR Project No. 9449), the specifi c objective 
of the project was to assess the production, consumption, 
trade, income distributional, regional, environmental, and 
welfare eff ects in Indonesia of structural and policy changes at 
home and abroad. Particular attention was to be paid to those 
structural and policy changes that could aff ect Indonesia’s 
agricultural sector over the next 5-10 years. Th e implications 
of national and global economic growth, of regional and 
multilateral trade liberalisation initiatives, and of Indonesia’s 
ongoing unilateral policy reforms were the initial focus of the 
study. However, with the onslaught of the fi nancial crisis that 
began in the latter part of 1997, the project leaders added that 




































As well as being established to publish high quality refereed new works the University of  Adelaide 
Press selects previously published books by staff  for reprinting both electronically and as soft-
cover books.  
 
Strengthening the Global Trading System 
 
Indonesia in a Reforming World Economy 
 
Reforming Trade Policy in Papua New Guinea and the Pacific Islands 
 
The Economics of  Quarantine 
 
Global Wine Markets, 1961-2003 
 
The Building of  Economics at Adelaide 
(Barr Smith Press imprint) 
INDONESIA 
IN A REFORMING WORLD 
ECONOMY 




Kym Anderson, Randy Stringer, Erwidodo 


















Published in Adelaide by 
 
The University of Adelaide Press 
Level 1, 254 North Terrace 






The University of Adelaide Press publishes externally refereed scholarly books by staff of the 
University of Adelaide.  It aims to maximise the accessibility to its best research by publishing 
works through the internet as free downloads and as high quality printed volumes on demand. 
 





This book is a facsimile republication.  Some minor errors may remain.  Originally published by the 
Centre for International Economic Studies, University of Adelaide.   
 
© Kym Anderson, Randy Stringer, Erwidodo and Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan 2002, 2009 
 
First published 2002 
Republished 2009 
 
This work is licenced under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License. To view a 
copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ or send a letter to Creative 
Commons, 444 Castro Street, Suite 900, Mountain View, California, 94041, USA. This licence 
allows for copying any part of the work for personal and commercial use, providing author 







Agriculture Indonesia – Agricultural industries Indonesia – Indonesia Economic conditions – 
Indonesia Commerce 
 
For full Cataloguing-in-Publication data please contact National Library of Australia: 
cip@nla.gov.au 
 
ISBN 978-0-9806238-7-1 (electronic) 
ISBN 978-0-9806238-1-9 (paperback) 
 
 
Printed by Griffin Press 
Cover image: iStockphoto 





 List of tables, figures and boxes vii 
 Acronyms xii 
 Preface xiv
 List of contributors xv  
1 Introduction, by Randy Stringer, Erwidodo, Tubagus 
Feridhanusetyawan and Kym Anderson 
1 
2 Effects of growth, its interruption, and the Uruguay 
Round on Indonesian agriculture, by Anna Strutt and 
Kym Anderson 
10 
3 Effects of AFTA and APEC trade policy reforms on 
Indonesian agriculture, by Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan, 
Mari Pangetsu and Erwidodo 
28 
4 Trade liberalisation and soil degradation in Indonesia, by 
Anna Strutt 
40 
5 Will the Uruguay Round and APEC reforms harm air 
and water quality in Indonesia? by Anna Strutt and Kym 
Anderson 
61 
6 Impacts of agricultural protection growth at home and 
the WTO’s Doha Round on Indonesian agriculture, by 
Kym Anderson, Erwidodo, Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan and 
Anna Strutt 
104 
7 Effects of agricultural policy reform on household and 
regional income distribution in Indonesia, by Peter Warr 
and Prem Thapa 
135 
8 Effects of farm policy reform on Indonesia’s secondary 
food crops, by Sjaiful Bahri, Reni Kustiari and Glyn Wittwer 
164 
vi   
 
9 Effects of agricultural policy reform in Indonesia on its 
food security and environment, by Erwidodo, Glyn 
Wittwer and Randy Stringer 
179 
10 Impacts of trade policy reform on income distribution 
and poverty in Indonesia, by Johanna Croser 
206
 APPENDIX 1: The WAYANG Model of the Indonesian 
economy, by Glyn Wittwer 
244 




List of tables, figures and boxes 
PAGE 
TABLES   
2.1 Projected cumulative [and annual] percentage changes 
in GDP and factor endowments assumed for various 
countries, 1992 to 2005 
13 
2.2 Changing structure of global GDP, 1992, 2005 and 
2005ig 
15 
2.3 Percentage changes in sectoral output (and cumulative 
changes in the compositional share of total GDP 
output) in Indonesia, 1992-2005, 1992-2005ig with and 
without Uruguay Round trade liberalisation 
16 
2.4 Sectoral shares of Indonesia’s GDP, actual 1992 and 
2005 under various scenarios 
18 
2.5 Sectoral shares of Indonesia’s merchandise exports, 
actual 1992 and 2005 under various scenarios 
19 
2.6 Agriculture and food processing exports and imports, 
actual 1992 and 2005 under various scenarios 
20 
3.1 Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
outputs in Indonesia 
36 
3.2 Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
exports in Indonesia 
37 
3.3 Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
imports in Indonesia 
38 
4.1 Contribution of each region to agricultural production 
in Indonesia, by sector 
44 
4.2 Regional aggregation in the GTAP model 50 
4.3 Commodity aggregation in the GTAP model 51 
4.4 Welfare effects of Uruguay Round liberalisation for 
Indonesia 
53 
viii   
 
 
4.5 Contribution from the agricultural and forestry sectors 
to erosion in Indonesia 
53 
4.6 Change in soil erosion in Indonesia from Uruguay 
Round implementation 
55 
5.1 Projected cumulative [and annual] percentage changes 
in GDP and factor endowments assumed for various 
countries, 1992 to 2020 
66 
5.2 Percentage changes in sectoral output levels and in 
sectoral shares of GDP due to economic growth, 
Indonesia, 1992-2010 and 2010-2020a 
70 
5.3 Percentage changes in sectoral output levels in 
Indonesia following Uruguay Round and APEC trade 
reforms, Indonesia, 2010 and 2020 
71 
5.4 Recent and projected levels of atmospheric emissions 
in the base cases, Indonesia, 1992, 2010, and 2020 
78 
5.5 Decomposition of changes in pollution as a 
consequence of economic growth and structural 
changes, Indonesia, 1992-2010 and 2010-2020 
79 
5.6 Recent and projected levels of water use and quality in 
the base cases, Indonesia, 1992, 2010, and 2020 
82 
5.7 Decomposition of pollution effects from Uruguay 
Round trade reform (incl. in China), Indonesia, 2010 
85 
5.8 Sectoral decomposition of the total change in emissions 
due to Uruguay Round implementation, Indonesia, 
2010 
87 
5.9 Decomposition of pollution effects in Indonesia under 
APEC liberalisation, 2020 
89 
5.10 Percentage changes in resource-sector output levels in 
various regions of the world following Uruguay 




5.11 Decomposition of pollution effects in Indonesia under 
APEC liberalisation, with 0.5 percent p.a. extra GDP 
growth in APEC economies, 2020 
91
5.12 Changes in pollution as a consequence of economic 
growth and structural changes, Indonesia (a) 1992-2005 
and (b) interrupted growth scenario, 1992-2005ig 
93 
5.13 Decomposition of pollution effects from Uruguay 
Round trade reform (including in China), Indonesia 
95 
5A Import tariffs without and with Uruguay Round 
liberalisation, by sector, Indonesia, 2010 
102 
6.1 Post-Uruguay Round tariffs (and agricultural 
production and export subsidies), various country 
groups, 2005 
108 
6.2 Sectoral shares of GDP, post-Uruguay Round in 2005, 
of private household consumption in 1995, and of trade 
in 1997 
111 
6.3 Effects on economic welfare (equivalent variation in 
income) of removing distortions to various goods 
markets post-Uruguay Round, major economic 
regions, 2005 
112 
7.1 Classification of households in Indonesia 147 
7.2 Sources of gross household factor incomes in Indonesia 148 
7.3 Estimated effects of increases in rice consumption 
subsidies with fixed aggregate employment, Indonesia 
153 
7.4 Estimated effects of increases in rice consumption 
subsidies with fixed nominal wages, Indonesia 
161 
8.1 Shares of food in household expenditure by income 
group, Indonesia, 1999 
166 
8.2 Indonesia’s rice, maize and soybean production, 1996 
to 1999 
168 
x   
 
 
8.3 Effects of productivity gains in soybean, maize and 
cassava cropping in Indonesia 
176 
9.1 Changes in real wages for weeding in selected 
provinces of Indonesia, 1997-98 
182 
9.2 Increase in the price of paddy and vegetables relative 
to wages, various regions of Indonesia, 1997-98 
184 
9.3 Effects of a 40 percent real price rise for rice, Indonesia, 
1998 
186 
9.4 Incidence of poverty in Indonesia, 1976 to 1998 187 
9.5 The impact of the crisis on school enrolments in 
Indonesia, 1998-99 
189 
9.6 Key closure choices in the WAYANG model of the 
Indonesian economy 
195 
9.7 Estimated effects of a real depreciation in Indonesia 199 
10.1 Classification of households in WAYANG 209 
10.2 Factorial sources of income for households in 
Indonesia 
210 
10.3 Variables and parameters for constructing beta 
distributions for Indonesia 
212 
10.4 Estimated effects on Indonesia’s macroeconomy and 
on factor returns 
220 
10.5 Poverty headcount measures in Indonesia following 
policy reform 
225 
10.6 CV measures for Indonesia 225 
10.7 Sectoral shares in regional output and poverty by 
region in Indonesia  
230 
10.8 Estimated effects of reform on regional output, 
employment and wages 
230 
10A Tariff and NTB schedule for Indonesia, 1993 241 
xi 
A1 Country and regional disaggregation in GTAP, 
versions 3 and 4 
256 
A2 Commodity disaggregation in GTAP, versions 3 and 4 258 
xii   
 
 
FIGURES   
8.1 Production of rice, maize, soybean and cassava, 
Indonesia, 1969-1998 
160 
8.2 Maize imports and exports, Indonesia, 1969 to 1997 164 
8.3 Soybean exports and imports, Indonesia, 1975 to 1996 165 
8.4 Cassava exports, Indonesia, 1970 to 1997 167 
9.1 Wholesale price indices for export commodity groups, 
Indonesia, 1987 to 1998 
177 
9.2 Indices of farm household consumer prices, food 
prices, and agricultural wages, West Java, 1997-98 
178 
9.3 Stylised growth scenarios for Indonesia in the wake of 
the crisis 
196 
10.1 Beta distributions for the WAYANG household groups 208 
10.2 The beta distribution and monetary poverty line for the 
Rural 1 household group pre- and post-trade policy 
reform 
216 




ACIAR Aust. Centre for International Agricultural Research 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area 
AMS Aggregate measure of support (to domestic agric.) 
ANU Australian National University 
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
BULOG Badan Urusan Logistik (agency for centralised trading)  
CASER Centre for Agro-socioeconomic Research, Bogor 
CEPT Common effective preferential tariff 
CIES Centre for International Economic Studies, Adelaide 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta 
CV Compensating variation in income (welfare measure) 
ECOTECH Economic and technical cooperation 
EVSL Early voluntary sectoral liberalisation 
EU European Union 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GCE Computable general equilibrium 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GMO Genetically modifies organism 
GRP Gross regional product 
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IRTS Increasing returns to scale 
KUD Kooperasi utama desa (village cooperatives) 
LDCs Least-developed countries 
MFA Multifibre Arrangement 
MFN Most favoured nation 
R&D Research and development 
RSPAS Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, ANU 
TILF Trade and investment liberalisation and facilitation 
TRIPs Trade-related intellectual property rights 
US United States (of America) 
WTO World Trade Organization 





In the mid-1990s a joint research project was established between 
CASER (Bogor), CIES (Adelaide), CSIS (Jakarta) and RSPAS (at 
ANU, Canberra) to examine interactions between agriculture, trade 
and the environment in Indonesia. Funded by the Australian Centre 
for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR Project No. 9449), 
the specific objective of the project was to assess the production, 
consumption, trade, income distributional, regional, environmental, 
and welfare effects in Indonesia of structural and policy changes at 
home and abroad. Particular attention was to be paid to those 
structural and policy changes that could affect Indonesia's 
agricultural sector over the next 5-10 years. The implications of 
national and global economic growth, of regional and multilateral 
trade liberalisation initiatives, and of Indonesia's ongoing unilateral 
policy reforms were the initial focus of the study. However, with the 
onslaught of the financial crisis that began in the latter part of 1997, 
the project leaders added that issue to the research agenda. 
 
The analysis draws on and adapts the global GTAP Model, which is 
a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world 
economy within which there are sub-models for numerous 
individual economies including for Indonesia. The project began by 
also using a national CGE model for Indonesia, called INDOGEM, 
which was constructed in a previous ACIAR project by Ray Trewin 
and colleagues at the Australian National University (which in turn 
drew on a forestry-focused model developed by Philippa Dee of the 
Productivity Commission in Canberra). For the present project a 
more-detailed national economy-wide model was needed, however, 
if we were to get some idea of the regional and household income 
distributional and poverty consequences of policy changes. Hence 
ANU’s Peter Warr, with the help of some junior colleagues, created 
the so-called WAYANG model. This was based on the ORANI-G 
model for Australia developed by Peter Dixon and colleagues at 
Monash University’s Centre of Policy Studies, and uses GEMPACK 
software developed by Ken Pearson and colleagues (also at 
Monash). To all of those people we offer our thanks.  
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This volume brings together a subset of papers that have used those 
two CGE models as part of ACIAR Project 9449. Chapters 2 to 6 
draw on various versions of the GTAP model, while Chapters 7 to 
10 involve applications of various versions of the WAYANG model. 
Two technical appendices complete the book, one on each of those 
models. It is hoped that these applications will tempt other 
Indonesian economists to make use of these models for analysing 
other growth and policy reform issues in the years ahead. To 
encourage that, the WAYANG model has been documented by Glyn 
Wittwer and is available as Working Paper 99.10  "WAYANG: A 
General Equilibrium Model Adapted for the Indonesian Economy". 
The paper and the full model are freely downloadable from the CIES 
website, along with electronic copies of all the other main ACIAR 
project working papers, at www.adelaide.edu.au/CIES/indlist.htm 
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BY RANDY STRINGER, ERWIDODO, TUBAGUS 
FERIDHANUSETYAWAN AND KYM ANDERSON 
For the quarter-century prior to the financial crisis of late 1997, 
Indonesia’s economic performance had been, along with that of 
other East Asian countries, one of the best in the world. During 
those years Indonesia’s real GDP grew at an average rate of more 
than 6 percent per year, inflation averaged less than 10 percent, and 
the incidence of poverty fell from three-fifths to one-seventh of the 
population. Significant structural changes accompanied that rapid 
economic growth, the nature of which raised important questions 
about its impact, together with that of Indonesia’s agricultural, 
industrial, trade and environmental policies, on the sustainability of 
the country’s development.  
Up to 1997 all the forward-looking analyses aimed at understanding 
how to best address these structural changes had assumed the 
economy would continue growing at a strong pace into the future. 
The dramatic withdrawal of financial capital from Indonesia and the 
crash in the value of its currency from late 1997 meant that all these 
previous analyses needed to be revised. Also, the domestic policy 
emphasis shifted temporarily to emphasise basic concerns over 
unemployment, hunger and poverty, leaving concerns over the 
environment to richer countries’ citizens. 
Lots of important new questions emerged. How much difference 
would a few years of GDP decline in Indonesia make to projections 
of the structure of production, employment and trade? Might there 
be a re-agriculturalisation of the economy? How would the crisis 
alter the expected effects on Indonesia of implementation of the 
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WTO’s Uruguay Round agreements, and hence on attitudes towards 
the efficacy of trade and other economic policy reforms? What 
would be the short and long term implications of the economic crisis 
on food security? How would the rupiah’s devaluation impact on 
factor prices and food production? How would rural communities 
cope with thousands of urban unemployed returning to the 
countryside in search for jobs and food? Would trade reform at 
home or abroad reduce or add to the country’s woes? 
The chapters in this volume address these and related questions 
associated with the post-1997 financial crisis, as well as questions 
about the environmental consequences of a return to economic 
growth. They do so using two different economy-wide models, one 
national and the other global. A global model that provides a 
system-wide perspective is essential for assessing the impact on 
Indonesia of major economic shocks abroad, such as the 
implementation of WTO agreements, APEC or ASEAN initiatives, 
or ongoing reforms in former centrally planned economies. The 
national model complements that global one as it is able to provide 
more details of regional and household effects within Indonesia, 
including their impacts on poverty.  
The next five chapters make use of the global, economy-wide model 
known as GTAP. The subsequent four chapters use WAYANG, 
which a general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy 
named after the Indonesian puppet theatre. WAYANG was 
specifically developed for this project, but it has been fully 
documented and is freely available on the internet so as to 
encourage its continuing use.  
A shared objective of all the studies reported here is to assess the 
efficiency, distributional, and welfare effects of structural and policy 
changes at home and abroad that affect Indonesia’s agricultural 
production and trade in the course of its economic growth and 
response to the economic crisis. 
The chapters also share a common focus on agriculture. The 
agricultural sector is a key component of the Indonesian economy, 
accounting for large shares of GDP, government budgeting, 
employment, consumption and trade. In addition, two chapters 
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(Chapters 4 and 5) assess the environmental impacts on Indonesia of 
economic growth and trade policy reforms. 
Policies affecting agriculture have significant impacts on the overall 
economy. Moreover, there are major linkages between Indonesian 
agriculture and environmental resources such as soils, forests and 
water, and between individual sector policies and the use of 
primary factors and intermediate inputs. Hence the most 
appropriate tool for such analysis is computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) modeling that is able to capture the intersectoral effects of 
growth and policy reform. 
In Chapter 2, Strutt and Anderson use the GTAP model to examine 
how much difference a few years of GDP decline in Indonesia and 
other East Asian economies make to projections of structural change 
in Indonesia. In particular, they ask how the crisis alters the 
expected effects on Indonesia of implementation of the Uruguay 
Round, and hence attitudes towards the efficacy of that and 
subsequent trade policy reforms. The chapter begins by modelling 
the effect of the growth interruption on the economy in 2005 without 
and then with Uruguay Round implementation. Next, two 
alternative possible trade policy responses to the crisis are 
simulated: either Indonesia chooses to slow its trade reform 
program, or it chooses to liberalise its markets even further than it is 
currently committed to under the Uruguay Round.  
The results show that both the growth interruption and the choice of 
policy response could have substantial effects on sectoral growth 
rates and hence structural change. Specifically, there could be a re-
agriculturalisation of the economy. With the declining relative 
importance of the agricultural sector being temporarily reversed by 
the crisis, and with workers returning from urban areas to their 
family’s village, the study suggests it is more important now than 
ever to examine ways to boost rural development. Trade and other 
policy choices are shown also to impact substantially on the level 
and sectoral distribution of output, wages, etc. The final section 
draws out some trade and sectoral policy implications of the 
findings. 
In Chapter 3, Feridhanusetyawan, Pangestu, and Erwidodo use the 
GTAP model to measure the impacts of various regional trade 
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liberalisation proposals on the economies in the Asia Pacific region 
including Indonesia. The objective of this chapter is to examine the 
potential gains or losses and to predict the changing trade patterns 
and resource reallocations that are expected to result from these 
liberalisations. The study focuses on Indonesia even though the 
model treats Indonesia as part of an interdependent world economy. 
Among the liberalisation scenarios considered are the combination 
of Uruguay Round, APEC and AFTA trade reforms. 
The authors find that among the existing liberalisation commitments 
in the Asia Pacific region, the implementation of the two major 
commitments, namely the Uruguay Round and APEC, would 
greatly benefit Indonesia. AFTA, on the other hand, is expected to 
contribute little to economic welfare for Indonesia. The explanation 
is that AFTA creates but also diverts trade of ASEAN countries 
(which trade mostly with non-ASEAN countries). The authors 
conclude that Indonesia would be better to focus its attention on 
pursuing more open and non-discriminatory trade liberalisation 
through APEC or the new Doha Development Round of the WTO. 
Strutt extends the GTAP model in Chapter 4 to include the effects of 
land degradation for the Indonesian economy. Soil erosion is one of 
the more significant environmental problems caused by agricultural 
production in Indonesia. This chapter simulates the off-site 
environmental damage and on-site productivity impacts of soil 
erosion, along with the standard intersectoral and interregional 
economic effects of trade liberalisation. It then analyses the welfare 
implications of trade policy changes where soil erosion occurs and 
land productivity is reduced.  
The inclusion of erosion and land degradation in GTAP enables a 
fuller welfare analysis of the effects of economic policy changes. An 
important finding of this chapter is that with Uruguay Round trade 
liberalisation, the level of production and soil erosion rises in the 
coarse grain sector but falls in the non-grain crops and forestry 
sectors. Net land productivity changes appear to be positive, since a 
reduction in land use in the large non-grain crops sector would 
improve land productivity. Results for the non-marketed off-site 
effects of erosion, however, suggest that there may be a small 
increase in soil erosion in Indonesia with trade liberalisation. This is 
due to increased land use in the relatively erosive coarse grain 
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sector. Even so, relative to the projected gain from trade 
liberalisation, the cost of damage caused by increased erosion 
appears low. Chapter 4 also attempts to make explicit some of the 
trade-offs between income growth (from trade reform) and 
environmental damage from land degradation. The results suggest 
that the economic welfare benefits offered by trade reform far 
outweigh the small overall impact on soil erosion in Indonesia. This 
does not imply that land degradation is not a significant problem for 
Indonesia, but it does suggest that Uruguay Round implementation 
is not likely to significantly worsen the problem, at least at an 
aggregate level. The most serious effects of land degradation are 
often location-specific (for which local studies, along with ongoing 
efforts to ensure domestic resource policies are environmentally 
sustainable, will be important whether or not there is further trade 
reform). 
The GTAP model is modified even more in Chapter 5 with the 
addition of an environmental module to capture effects on air and 
water. In that chapter Strutt and Anderson provide estimates that 
make it easier to assess whether the standard gains from trade 
reform are sufficient to outweigh any loss in welfare due to added 
environmental damage that might accompany trade liberalisation. 
One aim of this empirical study is to foreshadow any need for 
environmental policy changes to accompany such reforms. With an 
environmental module attached to the Indonesian part of the GTAP 
model, it is able to project the world economy to 2010 and 2020 
without and with trade reforms. The effects of structural and policy-
induced changes in economic activity on air and water pollution in 
Indonesia are then measured. The results are able to apportion the 
contributions of changes in the aggregate level and composition of 
output, and in production techniques, to changes in environmental 
indicators.  
This case study first looks at the effect of economic growth at home 
and abroad without any policy changes. It suggests that if 
Indonesia’s present environmental policies remain unchanged, 
projected economic growth and structural changes over the next two 
decades would add to environmental degradation and resource 
depletion in the country. Strutt and Anderson stress that this 
conclusion is not an argument against economic growth. Rather, it is 
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an argument for introducing and strengthening the enforcement of 
environmental and resource policies to internalise some of the 
externalities associated with output and consumption expansion. 
When optimal environmental (and other) policies are in place and 
are continually adapted to remain optimal over time, economic 
growth enhances social welfare. There may be more environmental 
degradation or further resource depletion, but at least those changes 
would be optimal from that society’s viewpoint, given the actual or 
opportunity cost of avoidance or abatement.  
Likewise, trade reform can contribute to environmental damage and 
resource depletion, but again that will not be nationally welfare-
reducing so long as optimal environmental (and other) policies are 
always in place. The Indonesia case study in Chapter 5 suggests that 
trade policy reforms slated for the next two decades would improve 
the environment in some cases (at least with respect to air and water 
pollution) and could reduce the depletion of natural resources. Even 
in the worst cases, trade reforms would add only very slightly to 
environmental degradation and resource depletion even without 
toughening the enforcement of existing environmental and resource 
regulations or adding new ones. The increases in pollution, where 
they occur, are driven primarily by a small number of sectors. Thus 
they could be targeted with environmental policies to help reduce 
emissions. The economic gains from trade reforms and the scope for 
adopting well-targeted environmental and resource policies to 
reduce any serious damage are such that social welfare almost 
certainly is going to be improved by these liberalisations. 
In the final study in this volume to use GTAP, Anderson, Erwidodo, 
Feridhanusetyawan and Strutt explore empirically in Chapter 6 the 
scope for further gains to Indonesia from liberalising agricultural 
markets in OECD countries. In addition, the chapter examines what 
is likely to be included in the next agricultural negotiations. It asks if 
the likelihood of the next WTO round delivering siseable 
agricultural protection cuts and benefiting the world’s poor (the vast 
majority of whom are developing country producers) would be 
significantly greater if negotiations include protection cuts for other 
sectors. It also explores new issues on the WTO’s agenda. Finally, 
the study assesses whether rule-making efforts to accommodate 
new issues should be de-linked from the agricultural negotiations 
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on border measures, rather than simply included under the three 
headings used in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(import market access, export subsidies, and domestic support). 
The authors of Chapter 6 conclude that traditional agricultural 
market access liberalisation should continue to be the key priority 
issue for developing countries such as Indonesia. However, 
attention should focus also on reducing protection granted to 
manufacturing and services industries in developing countries 
themselves, as protection in those sectors bestows a significant anti-
agricultural bias in many low- and middle-income economies, 
making it more difficult for them to benefit from the agricultural 
trade reform of OECD countries. As far as the multilateral 
agricultural agenda is concerned, the focus should be on further 
reducing agricultural protection, particularly in industrialised 
countries, so as to give developing country farmers better access to 
export markets. Chapter 6 also argues that care should be taken not 
to overload international trade agreements with too many new 
trade-related issues.  
The WAYANG model of the Indonesian economy is developed in 
Chapter 7 by Warr and Thapa, who use it to run a series of 
simulations motivated by the post-1997 economic crisis. In 
particular, they address policy issues associated with the 
affordability of food for the poorest people, reflected in the special 
government measures targeting additional food subsidies, 
especially for rice, to the poorest households. In special market 
operations, rice is sold at prices equivalent to around 50 to 60 
percent of normal market prices. As the depreciation of the rupiah 
continued during 1998, the subsidies grew and the gap between 
international prices and domestic rice prices increased. The level of 
rice imports also increased substantially.  
Warr and Thapa find that the consumption subsidy on rice has 
effects on different consumers that are not identical to those that 
would be predicted on the basis of the share of rice in the total 
expenditure of these households. This is because household incomes 
are affected by the factor market consequences of the subsidies. In so 
far as domestic producer prices of rice are increased by consumption 
subsidies, the production factors used intensively in rice production 
enjoy increased returns. Households who own these factors 
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therefore tend to benefit. The way factor markets respond depends 
on labour market conditions as well as how other factor markets 
evolve in the post-crisis environment. The authors point out that 
subsidies have to be paid for. The manner in which the 
government’s outlay for the subsidies is met therefore also will 
influence the distributional consequences across households.  
In Chapter 8, Bahri, Kustiari and Wittwer make use of the 
WAYANG model to help understand the ways in which nonrice 
food crops (maize, soybean and cassava) are affected by the 
financial crisis as well as by changes in research, development and 
infrastructure investments. The concern in this chapter relates to 
post-crisis policy changes involving greater regional autonomy, 
leading to decentralisation of development activities. The 
government’s intent is to allow individual provinces to manage 
their own agricultural development programs. 
Chapter 8 provides detailed background on secondary crop 
development in Indonesia and then models an all-input 
productivity increase for maize, soybeans and cassava. Output gains 
depend on both the assumed magnitude of productivity growth 
arising from a partial redirection of funds, but also on the ability of 
individual industries to export. Household income impacts are also 
analysed. Specifically, the modeling scenario results in all 
households gaining from productivity growth in secondary crops. 
The chapter’s conclusions suggest that Indonesia would gain from a 
reallocation of research and development funding towards maize, 
soybeans and cassava. 
In chapter 9 Erwidodo, Wittwer and Stringer examine how 
agriculture can contribute to overcoming the negative consequences 
of the crisis in the medium term. WAYANG is used to model the 
consequences of a real devaluation, productivity declines, and a loss 
of the country’s endowment of some productive factors. The 
scenarios presented assume a degree of adjustment within the 
Indonesian economy. For example, the Indonesian government 
responded to the crisis by liberalising markets and by removing 
legislative restrictions on agricultural land use.  
In the real devaluation scenario, WAYANG is used to predict which 
industries might win and which might lose from the real 
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devaluation. A number of influences are considered to assess the 
magnitude of the gain or loss to a particular industry from a real 
devaluation. They include the export intensity of sales of the 
industry’s output, the import intensity of production, overall cost 
changes, the fate of other industries intensive in purchases of the 
output of this industry, and the proportion of household sales in 
total sales. Among the results, the authors find that that real 
consumption declines by 14 percent for high income urban 
households and by 21 percent for rural households in agriculture 
with more than 1 hectare of land. As expected, export-oriented crops 
increase output in response to the devaluation, but the model 
highlights additional sources of growth for certain commodities. 
And any commodity reliant on households for a large proportion of 
sales suffers a substantial negative local market contribution, due to 
the negative effect of declining household expenditure.  
In the final chapter, the WAYANG model’s regional and household 
disaggregations are exploited further by Croser to provide more 
insights into the impacts of trade liberalisation on income 
distribution and on poverty. Of course trade measures are unlikely 
to be first-best instruments for achieving income distributional 
goals, but if it can be shown that trade reform is pro-poor, then that 
provides yet another reason to reduce trade barriers. And indeed 
Croser’s results do suggest that removing Indonesia’s trade barriers 
would reduce poverty and improve the welfare of the poorest 
households. But the results also suggest richer households would 
benefit more, so the gap between the rich and poor would widen 
within the country even though the poor would be better off in 
absolute terms. The poverty reduction effect of trade reform is even 
stronger when perfect competition is replaced by the more-realistic 
assumption of increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition. 
The volume concludes with appendices that provide some details of 
the two economy-wide models exploited in these studies: the 
WAYANG national model, summarised by Wittwer, and the GTAP 
global model, summarised by Strutt. It is hoped that by providing 
those details, other analysts will be inspired to put these models to 
work in analysing new development and policy issues as they arise 
in Indonesia or other developing countries. 
 
2 
Effects of growth, its interruption, and the 
Uruguay Round on Indonesian agriculture 
ANNA STRUTT AND KYM ANDERSON  
All of the forward-looking analyses of East Asia’s economies of the 
decade or so to mid-1997 had been premised on the assumption that 
rapid national output and trade growth would continue. The 
dramatic withdrawal of financial capital from the region and the 
crash in the value of local currencies from late 1997 meant that such 
analyses needed to be revised. How much difference would a few 
years of GDP decline in Indonesia and other East Asian economies 
make to projections of structural change in Indonesia, for example? 
Might we even see a re-agriculturalisation of the economy? In 
particular, how will the crisis alter the expected effects on Indonesia 
of implementation of the Uruguay Round, and hence attitudes 
towards the efficacy of that and other economic policy reforms? 
To help answer these questions, this chapter uses a global, economy-
wide model known as GTAP (Hertel 1997). That model was used 
recently to project the implications of economic growth and 
Uruguay Round trade policy reform at home and abroad for the 
structure of Indonesia’s economy over the period to 2005 (Anderson 
and Pangestu 1998). We extend that work to consider the impact of 
an interruption to growth due to the current economic and financial 
crisis. We begin by modelling the effect of the growth interruption 
on the economy in 2005 without and then with Uruguay Round 
implementation. We then simulate two alternative possible trade 
policy responses to the crisis: either that Indonesia chooses to slow 
its trade reform program, or that it chooses to liberalise its markets 
even further than it is currently committed to under the Uruguay 
Round.  
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Results show that both the growth interruption and the choice of 
policy response could have substantial effects on sectoral growth 
rates and hence structural change. Specifically, there could be a re-
agriculturalisation of the economy. Trade and other policy choices 
are also shown to impact substantially on the level and sectoral 
distribution of output, wages, etc. The final section of this chapter 
draws out some trade and sectoral policy implications of the 
findings. 
Projecting structural change to 2005 
Economic development and on-going policy reforms in Indonesia 
and other countries of the world will change substantially the level, 
composition, and location of production and consumption during 
the next decade or so. As in Anderson et al. (1997) and Anderson 
and Pangestu (1998), we project global economic growth and 
structural changes from the GTAP model’s base period of 1992 to 
2005.1 This is done initially using 1997 World Bank GDP, labour 
force, investment and population projections, together with the GTAP 
Version 3 data base and model. That GTAP data base divides the 
world economy into 37 sectors and 30 countries or country groups, 
but for the present analysis it is aggregated to 23 product groups and 
to five regions: Indonesia, other developing APEC economies, the 
rest of the world’s developing and transition economies, high-
income APEC economies, and the other-high income countries 
(Western Europe).  
To project future changes in the global economy, we present two 
alternative baseline scenarios, the first reflecting similar 
assumptions to those used by Anderson and Pangestu (1998), the 
second taking into account the possible impact of the current 
economic crisis in Indonesia and some of the other East Asian 
countries. 
                                                 
1 See Strutt (1998, Ch. 4) for details. The GTAP model does not include 
financial markets explicitly, so the focus is just on real variables in goods, 
services and factor markets and on trade and sectoral policy responses. For an 
empirical modeling analysis of the East Asian crisis in which financial markets 
and macroeconomic policies are the central focus, see for example McKibbin 
and Martin (1998). 
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First baseline scenario, 1992-2005 
For the first baseline scenario we adapt growth rates from Anderson 
et al. (1997) and Arndt et al. (1997). The upper half of Table 2.1 
reports the assumed rates of growth in factors and real GDP (from 
which the implied rates of total factor productivity growth may be 
derived) for the period from 1992 to 2005. Exogenous projections of 
each region’s endowments of physical capital, unskilled and skilled 
labour, and population are utilized. These are based on 
combinations of historical data and World Bank projections of the 
growth in population, labour force, real GDP and investment.  
For Indonesia, the assumed rates of factor and GDP growth in this 
first baseline scenario are, as in Anderson and Pangestu (1998), close 
to government expectations prior to 1998 and in line with past 
trends. Growth rates from Table 2.1 are applied to GDP, physical 
capital, unskilled labour, skilled labour, and the population level to 
simulate the cumulative change in them for 1992-2005. This gives 
our first baseline scenario. 
Second baseline scenario: 1992-2005 with interrupted growth 
The second baseline assumes that the current financial crisis in 
Indonesia and other East Asian economies will have a significant 
dampening effect on economic growth for several years. For the 
historic period 1992-1997, the same growth rates are assumed as 
above in the first baseline scenario; and from 2000 to 2005 we 
assume that the economy recovers back to initial projected growth 
rates. In the three years 1998 to 2000, however, this scenario assumes 
that, for Indonesia, physical capital shrinks about 15 percent and 
that this leads to job layoffs such that the amount of skilled labour 
employed as such shrinks by a similar amount and that jobs for 
unskilled labour cease to grow during those three years. Hence GDP 
falls by nearly a quarter over that period. We also assume GDP and 
factor growth rates average zero in other East Asian developing 
economies during that period, as detailed in the lower half of Table 
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Table 2.1: Projected cumulative [and annual]a percentage changes 
in GDP and factor endowments assumed for various 

















































































































































a Numbers in square brackets refer to the total 1992-2005 annual growth rates in 
the first scenario; in the second scenario they refer to all but the 1998-2000 
period, when the annual rates of growth in curved brackets apply. 
Source: Author’s calculations from Anderson et al. (1997) and Arndt et al. 
(1997). 
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Even with what might be viewed as a relatively conservative 
modification to Indonesia’s growth rates (given that GDP in 1998 is 
expected to be down 15 percent in 1998), the 22 percent decline in 
GDP between 1998 and 2000 has a large projected impact on total 
cumulative GDP growth in Indonesia over the full period 1992-2005. 
Cumulative growth is reduced from 130 percent in the first baseline 
scenario to 48 percent in our second slower-growth baseline. This is 
because the growth from the first five years is almost completely 
wiped out by the negative growth assumed for Indonesia in the 
three years 1998-2000. Although the economy is assumed to resume 
rapid growth after 2000, it is from a much lower base than it would 
otherwise have been.  
The changing structure of the global economy 
The structural changes projected for 1992-2005 have implications for 
the shape of the world economy as economies and their factor 
endowments grow at different rates. The structural change 
projections in our first scenario will also cause large relative shifts in 
production in the Indonesian economy. These effects are less in our 
second, slower growth scenario, however. 
Table 2.2 shows the changes in world output projected to 2005 in 
both the initial (2005) and the interrupted growth (2005ig) scenarios. 
The size of the world economy in the initial scenario is projected to 
increase by 43 percent between 1992 and 2005, but only by 40 
percent in the Asian slowdown scenario. Under the initial scenario, 
the developing East Asian countries gain considerably in 
significance. Developing APEC economies including Indonesia were 
projected to increase their contribution to world output by around 
55 percent before the crisis hit. However, in the second scenario 
where the crisis is taken into account, Indonesia increases its 
contribution to world output by only 7 percent and other APEC 
developing countries by only 33 percent.  
The changing structure of the Indonesian economy, 1992 
to 2005 
All sectors in Indonesia can be expected to increase output between 
1992 and 2005, even when growth is interrupted, according to the 
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first two columns of Table 2.3. However, projected changes in the 
structure of production in Indonesia depend on the growth 
assumptions made. The on-going reduction in the importance of the 
agricultural and other natural resource based sectors is set to 
continue. This is shown by the numbers in parentheses in Table 2.3, 
which indicate the changing contribution to the composition of 
Indonesia’s GDP. Even without the Uruguay Round being 
implemented, the projected contribution to GDP of each 
agricultural/natural resource industry would fall between 1992 to 
2005, but each falls much less in the interrupted growth scenario 
(compare the parenthetic numbers in columns 1 and 2). That is, the 
economy does not move as much towards manufacturing and 
service sectors when growth slows. Sectors that significantly 
increase their contribution to GDP, though again less so in the 
interrupted growth scenario, include other unskilled labour-
intensive manufactures such as textiles and clothing.  
Table 2.2: Changing structure of global GDP, 1992, 2005 and 2005ig 
(1992 US$ and percent) 

































7950 34.1 10319 31.1 10288 31.6 
TOTAL 23301 100 33220 100 32577 100 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
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Table 2.3: Percentage changes in sectoral output (and cumulative 
changes in the compositional share of total GDP output) 
in Indonesia, 1992-2005, 1992-2005ig with and without 
Uruguay Round trade liberalisation  










     
Paddy Rice 59 (-31) 26 (-15) -0.9 -1.1 
Coarse grains 18 (-49) 9 (-26) 4.6 5.5 
Non-grain crops 39 (-39) 13 (-24) -3.5 1.1 
Livestock 75 (-24) 29 (-13) -0.3 -0.7 
Forestry 69 (-26) 26 (-14) -2.6 3.7 
Fisheries 57 (-32) 13 (-23) 1.2 3.2 
Coal 74 (-24) 36 (-8) -8.2 4.3 
Oil 73 (-25) 27 (-14) -3.5 1.5 
Gas 65 (-28) 25 (-16) -3.6 1.5 
Other minerals 78 (-23) 28 (-13) -5.5 1.9 
Food processing 58 (-31) 26 (-15) -1.0 -1.1 
Textile products 249 (52) 90 (29) 49.2 -30.4 
Wood products 54 (-33) 20 (-19) -5.2 5.7 
Paper 186 (25) 65 (12) -4.8 4.1 
Petroleum and coal 149 (8) 50 (2) 0.4 -0.5 
Chemicals, rubber & 
plastics 
165 (15) 58 (7) 0.8 4.7 
Nonmetallic minerals 159 (13) 63 (11) -5.1 5.0 
Other manufactured 
products 
203 (32) 61 (9) -13.3 8.2 
Electricity, water and gas 158 (12) 54 (4) 1.9 -1.0 
Construction  142 (5) 66 (12) 0.5 -0.6 
Trade and transport 180 (22) 62 (10) -1.6 1.3 
Other services, private 173 (19) 58 (7) -1.3 0.3 
Other services, 
government 
239 (48) 93 (31) -0.4 0.0 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
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Table 2.4 summarises these changes in sectoral GDP shares. Note in 
particular that interrupted growth pushes projected shares of GDP 
in 2005 roughly half-way back to its 1992 level in the case of 
agriculture and food processing, compared with what would have 
been had the high economic growth rate of the past quarter century 
continued. The main reason for the differences between the two 
scenarios is given by Rybczynski (1955): in a comparative static 
situation, when the endowment of a subset of inter-sectorally mobile 
factors is reduced, the sectors using those factors relatively intensely 
will tend to shrink and other sectors expand, ceteris paribus. Since 
non-primary sectors use physical capital relatively intensely, and 
that factor is now relatively scarcer because of the crisis, the primary 
sectors’ shares of GDP are higher and others are lower in the 
interrupted growth scenario (compare rows 2 and 3 of Table 2.4).2 
Real wages of unskilled workers are projected by our model to be in 
2005 only 13 percent above those in 1992 in the interrupted growth 
scenario, compared with 51 percent above had high growth 
continued. 
The effect of slower growth on the projected composition of exports 
is shown in Table 2.5. Agriculture and food’s share of exports was 
expected to shrink dramatically over the 13-year projection period to 
2005 as the light manufactures’ share continued to grow, in line with 
past trends (c.f. the historical changes over two previous 13-year 
periods at the top of Table 2.5). But now with this interruption to 
economic growth, those changes are expected to be less.  
                                                 
2 The above results are not very sensitive to changes in factor intensities: 
boosting the share of value added by unskilled labour (and lowering capital’s 
share) in those manufacturing sub-sectors the use that factor relatively intensely 
changes the effect of the growth slowdown on GDP shares by only a small 
fraction of one percent. The slump in petroleum prices in international markets 
in the latter 1990s, which is expected to continue into the new millennium 
(World Bank 1998), may well add to the re-agriculturalisation of the economy. 
The standard booming-sector theory in reverse tells us that a drop in the price 
of Indonesia’s exports of energy raw materials (which had comprised about 
one-third of export earnings) would shrink the mining and perhaps non-
tradables sectors but expand other tradables sectors, including agriculture 

















Actual 1992 21.9 15.7 3.7 13.8 44.9 100 
Projected 2005 if no UR:       
-- high growth 18.6 16.5 5.2 14.1 45.6 100 
-- interrupted growth (ig) 20.4 17.1 4.5 13.5 44.5 100 
Projected 2005 with UR:       
-- high growth 17.7 15.87 7.5 13.4 45.7 100 
-- interrupted growth (ig) 19.5 16.3 6.9 12.7 44.6 100 
 
Additional policy changes (imposed on interrupted growth (ig) scenario for 2005) 
 -- Indonesia reneges on its 
UR obligations 
20.5 17.9 3.1 14.1 44.4 100 
 -- Indonesia further reforms 
trade 
19.2 16.2 7.4 12.4 44.8 100 
 -- Indonesia reforms 
agricultural domestic policy 
20.0 16.1 6.7 12.6 44.6 100 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
 













Actual 1966 59.7 29.1 0.0 11.2 100 
Actual 1979 17.0 73.0 0.7 9.3 100 
Actual 1992 11.1 35.9 20.1 32.9 100 
Projected 2005 if no UR:      
-- high growth 2.6 29.6 35.4 32.4 100 
-- interrupted growth (ig) 5.1 35.1 28.1 31.7 100 
Projected 2005 with UR:      
-- high growth 2.3 23.3 50.2 24.2 100 
-- interrupted growth (ig) 4.4 28.3 43.3 24.0 100 
Additional policy changes (imposed on interrupted growth (ig)scenario for 2005)  
 -- Indonesia reneges on its UR 
obligations 
5.7 37.8 17.6 38.9 100 
 -- Indonesia further 
    reforms trade 
4.6 26.5 45.4 23.6 100 
 -- Indonesia reforms  
      agricultural domestic policy 
5.8 28.1 42.3 23.7 100 
Source: GTAP 4 data base (CGTA 1998) and, for projections, authors’ GTAP model results. 
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Table 2.6: Agriculture and food processing exports and imports, 


















Actual 1966 468 58 0.78 na 2.37 
Actual 1979 3265 1498 0.37 na 1.14 
Actual 1992 3774 2409 0.22 101 1.18 
Projected 2005 if no UR:     
-- high growth 1768  6979 -0.60 93 0.30 
-- interrupted 
growth (ig) 
2503 4434 -0.28 95 0.60 
Projected 2005 with UR:     
-- high growth 1907 8283 -0.63 91 0.25 
-- interrupted 
growth (ig) 
2595 5369 -0.35 96 0.48 
Additional policy changes (imposed on 
interrupted growth (ig) scenario for 2005) 
   
 -- Indonesia 
reneges on its UR 
obligations 
2671 4488 -0.25 96 0.60 
 -- Indonesia 
further reforms 
trade 
2885 5920 -0.34 94 0.49 




3426 4979 -0.18 96 0.63 
a Share of this product group in Indonesia’s exports relative to its share in the value of 
world merchandise exports. 
 
Source: GTAP 4 data base (CGTA 1998) and, for projections, authors’ GTAP 
model results. 
Table 2.6 details these trade changes for agriculture and food 
processing: the growth interruption lowers imports of those 
products dramatically, but boosts exports of them. Hence the index 
of agricultural and food trade specialisation (net exports as a ratio of 
the sum of exports and imports in value terms), which had fallen 
from 0.9 in the mid-1960s and 0.4 in the late 1970s to 0.2 in the early 
Effects of growth, its interruption, and the UR on agriculture  21 
1990s, is projected to fall by 2005 just to -0.28 under interrupted 
growth compared with -0.6 under high growth (see column 3). It 
means self sufficiency in those products falls from 101 percent in 
1992 to just 95 percent instead of 93 percent as projected under high 
growth (column 4). Likewise, the index of ‘revealed’ comparative 
advantage in this product group, which had fallen from 2.4 in the 
mid-1960s to 1.2 in the early 1990s, is projected to fall only to 0.6 by 
2005 under interrupted growth compared with 0.3 under high 
growth (column 5 of Table 2.6). 
Uruguay Round liberalisation 
To help users model the global policy reforms agreed to in the 
Uruguay Round, which are being implemented over the ten years to 
2005, Version 3 of the GTAP database provides post-Uruguay 
Round protection vectors which draw heavily on the work of the 
World Bank (Hertel 1997, Chs. 13, 14). Import tariff levels in the 
model are lowered, as are domestic agricultural supports and 
agricultural export subsidies; and MFA quotas which restrict textile 
and wearing apparel exports from low-cost suppliers to the 
industrialised markets, represented in GTAP as bilateral export tax 
equivalents in the exporting LDCs in the GTAP database (Hertel 
1997, Chs. 3, 15), are reduced by the appropriate amount to simulate 
removal of MFA quotas.1 
Trade reforms, such as the implementation of the Uruguay Round, 
offer important opportunities for the Indonesian and other 
economies as we move into the next century. However, for 
Indonesia these gains are being reduced somewhat because of the 
financial crisis. As measured by an equivalent variation in income, 
the reduction is estimated to be $296 million per year.  
                                                 
1 Following Anderson et al. (1997). The starting point is the level of textile 
quotas as at 1992, which is the base year for Version 3 of the GTAP model. We 
assume that China will be fully integrated into the WTO by 2005 and hence, in 
our Uruguay Round simulation, that China reduces tariffs in accordance with 
the offer made by China to WTO member countries in late 1994 (Bach et al. 
1996). Christian Bach generously provided post-WTO membership rates for 
China for the full disaggregated GTAP data base. These tariff reductions may 
be conservative, as the offer was unacceptable to the WTO members at the time. 
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The biggest gains from the Round are expected to go to the textile 
and clothing sector which, with the lifting of ‘voluntary’ export 
restraints under the MFA reform, would have increased its GDP 
share from 5.2 to 7.5 percent. The proportional increase in the 
interrupted growth scenario is similar, but from a lower base of 4.5 
to 6.9 percent (column 3 of Table 2.4). That means the GDP shares 
for primary sectors, including agriculture, are lowered by the 
Round, but from a higher base in the case of the interrupted growth 
scenario. Agriculture’s share of GDP falls by almost 1 percentage 
point, as does that of ‘other primary’ sectors, in both scenarios 
(compare rows 2 and 3 with rows 4 and 5 in Table 2.4). 
In terms of export shares, Table 2.5 shows the huge expected 
changes to the composition of exports of manufactures should 
Indonesia indeed receive the expanded access to US and EU textile 
and clothing markets that are promised in the Uruguay Round 
Agreement. With interrupted growth, however, there is less 
expansion of the textile sector and hence less to gain from that part 
of the Uruguay Round reform. The sector’s share of merchandise 
exports is thus expected to rise from 20 to 43 percent rather than to 
50 percent between 1992 and 2005.2 Primary sector export shares 
would be larger in that case, with agriculture’s being nearly twice as 
large (falling from 11 percent in 1992 to 4.4 instead of 2.3 percent in 
2005). Self sufficiency in food and agricultural products (production 
as a percentage of domestic consumption at market prices), which 
was 101 percent for Indonesia in 1992, would have fallen to 91 
percent by 2005 with continued high growth and implementation of 
the Uruguay Round. The growth interruption raises that projection 
for 2005 to 96 percent (column 4 of Table 2.6). 
The impact of altering Indonesia’s trade liberalisation 
When an economic crisis of the magnitude of that which hit 
Indonesia in 1998 occurs, governments tend to alter trade and 
sectoral policies in one of two directions: either they become more 
inward looking and raise protectionist barriers in an attempt to slow 
                                                 
2 Or less of course should the US and EU not open up as fully as has been 
promised. Even so, the 43 percent from textiles and another 24 percent from 
other manufactures would still mean Indonesia’s share of exports from all non-
food manufactures in 2005 was no less than that of Thailand in the early 1990s. 
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job losses, or they accelerate their policy reform agenda in the hope 
of trading their way out of increased poverty. This section examines 
the effects of both of these policy scenarios, compared with the 2005 
data base with interrupted growth and assuming the Uruguay 
Round has been fully implemented by the rest of the world.  
What if Indonesia does not liberalise as agreed in the Uruguay 
Round? 
If Indonesia does not meet its Uruguay Round commitments, 
important growth opportunities will be lost. In this scenario we 
assume that Indonesia does not reduce its own tariffs as promised 
under the Uruguay Round, but still receives MFN status in markets 
abroad where Uruguay Round liberalisations are assumed to 
continue. These projections suggest a further reduction of US$0.7 
billion per year in real GDP for Indonesia when it does not liberalise 
along with other WTO members. Should the US and EU deny 
Indonesia expanded access to their markets for textiles and clothing 
in retaliation for it not opening up as promised, however, 
Indonesia’s would be lower by $3.7 billion rather than just $0.7 
billion. In terms of equivalent variation in income, economic welfare 
is projected to be US$3.5 billion less in this latter case. 
The changes in output for each sector from full Uruguay Round 
implementation, shown in the third column of Table 2.3, can be 
compared with column 4 which show what happens if Indonesia 
does not implement its Uruguay Round commitments and thereby 
does not get improved access to world textile and clothing markets. 
Indonesia then moves more resources into other sectors such as 
other manufacturing, natural resource intensive sectors, trade and 
transport, and grains.3 Clearly Indonesia will lose significantly if it 
does not meet its Uruguay Round obligations, especially if that 
causes it to lose market growth opportunities associated with MFA 
quota removal. The impact on sectoral GDP shares is clear from 
Table 2.4: the textiles etc. share falls from 7 to 3 percent, and the 
primary sector’s share rises nearly three percentage points. Export 
shares change in a similar direction but the changes are much larger, 
                                                 
3 This is likely to have severe implications for environmental damage and 
air pollution as these sectors are significantly more damaging than the textile 
sector (Strutt and Anderson 2000). 
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with textiles’ share at 18 instead of 43 percent and the primary 
sector’s share at 44 instead of 33 percent (Table 2.5). 
What if Indonesia liberalises further? 
By way of contrast, in the final two simulations we again start from 
a post-Uruguay Round scenario (2005ig). We first examine the 
implications of a further 25 percent reduction in import tariffs by 
Indonesia over and above its Uruguay Round commitments. With 
this further liberalisation, Indonesia’s real GDP increases by an 
additional 0.4 percent or US$74 billion per year. Light manufactures 
and services would gain a bit more, with textile and clothing output 
7 percent higher while other manufacturing and the natural 
resource-intensive sectors tending to decrease output slightly with 
this further liberalisation. Total exports and imports for Indonesia 
increase by almost 7 percent, on top of the increase from Uruguay 
Round liberalisation. Agriculture’s share of those exports is slightly 
higher than in the ig scenario along with textiles’, at the expense of 
the other sectors’ shares (Table 2.5). The greater volume of food 
imports means that self sufficiency in agriculture and food is 
slightly lower, at 94 instead of 96 percent (column 4 of Table 2.6). 
Finally, what if Indonesia went even further down the reform path? 
For example, with agriculture likely to become relatively more 
important because of the crisis than it otherwise would be, the 
government might consider reducing farm productivity-reducing 
domestic production and marketing regulations so as to boost this 
potential engine of growth recovery. One important regulation that 
reputedly has inhibited growth in the estate crop sector is that the 
sector has been kept in the hands of para-statal agencies. Suppose 
privatization or other reforms there led to a boost in total factor 
productivity in the non-grain crop sector by 10 percent by 2005. Our 
results suggest that, compared with the interrupted growth scenario 
ig, this would boost real GDP by 0.6 percent and that sector’s output 
and exports by 12 and almost 60 percent, respectively. It would raise 
agriculture’s share of GDP by 0.8 percent, and its share of exports 
from 4.6 to 5.8 percent (bottom of Tables 4 and 5).  
Conclusions  
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The large changes projected for the structure of the global economy 
between 1992 and 2005 will be moderated once the effects of the 
Asian slowdown are felt. There is a large adverse effect expected on 
cumulative real output in Indonesia over this period, and more so 
the slower the country recovers from the current crisis. Hence the 
urgent need to find ways to return the economy to rapid growth as 
soon as possible.  
Trade reform, particularly multilateral trade liberalisation, enhances 
Indonesia’s economic growth and development prospects. Even in 
our comparative static model, Uruguay Round liberalisation was 
projected to increase Indonesia’s real GDP by approximately 1.4 
percent. That projection has been lowered slightly by the growth 
interruption, and could be lowered further -- or raised -- depending 
on trade and other policies responses to the crisis. On the one hand, 
if Indonesia responds by not meeting its Uruguay Round tariff 
reduction commitments, that is projected to lower its GDP by 
another 0.5 percent per year. On the other hand, if Indonesia not 
only meets but is able to exceed its Uruguay Round commitments 
with an additional 25 percent reduction in its import tariff rates, 
GDP is projected to be higher by a further 0.4 percent per year. And 
as the final scenario above shows, that could be raised to a 1 percent 
boost if domestic de-regulation in agricultural markets were able to 
raise productivity in the non-grain crop sector by 10 percent. 
With the declining relative importance of the agricultural sector 
being temporarily reversed by the crisis, and with workers returning 
from urban areas to their family’s village, it is more important now 
than ever to examine ways to boost rural development. Great scope 
for doing that has been shown to exist in Indonesia (Tabor 1998), as 
in other areas of Asia (World Bank 1997). The extent to which the 
government is prepared to take up that challenge will provide a key 
indicator of the quality of its economic governance. 
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Effects of AFTA and APEC trade policy 
reforms on Indonesian agriculture 
TUBAGUS FERIDHANUSETYAWAN, MARI PANGESTU, 
ERWIDODO∗ 
Indonesia is facing commitments to international trade liberalisation 
through the Uruguay Round, its participation in Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), and its collaborative effort with 
other ASEAN economies to form an ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA). As part of the Uruguay Round commitment, Indonesia has 
been reducing its border tariffs, opening its markets, as well as 
reducing other domestic distortions especially in the agricultural 
sector.  
As a member of APEC, Indonesia is determined to liberalise trade 
and investment in the Asia Pacific region. In the meeting in Bogor, 
Indonesia, in 1994, APEC economies set the long-term goal of free 
and open trade and investment in the Asia Pacific. The Bogor 
Declaration hopes to realize the goal in 2010 for developed 
economies and 2020 for developing economies. Furthermore, the 
Bogor meeting clarified the three pillars on which APEC would be 
based, namely, Trade and Investment Liberalisation and Facilitation 
(TILF); Economic and Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH); and 
Development Cooperation. Import tariffs have been cut unilaterally 
                                                 
∗This is a synopsis of a much longer 1999 working paper. Thanks are due to Jose 
Rizal and Arya B. Gaduh from the CSIS for valuable research assistance. 
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in APEC member economies, and further tariff cuts are expected so 
as to implement the Bogor goal. 
While considerable industrial tariff reduction has been implemented 
in APEC, there has not been much discussion of agricultural 
liberalisation. This is different from the Uruguay Round which 
explicitly specifies reductions of import tariffs, domestic subsidies, 
and export subsidies on agricultural commodities. In APEC, the 
tariff reduction measure is generally based on the average level of 
tariff. This means that sectoral classifications become less relevant. It 
was only more recently that the sectoral approach to tariff reduction, 
the so called Early Voluntary Sectoral Liberalisation (EVSL), was set 
out in the Vancouver meeting in 1997. However, in the following 
year in Kuala Lumpur, there was a disagreement among APEC 
member economies on the liberalisation of some sensitive 
agricultural sectors. As a result, APEC had to submit its EVSL 
problems to the WTO for resolution. Clearly agriculture remains a 
sensitive sector within APEC. 
As a member of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Indonesia is also committed to form a free trade area in ASEAN 
(AFTA) in 2003. Different from the most-favoured-nation schemes in 
APEC and the Uruguay Round, AFTA is meant to create a 
discriminatory trading block in ASEAN. While in general the 
coverage of AFTA includes both the agricultural and non-
agricultural sectors, the progress of agricultural trade liberalisation 
has been very slow. It remains to be seen whether AFTA can be fully 
implemented in 2003. 
This chapter estimates the impacts of Uruguay Round, APEC and 
AFTA trade liberalisations on the economies in the Asia-Pacific 
region in general, as well as specifically on Indonesia, by using a 
quantitative economic model. The objective is to measure the 
potential gains or losses, and to predict the changing trade patterns 
and resource reallocation as a result of these liberalisation schemes. 
The focus is on Indonesia even though the model treats Indonesia as 
part of an interdependent world economy.  
This study compares the impact of each scenario on welfare, output, 
and resource allocation in the Indonesian economy. It uses a global 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model known as GTAP 
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(see Appendix 2 of this volume) which allows us to trace the impact 
of trade liberalisation through flows of goods and services across 
sectors and countries. In a global CGE framework, the world 
economy is classified into several regions and sectors, where 
quantity and prices adjust to the changing supply and demand that 
form the equilibrium conditions in every market. Policy changes, 
such as a reduction in import tariffs, lead to changing equilibrium 
market conditions in every sector and region involved in the model. 
The GTAP model measures the impacts of these policy changes on 
prices and quantities, structural resource allocation, as well as 
welfare gains or losses.  
The chapter is organised as follows. The first part discusses various 
forces of trade liberalisation that Indonesia is currently facing. This 
includes a discussion of the Uruguay Round, APEC and AFTA. The 
second part presents the modelling framework in a computable 
general equilibrium model, including the development of various 
scenarios to represent various schemes of trade liberalisation. The 
third part presents the results of the simulation and is followed by 
the conclusion. 
Forces of trade liberalisation 
Liberalising trade in agriculture through the Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round has been the main driving force of agricultural 
sector liberalisation in the Asia Pacific during the past decade. Even 
though in terms of actual trade liberalisation the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture seems to be limited, its achievement was 
quite significant. Other international trade agreements, many of 
which are more progressive than the Uruguay Round in terms of 
non-agricultural products, often fall short in terms of a push for 
more agricultural liberalisation. Hence, the success of the Uruguay 
Round in including agriculture in its agreement has become the 
primary source of efficiency gains from this reform. Prior to this 
agreement, trading economies could maintain inefficient and costly 
barriers since the sector was not regulated under GATT (now WTO) 
rules. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture consisted of two 
parts: a set of general commitments on the new GATT rules on 
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agriculture, and country schedules on the commitments of each 
participant on tariffs and other areas of obligations. These different 
areas include obligations to improve market access and reduce 
domestic support measures and export subsidies.  
ASEAN Free Trade Area 
In January 1992, intra-ASEAN economic co-operation received a 
major boost at the Fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore with the 
agreement by ASEAN countries to achieve an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) within 15 years. Originally, fifteen commodity groups 
were chosen to be on the fast track.1 For fast-track products with 
tariffs greater than 20 percent, tariffs were to be immediately 
reduced to 20 percent, and to 0-5 percent within 10 years; while for 
fast-track products with tariffs at 20 percent or below, tariffs were to 
be reduced to 0-5 percent within 7 years. To qualify for CEPT 
(Common Effective Preferential Tariff), goods must satisfy the 
ASEAN local content requirement of 40 percent. AFTA was a 
broader and much improved intra-ASEAN liberalisation program, 
but unprocessed agriculture products were initially excluded. 
Various forces including the commitments under the Uruguay 
Round, progress in APEC and unilateral liberalisations have 
contributed to accelerating and deepening ASEAN cooperation. For 
example, the timetable by which all products in the CEPT will have 
tariff rates of not more than 0-5 percent was accelerated from 15 to 
10 years, that is, by 2003. A number of products were also 
accelerated to the year 2000, by which time 88 percent of tariff lines 
were in the 0-5 percent tariff range. Also, the product coverage of 
CEPT was broadened to include unprocessed agriculture products, 
although they are further categorised into temporary exclusion and 
sensitive lists. Items in the sensitive list will be liberalised under a 
separate schedule, but they are expected to go beyond ASEAN’s 
commitments in agriculture under the WTO. Based on tentative 
lists, it appears close to 70 percent will be on the inclusion list. The 
temporary exclusion list will also be phased into the inclusion list by 
                                                 
1 The fast track products are: vegetable oils, chemicals, fertilisers, rubber 
products, pulp and paper, wooden and rattan furniture, gems and jewellery 
products, cement, pharmaceuticals, plastics, leather products, textiles, ceramics 
and glass products, copper cathodes, and electronics. 
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2003. There has been agreement that the sensitive list should be kept 
at a minimum and currently it comprises around 10 percent of the 
tariff lines in unprocessed agriculture products.  
Despite that accelerated progress, difficulties have been experienced 
in reaching an agreement on the agricultural items to be included in 
the temporary exclusion and sensitive lists, and the time limit by 
which all items are phased into the inclusion list. At the ASEAN 
summit in 1995 for example, Indonesia reintroduced 15 agriculture 
products to its sensitive list that had earlier been in the temporary 
exclusion list. The majority of these products are items which are 
coordinated by a state logistic agency (BULOG) and included rice, 
sugar, wheat flour, and soybean. 
Indonesia's decision to postpone the liberalisation of these 15 food 
items dominated the 10th AFTA Council meeting in Jakarta in 
September 1996. Indonesia, supported by the Philippines, refused to 
accept a 2010 deadline for including rice and sugar into the CEPT 
scheme. In addition to the sensitive list, Indonesia created a new list 
called the "very sensitive list" and included the two food items in 
that list. Indonesia and the Philippines demanded that the 2010 
deadline be pushed back by 10 years. On the other hand, Thailand 
insisted that all unprocessed agricultural commodities be phased in 
1 January 2003 and be totally liberalised by 2010. By the end of the 
meeting it was agreed that the liberalisation of sensitive agricultural 
commodities will begin in January 2003 and end in 2010, but 
Indonesia and Philippines were allowed some flexibility. For 
example, Indonesia can maintain import tariffs on rice and sugar 
above 5 percent after 2010 and introduce safeguard measures at that 
time to protect domestic producers. 
APEC 
In 1993, leaders of the APEC economies met in Blake Island, Seattle, 
to discuss the progress of liberalisation in the Asia-Pacific area. This 
meeting became a milestone of the forum’s progress, since the 
meeting provided a vision of free trade and investment in the 
region. Even though APEC itself had been formed in 1989, it was not 
until 1993 that APEC formulated a clear picture of what it wanted to 
achieve. A year after the Seattle meeting, another meeting in Bogor, 
Indonesia, set the long term goal of free and open trade and 
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investment in the Asia Pacific. With the Bogor Declaration, APEC 
economies hoped to realize this long term goal in 2010 for 
developed economies and 2020 for developing economies.  
In the following year, APEC leaders meet at Osaka to formalise this 
vision, and in doing so, laid down the framework for liberalisation. 
This framework, known as the Osaka Action Agenda (OAA), 
included nine clearly defined principles for APEC. They are: (1) 
comprehensiveness; (2) WTO-consistency; (3) comparability; (4) 
non-discrimination; (5) transparency; (6) standstill; (7) simultaneous 
start, continuous process and differentiated timetables; (8) 
flexibility; and (9) cooperation. In 1996 these nine principles were 
further emphasised in Manila and, based on this framework, action 
plans were made. These action plans, known as Manila Action Plans 
for APEC (MAPA), served as a map towards the Bogor goal. 
Basically, MAPA was a set of liberalisation initiatives conducted 
either unilaterally or collectively. Unilateral and voluntary 
liberalisation became to be known as Individual Action Plans (IAPs), 
while collective initiatives were called Collective Action Plans 
(CAPs). By promoting these initiatives, it was expected that greater 
benefits of liberalisation would be felt by APEC economies because 
of a widened scope. This widened scope was achieved by allowing 
APEC members to work, firstly, on the goal through the 
simultaneous efforts of their own action plans. But in addition, 
concerted actions by APEC economies would enhance its collective 
capacity to lead global liberalisation. Via MAPA, APEC members 
reinforced the trends of liberalisation by ensuring more transparent 
trade regimes through the IAPs and CAPs, reducing the cost of 
doing business, and strengthening economic and technical 
cooperation in the region.  
Modelling trade liberalisation 
International trade liberalisation in this chapter is modeled using the 
global computable general equilibrium model and database known 
as GTAP. Version 3 of the database is used here because its tariff 
rates represent the situation when the Uruguay Round and other 
regional arrangements were launched in the first half of the 1990s. 
To model the impact of trade liberalisation on Indonesia’s 
agriculture in this global CGE model, the world economy is 
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aggregated into 19 regions (in order to give a detailed coverage of 
the APEC members) and 12 commodity groups (four or them 
agricultural, three other primary sectors, four manufacturing 
sectors, and an aggregated services sector. Five different 
liberalisation scenarios are considered to capture the Uruguay 
Round, AFTA and APEC agreements plus two more with greater 
agricultural reform.  
The first scenario simulates an international trade regime in which 
the Uruguay Round is the only available force of liberalisation. This 
serves as a benchmark for results from other simulations. Three 
different shocks are applied: domestic tax and/or subsidy 
reductions in the agricultural sectors by 20 percent in developed 
countries and 13 percent in developing countries; agricultural export 
subsidy reductions by 36 percent in developed countries and 24 
percent in developing countries; and border tariff reductions, in 
both agricultural and non-agricultural commodities (as specified in 
the GTAP version 3 database). 
The second and third scenarios simulate the additional impact of 
AFTA, in addition to that of the Uruguay Round, on the ASEAN 
economies. AFTA only deals with reductions of import tariffs, 
which apply only to intra-ASEAN trade. Its schedule for completing 
the tariff reductions in 2003 is clearly faster than APEC’s 2010 and 
2020 targets. In our AFTA scenario, border tariffs between ASEAN 
member economies are reduced to zero while tariffs between 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN economies are maintained at the level 
committed for the Uruguay Round. The only difference between the 
second and third scenarios is their treatment of the agricultural 
sectors: in the second scenario, the agricultural sectors are not 
liberalised beyond Uruguay Round commitments, while in the third 
scenario, the agricultural sectors are liberalised for intra-ASEAN 
trade. This allows us to indicate the importance of agricultural trade 
reforms. 
The fourth and fifth scenarios are a combination of the Uruguay 
Round and APEC MFN liberalisations (of zero tariffs in 2010 for 
developed and in 2020 for developing APEC economies, with the 
additional assumption that the latter economies have tariffs of 5 
percent in 2010). Similar to the second and third scenarios, in the 
fourth scenario the agricultural sectors are not liberalised by APEC 
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economies whereas in the fifth scenario they are included in the 
liberalisation.  
The results  
Welfare 
The results show that broader the country participation, the wider 
the sectoral coverage, and the greater the tariff reductions, the larger 
are the welfare benefits of trade liberalisation. The welfare gain for 
Indonesia as a result of participating in the Uruguay Round is 
estimated at about US$3.3 billion per year. The aggregate gain for 
the five large ASEAN countries is US$13.6 billion.  
AFTA does not contribute much to the welfare gains over and above 
what has been achieved by the Uruguay Round, even for the 
ASEAN member economies who get an additional welfare gain of 
just US$270 million on top of the gains from the Uruguay Round. 
Indonesia would get an additional benefit of US$50 million from the 
implementation of AFTA in addition to the Uruguay Round.  
The inclusion of the agricultural reform in AFTA slightly reduces 
the welfare gain for all ASEAN members compared with the 
previous scenario that excludes agriculture: trade diversion is 
outweighing trade creation. However, Indonesia is a gainer as it 
becomes a bigger agricultural exporter within ASEAN. The 
additional welfare gain for Indonesia as a result of including 
agriculture is about US$ 90 billion.  
The additional benefit from implementing APEC in addition to the 
Uruguay Round is much larger than that from AFTA. For Indonesia 
the APEC liberalisation excluding agriculture would boost welfare 
by $530 million per year over and above the Uruguay Round 
benefits. If agriculture also is included in the APEC reform, 
Indonesia is no better off even though most other APEC economies 
are. The reason is that, unlike in the AFTA preferential scenario, 
Indonesia faces competition from other agricultural exporters within 
the APEC region when it involves MFN liberalisation. 
Domestic Production 
The results in Table 3.1 suggest that implementation of the Uruguay 
Round globally would reduce some primary production in 
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Indonesia but would boost its textile and clothing sector enormously 
(although China’s recent accession to WTO is likely to dampen 
apparel growth somewhat) as well as expand slightly its output of 
other manufactures and services. Agricultural output is projected to 
decline further with AFTA if agricultural liberalisation is excluded. 
If agriculture is fully included in AFTA, on the other hand, 
Indonesia’s grain output would boom as new market opportunities 
became available (preferentially) within ASEAN. Under APEC 
reform on top of the Uruguay Round, the final columns of Table 3.1 
suggest that Indonesia’s textile and clothing sector would grow less 
than without APEC reform, reflecting the model’s projected growth 
in competition from China (which in fact is now happening anyway 
because of China’s accession to WTO in December 2001). That 
slower expansion in textiles is offset by the slower contraction of 
mining under APEC. Notice too that the inclusion of agriculture in 
the APEC reform makes little difference to Indonesia. This is 
because agricultural comparative advantage is stronger in some 
other APEC economies, and so the farm expansion that is projected 
under AFTA does not show up when the agricultural reform takes 
the form of most-favoured-nation as under APEC. 
Table 3.1: Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
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      US$ma 
Paddy rice -0.8 -0.8 -1.2 -0.4 -0.7 -51 
Grains 0.5 0.5 31.7 1.0 2.6 22 
Nongrain crops -0.3 -0.4 -1.2 0.0 0.1 10 
Livestock 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.6 52 
Forestry -0.4 -0.6 -0.9 -0.8 -0.6 -16 
Fishing 0.3 3.5 3.3 1.1 1.3 49 
Processed food 0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.6 0.3 77 
Petroleum, coal, 
chemicals 
0.4 0.3 0.1 1.5 1.5 339 
Other mining -11.7 -12.1 -12.2 -9.2 -9.1 -1580 
Textiles/clothing 46.6 47.0 46.4 33.8 33.2 4016 
Other manuf. 0.6 0.3 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 -60 
Services 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 1922 
a Change in value of sectoral output  
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Table 3.2: Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
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      US$ma 
Paddy rice -14.6 -14.8 -16.9 -6.7 145.1 0 
Grains 41.8 42.1 1816.2 44.4 46.7 9 
Non-grain crops 44.0 43.8 42.0 44.9 46.8 976 
Livestock 32.2 32.2 49.6 33.5 30.4 26 
Forestry 9.2 9.0 8.9 18.8 19.7 8 
Fishing 0.2 10.8 10.5 1.9 2.5 29 
Processed food 1.8 2.3 -0.1 -0.5 -2.6 -41 
Petroleum, coal, 
chemicals 
18.1 17.8 17.4 14.5 14.5 563 
Other mining -11.9 -12.3 -12.4 -9.7 -9.6 -1061 
Textiles/clothing 86.2 86.9 86.3 67.6 66.8 4014 
Other manuf. 34.0 33.5 33.0 24.0 24.3 2177 
Services 2.6 2.5 2.2 3.8 3.9 96 
 
Patterns of Trade 
The impact of trade liberalisation on the changing patterns of 
exports and imports are more significant that those of outputs. 
Table 3.2 shows that with all trade liberalisation scenarios, 
Indonesia’s exports increase in all sectors except Other mining, 
and substantially so on non-grain crops, textiles/clothing and 
other manufactures. Similarly, imports of all groups of comm-
odities are expected to increase with trade liberalisation, as 
shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
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      US$ma 
Paddy rice 18.3 18.6 20.0 19.0 6.4 0 
Grains 2.9 3.0 12.3 4.2 -0.0 -0 
Non-grain crops 87.8 88.1 90.2 88.8 90.7 898 
Livestock 12.5 12.7 15.1 11.6 1.7 1 
Forestry 66.0 66.4 66.4 46.8 46.7 10 
Fishing 119.9 121.0 121.1 92.9 92.6 16 
Processed food 31.5 31.8 33.8 19.6 21.1 206 
Petroleum, coal, 
chemicals 
18.1 18.2 18.2 11.4 11.3 910 
Other mining 9.0 9.1 9.0 0.3 0.3 4 
Textiles/clothing 111.8 112.8 112.5 94.6 94.5 1475 
Other manuf. 24.4 24.5 24.5 18.2 18.2 2541 
Services 6.2 6.4 6.6 7.5 7.5 415 
Conclusion 
The result of this study has, in some ways, confirmed results of prior 
studies (e.g., Anderson et. al., 1996) on trade liberalisation in the 
Asia Pacific region. The general point is that the deeper the tariff 
cuts and the wider the product and country coverage of trade 
liberalisation, the bigger the welfare gains. This increase in welfare 
results from more efficient resource allocation. Among the existing 
liberalisation commitments in the Asia Pacific region, the 
implementation of the two biggest commitments, namely the 
Uruguay Round and APEC, would greatly benefit Indonesia. AFTA, 
on the other hand, is expected to contribute little to welfare gain for 
Indonesia. The explanation is that AFTA creates a discriminatory 
trading block in ASEAN, where trade diversion is offsetting 
potential trade creation. This suggests ASEAN would be better off 
economically from pursuing more open and non-discriminatory 
trade liberalisation through APEC or the new round of the WTO. 
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Agricultural liberalisation through APEC is expected to create an 
additional welfare gain for most economies, even though its 
magnitude tends to be small and it varies between economies. Its 
impact on Indonesia is small except under AFTA, where it gets 
preferential access to other ASEAN markets. 
Of course not every sector in the economy would benefit equally 
from trade liberalisation. In the Indonesian case, the biggest gain is 
expected to take place in the textile and garment sector, at the 
expense of the mining sector. Within the agricultural sector, 
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Trade liberalisation and soil degradation in 
Indonesia 
ANNA STRUTT 
This chapter extends the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) 
model to include the effects of land degradation for the Indonesian 
economy. For Indonesia, soil erosion appears to be one of the most 
significant environmental problems caused by agricultural 
production. We simulate the off-site environmental damage and on-
site productivity impacts of erosion, along with the standard 
intersectoral and interregional economic effects of trade 
liberalisation. We then analyse the welfare implications of trade 
policy changes where soil erosion occurs and land productivity is 
reduced.  
Land degradation may have significant adverse effects, particularly 
in developing countries (Scherr and Yadav 1996; Rosegrant and 
Ringler 1997). For example, in countries such as Costa Rica, Malawi, 
Mali and Mexico, soil erosion is estimated to cause national 
economic losses of between 0.5 and 1.5 percent of annual GDP 
(World Bank 1992a). Countries with fragile tropical land are 
particularly problematic, and rural poverty in developing countries 
may force people with no other options to exploit available 
resources beyond their sustainable capacity (Pinstrup-Anderson and 
Pandya-Lorch 1994).  
Indonesia also appears to suffer significant negative effects from 
land degradation, with World Bank estimates suggesting that soil 
erosion on Java costs the economy US$340-406 million per year in 
1989 dollars (Magrath and Arens 1989). Of this, nearly 80 percent is 
due to declines in the productivity of agricultural land. The other 20 
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percent or so is due to off-site costs such as siltation of irrigation 
systems and the loss of reservoir capacity. The estimated cost of soil 
erosion for Java is approximately 0.4 percent of total GDP or 2 
percent of agricultural GDP (Magrath and Arens 1989; World Bank 
1994).1 This is significant for a country that has achieved only a little 
over 2 percent average annual growth in agricultural production in 
recent times.2  
We begin by explaining modifications made to the standard GTAP 
model and our modelling of off-site damage and on-site 
productivity effects for Indonesia. The second section of this chapter 
presents results for our Uruguay Round trade liberalisation 
simulation, including erosion effects. The final section offers 
conclusions and policy recommendations.  
Modelling land degradation in Indonesia 
The environmental links of agricultural production are two-way. 
Agricultural production affects environmental quality and 
environmental quality affects agricultural production. There are 
many interrelated variables and feedback effects, and measurement 
of even the major environmental effects is not easy. We aim to keep 
the task manageable by concentrating on developing environmental 
damage functions for land. These are used with a modified version 
of the GTAP model to examine external costs and the degradation of 
land caused by soil erosion in Indonesia.  
As farmers increase their production, they tend to generate more 
erosion. The erosion damage can cause on-site productivity losses or 
off-site environmental damage. Farmers may respond to the on-site 
productivity effects (Barrett 1991), but are unlikely to take the non-
marketed off-site impacts of their activities into account when they 
make decisions if there are no incentives to do so.  
                                                 
1 However Lindert (1996) finds that there is virtually no evidence of 
productivity loss over many decades of net soil degradation in Indonesia. It is 
possible that farmers respond to minimize the effects of erosion by increasing 
other inputs such as fertiliser.  
2 1990-1996 as calculated from the agricultural production index provided 
in the FAO database (FAO 1997). 
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We modify the standard modelling of land in GTAP to enable land 
to shift between agriculture and forestry then we model both off-site 
environmental damage and on-site productivity effects. Our 
modifications involve minimal changes to the standard version of 
GTAP, while retaining the structure of the model and ensuring that 
the consistency of the benchmark data is preserved. We exploit 
available environmental data without introducing a large number of 
parameters for which no appropriate data exist.  
(a) Transformation of land between sectors 
There is no land allocation to forestry in Version 3 of GTAP. 
However, it appears likely that land does shift between the forestry 
and agricultural sectors (World Bank 1990, Southgate 1990).3 We 
therefore adjust the standard database to allocate some returns to 
forestry land in Indonesia. Returns to land are based on 50 percent 
of value added; this is similar to the value added by land for most 
other agricultural sectors in GTAP.  
GTAP models land as an imperfectly mobile factor of production 
with the mobility described by a constant elasticity of 
transformation (CET) function (Powell and Gruen 1968; Hertel and 
Tsigas 1997). The CET revenue function is analogous to the constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) cost function, but with an Allen 
partial elasticity of substitution less than zero. This restricts mobility 
and enables productivity differences between land used in different 
farm sectors, with land measured in productivity units rather than 
hectares (Darwin et al. 1995). We retain the standard GTAP elasticity 
of transformation function with an elasticity of substitution of -1 for 
all land-using sectors, including forestry. 
(b) Off-site environmental damage 
For resources with no stock feedback effects, environmental 
degradation can be modelled either as a factor of production (López 
1994), or as a joint product in output (Copeland 1994, Tobey and 
                                                 
3 There is some dispute about the extent to which agricultural 
extensification causes deforestation. But even if it is not the major cause (World 
Bank 1994), it is still likely to be significant (World Bank 1990 and Southgate 
1990). 
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Reinert 1991). Off-site effects are modelled here as driven by the 
level of production inputs and technology in the environmentally 
degrading sector. 
Assume there are j sectors, and that the amount of erosion in each 
sector (Ej) depends on the quantity of land used in that sector. Total 
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    and     β jj =∑ 1 . 
The term ej indicates the proportional change in erosion. This 
method of calculating environmental damage follows the innovative 
work of Coxhead and others (Coxhead and Shively 1995; Bandara 
and Coxhead 1995 and Coxhead 1996). When used with the GTAP 
model, it has the important advantage of only requiring estimates of 
jβ  (the share of total erosion contributed by each sector in the 
benchmark year). All other data and parameters necessary to 
determine the change in erosion are available in the standard GTAP 
database. Large changes to the core model and database are 
therefore unnecessary.  
For the non-marketed effects of off-site environmental externalities, 
we append damage functions to the standard GTAP model. We use 
these side-equations to calculate the change in total erosion and the 
resulting off-site damage caused by shifts in land use. Once we have 
estimated the change in erosion, we estimate the welfare costs of the 
non-marketed off-site effects.  
Magrath and Arens (1989) estimate the annual off-site damage 
caused by erosion for Java to be in the range of US$25.6m to 
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US$91.2m.4 However we need estimates of the total off-site erosion 
costs for Indonesia for 1992. Agricultural production is thought to be 
an important determinant of erosion. We use this as a proxy to scale 
up the costs of erosion from Java alone to the whole country. We 
derive estimates of the contribution of each region to production 
from a 1993 disaggregated social accounting matrix for Indonesia 
(Warr and Azis 1997, Table 7). Table 4.1 shows the relative 
contribution of Java (Region 1) to total agricultural crop and forestry 
production. The final row of Table 4.1 indicates that Java contributes 
approximately 50 percent to total agricultural crop and forestry  
Table 4.1:  Contribution of each region to agricultural production 
in Indonesia, by sector  
                                                           (percent) 
 Region 1(a) Region 2(b) Region 3(c) National 
Total(d) 
Paddy rice 63 14 25 100 
Coarse-grains 57 18 26 100 
Non-grain crops 53 26 20 100 
Forestry 3 11 84 100 
Total, agriculture and 
forestry 
49 20 31 100 
 (a)  DKI Jaya, West Java, DIY Yogyakarta, Central Java, East Java and Bali. 
(b)  DIY Aceh, North Sumatra, West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, Bengkulu, South 
Sumatra, Lampung. 
(c) West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggrara, East Timor, West Kalimantan, 
Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi,  
North Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, Maluku and Irian Jaya. 
(d) May not quite sum to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: Derived from Warr and Azis (1997, Table 7). 
production in Indonesia. We therefore estimate the total off-site 
costs of erosion in Indonesia to be in the order of double the costs for 
Java alone. With inflation of almost 10 percent in 1990 and 1991 
(McLeod 1997, p. 199), this places the off-site erosion costs for 
Indonesia in the range of US$62m to US$220m in 1992 dollars. It is 
hoped that this range provides some indication of the magnitude of 
                                                 
4 The off-site costs valued include the siltation of irrigation systems, the 
obstruction and dredging of ports, and reservoir siltation. 
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off-site erosion costs for Indonesia. Other factors such as the 
steepness of slopes, different soil types and high forestry production 
in regions other than Java may increase this estimate. However, the 
impact on reservoir siltation and irrigation systems is likely to be 
lower in the less populated areas outside Java, where there is lower 
emphasis on irrigated rice production.  
We use the high estimate of US$220m per annum to value the cost of 
off-site erosion in Indonesia. This is partly a cautionary approach, 
but also the cost estimates may be understated since they do not 
include all of the potential costs of off-side damage, such as the cost 
of flooding and stream flow irregularities (Magrath and Arens 
1989).5 
(c) On-site adverse productivity effects 
Although soil erosion does not appear to have a major impact on 
land productivity in countries such as the US, it may be a far greater 
problem for tropical countries such as Indonesia. For example, 
average erosion rates in the US are estimated at about 0.7 tons of 
soil/ha/yr. This compares with overall erosion rates in Java of 
around 6-12 tons/ha/yr on volcanic soils and much higher losses on 
limestone soils and agricultural land (World Bank 1990). The high 
erosion rates are mainly due to the level and intensity of tropical 
rainfall, and the loss of ground cover on steep terrain. It is therefore 
important to try to model these production feedback effects to 
capture the adverse impact of on-site soil erosion on land 
productivity in Indonesia.  
We capture the effect of land degradation in our modified version of 
the GTAP model through use of a land quality shifter parameter, 
FBf
j .6 As land quality deteriorates due to erosion, additional units of 
land (and other primary factors) are required to sustain the same 
                                                 
5 Studies for other regions have sometimes found the total off-site costs of 
erosion to be of much higher magnitude than on-site losses in production 
(Crosson 1986). 
6 This is very similar to an exogenous factor-specific technical change 
variable (though erosion and the associated FB f
j  could be determined 
endogenously within the model if suitable data were available).  
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level of output. Use of this feedback parameter mimics the 
deterioration in land quality and productivity when erosion occurs. 
We can now derive sector j’s demand for primary factors in the 
presence of erosion. Three primary factors of production are 
identified in the GTAP Version 3 database: land, labour, and capital. 
These primary factors combine according to a CES production 
technology, which is used to describe substitution possibilities 
between units of primary factors in sector j. The resulting effective 
primary factor input for sector j is then combined with intermediate 
inputs to form the production capability of sector j.   
Given the price of primary factor f in sector j ( Pfj ), profit maximizing 
producers choose the least cost combination of primary factor inputs 











    j = 1, …, n   (3) 
subject to a CES production function 
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1 .  ρ  is a parameter 
greater than or equal to –1; as it approaches zero, it approaches a 
Cobb-Douglas form. X fj is the effective land input (Dixon et al. 1982, 
pp. 76-81 and 1992, pp. 125-6). 
The Lagrangian function is: 
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where Λ  is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions for 
this cost minimization problem are: 
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These conditions are solved to determine the primary factor demand 
equation which is expressed in linear percentage change form as 
(Dixon et al. 1992, p. 125): 
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Lower case letters are used to indicate the percentage change in the 
corresponding upper case variables. Applying the percentage 
change forms of the two equations in (5), we find the primary factor 
demand: 




























































j  = demand for primary factor f by sector j 
z j   =  activity level in sector j 
fbf
j  =  primary factor f-augmenting feedback  
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σ f
j   =  elasticity of substitution between primary factors in 
sector j 
p f
j  =  unit price or rental rate for primary factors used by 
sector j 
S f
j   =  share of primary factor costs in sector j accounted for by 
the cost of primary factor f . 
Equation (7) relates each sector’s demand for primary factors to the 
overall activity level in the sector, to the costs of different types of 
primary factors, and to the feedback variable. Equation (7) indicates 
that if land degradation causes a one percent increase in the land-
specific feedback variable ( fb jj ), then the requirement of land by 
sector j increases by ( )( )1 11− −σ j fjS in order to sustain the given level of 
activity.7 Such a reduction in the quality of land will also induce 
substitution away from land toward the other two primary factors 
(Dixon et al. 1982, p. 82).  
The effects of the feedback variable outlined above necessitate some 
changes to the standard GTAP model and parameters. In the GTAP 
model, the equivalent of equation (7) appears as two types of 
equations. The first describes substitution among inputs within a 
nest. Its form follows directly from the CES form of the production 
function. The second type of equation is the composite price 
equation which determines the unit cost for the composite good 
produced by that branch (Hertel and Tsigas 1997). We adapt both of 
these equations to incorporate feedback effects. The decomposition 
equations appended to the standard model (Huff and Hertel 1996) 
are also changed to capture the impact of the feedback variable 
when decomposing welfare changes. This procedure for 
incorporating environmental damage more explicitly into the GTAP 
model could be generalised to include other forms of environmental 
damage, and also the situation where damage caused by one sector 
adversely affects other sectors.  
For Indonesia, we assume that the adverse effects of on-site soil 
erosion cause a reduction in land productivity in some agricultural 
                                                 
7Assuming that factor prices are constant.  
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sectors. Repetto et al. (1989) calculate average productivity losses to 
be 6.8 percent on erosion-sensitive crops such as maize and 4.3 
percent on less sensitive crops such as cassava. We follow this work 
and assume that the grain sector exhibits a 6.8 percent reduction in 
land productivity. The non-grain crops sector includes staple and 
estate crops. We assume that 50 percent of the crops are erosion-
sensitive, which leads to a 5.6 reduction in land productivity for the 
non-grain crop sector. No adverse productivity effects are assumed 
for other agricultural and forestry sectors.  
Effects of Uruguay Round trade liberalisation 
We model the effects of multilateral trade liberalisation using a 
general equilibrium model closure. This closure captures the 
changes in trade flows and the substitution in production and 
consumption that occurs between commodities. Prices, output levels 
and incomes are endogenous for all regions. Policy variables, factor 
endowment levels and technical change variables are exogenous. 
We aggregate the full 30 region, 37 sector Version 3 GTAP database 
to 6 regions and 17 sectors. The regional aggregation includes 
Indonesia, China, high income APEC economies, developing APEC 
economies, the other high income countries of Western Europe and 
the rest of the world’s developing and transition economies. Tables 
4.2 and 4.3 detail the regional and commodity aggregation. The 
model is implemented and solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and 
Pearson 1996). 
A Uruguay Round-type trade liberalisation is simulated from the 
GTAP 1992 base. Cuts to tariff rates, agricultural export subsidies 
and elimination of the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) quotas are 
needed to generate a credible post-Uruguay Round environment 
from the GTAP protection data (McDougall 1996). Using protection 
vectors that draw on extensive work by the World Bank (McDougall 
1997), we lower tariffs to post-Uruguay Round levels. The export tax 
equivalents of MFA quotas are removed and agricultural export 
subsidies are also reduced. We assume that agricultural export 
subsidies are reduced by 36 percent in developed economies. 
When protection is reduced, interregional and intersectoral shifts in 
economic activity affect welfare. Table 4.4 shows the projected effect 
of Uruguay Round trade liberalisation on welfare. Projected  
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Table 4.2: Regional aggregation in the GTAP model 
Regional Aggregation GTAP Aggregation 
Indonesia Indonesia 
China China 






















EU-3 (Austria, Finland and Sweden)  
EFTA (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland) 
Rest of the world’s 
developing  
and transition economies 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Rest of South America 
Central America and the Caribbean  
India 
Rest of South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
Middle East and North Africa  
Sub Saharan Africa 
Central European Associates (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
Former Soviet Union  
Rest of World 
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Table 4.3: Commodity aggregation in the GTAP model 
Aggregated Commodity  GTAP Commodity 
Paddy Rice Paddy rice  
Processed rice 
Wheat Wheat 
Coarse grains Coarse grains 







Coal, oil and gas Coal 
Oil 
Gas 
Other minerals Other minerals 
Food processing Other food products 




Wood and paper products Lumber 
Pulp paper etc. 
Petroleum and coal Petroleum and coal 
Chemicals, rubber and plastics Chemicals rubbers and plastics 
Non-metallic minerals Non-metallic minerals 
Other manufactured products Primary ferrous metals 
Non-ferrous metals 
Fabricated metal products 
Transport industries 
Machinery and equipment 
Other manufacturing 
Services Electricity water and gas 
Construction 
Trade and transport 
Other services (private) 
Ownership of dwellings 
Other services (govt.) 
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changes in economic welfare, as measured by an equivalent 
variation in income, are shown in the first row.  The welfare 
measures incorporate the effect of on-site environmental damage on 
land productivity. To prepare these results, we run a simulation 
with just the land productivity effects. Including land degradation 
in the model will affect the benchmark data, even with no policy 
changes. The difference between these results and the Uruguay 
Round simulation (including land productivity effects) allows us to 
isolate the results due to trade liberalisation, in the presence of land 
degradation.  
Uruguay Round trade liberalisation is projected to increase welfare 
for Indonesia by US$1.02 billion p.a. The welfare effects can be 
decomposed into four components (see Table 4.4): allocative 
efficiency effects (Huff and Hertel 1996), terms of trade effects 
(McDougall 1993), on-site productivity effects and off-site 
environmental damage.8 Allocative efficiency gains result when 
resources are reallocated into areas of more efficient production. As 
shown in the second row of Table 4.4, Indonesia experiences 
significant gains of US$833m in allocative efficiency. Of this gain, 
US$635m is due to improved allocative efficiency in the textile, 
leather and wearing apparel market when Indonesia reaps the 
benefits of MFA quota elimination. The contribution to welfare of 
changes in the terms of trade are reported to be US$180m in row 4. 
The inclusion of on-site productivity effects for changes in land use 
in Indonesia appears to cause a positive, albeit extremely small, 
change in welfare with trade reform. Row 4 of Table 4.4 shows that 
the productivity effects contribute 0.4 percent to the welfare gain 
from Uruguay Round liberalisation for Indonesia. This small 
positive contribution to welfare is driven by the reduction in 
production, and land degradation, in the large non-grain crop 
sector. Off-site environmental damage increases and leads to a small 
reduction in welfare of less than 0.15 percent. This effect is discussed 
further in the following section. 
 
                                                 
8 The summation of these effects may not equal the total change in welfare 
reported due to marginal utility of income effects. The effects are small in this 
simulation and simply reflect the non-homothetic preferences assumed in the 
standard version of GTAP (Huff and Hertel 1996).  
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Table 4.4:  Welfare effects of Uruguay Round liberalisation for 
Indonesia 
 Change  
(US$m) 
Total change in welfare  1,018 
     Allocative efficiency effects  832 
     Terms of trade effects  180 
     On-site productivity effects  4 
     Off-site productivity effects  -2 
Source: Author’s model results. 
 
 
Change in erosion and off-site damage 
Table 4.5 presents the assumptions used to calculate β j , the share of 
total erosion contributed by each sector in the benchmark year. The 
first column shows estimates of area harvested in each agricultural 
sector in 1992 derived from FAO data (FAO 1997).  
Table 4.5:  Contribution from the agricultural and forestry sectors 
to erosion in Indonesia 










Paddy Rice  11,103 0 0 
Grain  3,629 100 363 
Non-grain staple crops  3,457 100 346 
Non-grain estate crops  10,404 4 45 
Forestry  1,136 80 91 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, drawing on FAO (1997), Magrath and Arens 
(1989), Duchin et al. (1993) and Repetto et al. (1989). 
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Area harvested for forestry is calculated from Duchin et al. (1993, p. 
95).9 Erosion rates for each sector are approximations that can be 
improved as further data becomes available and as the available 
sectoral disaggregation of the GTAP database improves. We 
estimate the average erosion rates shown in column 2 from more 
detailed information presented in Magrath and Arens (1989), 
Duchin et al. (1993) and Repetto et al. (1989). No erosion is assumed 
in the paddy rice sector. Apart from the short-term erosion that 
occurs during the establishment of new ricefields, soil erosion does 
not appear to be an important issue for irrigated rice production 
(Duchin et al. 1993, p. 63). Within the non-grain crop sector, estate 
crops have a significantly lower erosion rate since they are 
predominantly tree crops. Columns 1 and 2 multiplied together give 
an indication of the total erosion contributed by each sector. 
To examine the off-site environmental damage of soil erosion in 
Indonesia, we analyse changes in land use. In particular, we 
examine the shift of land between crops with different rates of soil 
erosion. Table 4.6 reports the projected change in erosion following 
trade liberalisation. The first column shows the initial erosion share 
for each sector. These are the percentage shares in total erosion 
calculated from Table 4.5. The simulated change in land use is 
reported in column 3 of Table 4.6. The final column indicates the 
resulting aggregate change in erosion. Our simulation projects a 0.7 
percent increase in aggregate erosion in Indonesia following 
Uruguay Round liberalisation. Although land use is reduced by 
almost one percent in both the non-grain crop and the forestry 
sectors, it increases by almost three percent in the coarse grains 
sector. The coarse grain sector is a relatively small sector, but it has a 
high rate of erosion which drives this result. 
Given the existing off-site costs of erosion of US$220m we estimated 
above, the 0.7 percent increase in soil erosion projected here 
suggests an increase in off-site erosion costs of US$1.5m for 
Indonesia. Despite using a high estimate of off-site costs, this still 
represents less than 0.2 percent of the projected increase in welfare 
                                                 
9 Forestry output is 24 million cubic metres and average yield of 
production forest is 21.2 cubic metres/ha. If annual deforestation is used 
instead, the figure is very close, with 1.2 million hectares annually (World 
Resources Institute 1994, p. 307). 
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due to Uruguay Round trade liberalisation. Furthermore, the 
erosion increase may be overstated since the comparative statics 
ignore important long run effects and political benefits.10  





share (%)  






43   2.79  1.20 
Non-grain 
crops 
46 -0.93 -0.43 
Forestry 11 -0.78 -0.09 
Total 100 0  0.69 
Source: Author’s model results and Table 4.5, column 3. 
 
Systematic sensitivity analysis 
In a simulation such as that presented here, results often hinge 
crucially on the values of key exogenous inputs. When precise 
information is not available, as in the case of land productivity 
changes, it may be more appropriate to specify distributions rather 
than point estimates. Systematic sensitivity analysis (SSA) is an 
emerging technique that can incorporate information on 
distributions, as opposed to single point estimates, in computable 
general equilibrium models. Arndt (1996) developed the SSA 
technique from recent advances in the area of numerical integration 
and its application to economic problems (DeVuyst and Preckel 
1997). The procedure automates solving the model as many times as 
is necessary (Arndt and Pearson 1996).  
                                                 
10 For example, as world incomes grow, there may be a global 
improvement in soil caused by the shift away from producing staples, 
especially staple grains (Lindert 1996). In addition, significant erosion problems 
are caused by poor households with high discount rates seeking to increase 
immediate food production by using cropping methods that result in high soil 
erosion levels from their rainfed lands (Barbier 1990). Increased incomes may 
reduce these problems. And as land tenure becomes more secure, farmers may 
guard the productive capacity of their land more carefully. 
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We conduct SSA analysis on the land productivity feedback 
parameters used in this chapter. Symmetric triangular distributions 
are assumed: for coarse grains a mean of -6.8 and a minimum value 
of -13.6 are used; for non-grain crops a mean of -5.55 and a 
minimum value of -11.1 are used. The welfare results appear fairly 
robust to the assumptions we make for the on-site productivity 
effects of soil erosion. For example, the mean of the equivalent 
variation in income from Uruguay Round implementation is 
US$1,018 million, and the standard deviation is US$130 million.  
Thus even with the possibility of relatively high land productivity 
losses, we do not expect to see much erosion of the substantial gains 
from Uruguay Round implementation. 
Conclusions and policy implications 
The inclusion of erosion and land degradation in a global trade 
model enables a fuller welfare analysis of the effects of economic 
policy changes. We find that with Uruguay Round trade 
liberalisation, the level of production and soil erosion rises in the 
coarse grain sector but falls in the non-grain crops and forestry 
sectors. Net land productivity changes appear to be positive, since a 
reduction in land use in the large non-grain crops sector should 
improve land productivity. 
Results for the non-marketed off-site effects of erosion suggest that 
there may be a small increase in soil erosion in Indonesia with trade 
liberalisation. This is due to increased land use in the relatively 
erosive coarse grain sector. However, relative to the projected gain 
from trade liberalisation, the cost of damage caused by increased 
erosion appears very low (less than 0.2 percent of the welfare gain 
from trade liberalisation for Indonesia). Systematic sensitivity 
analysis of the key environmental parameters suggests these results 
are fairly robust to assumptions about land productivity losses. 
This chapter attempts to make explicit some of the trade-offs 
between income growth (from trade reform) and environmental 
damage from land degradation. Given the data available, our results 
suggest that the benefits offered by trade reform far outweigh the 
very small overall impact on soil erosion in Indonesia. Of course this 
does not imply that land degradation is not a significant problem for 
Indonesia. We simply suggest that Uruguay Round implementation 
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is not likely to significantly worsen the problem, at least at an 
aggregate level. The most serious effects of land degradation are 
often very location-specific, suggesting that local studies, along with 
ongoing efforts to ensure domestic policies are environmentally 
sustainable, will be important for Indonesia whether or not there is 
further trade reform.  
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Will the Uruguay Round and APEC reforms 
harm air and water quality in Indonesia? 
ANNA STRUTT AND KYM ANDERSON 
Most-favoured-nation (MFN) trade liberalisations will always 
improve global economic welfare even in the presence of 
environmental externalities, provided optimal environmental 
policies are in place (Anderson and Blackhurst 1992; Corden 1997, 
Ch. 13). However, where national environmental standards differ 
markedly between countries and international environmental 
spillovers are significant, globally optimal environmental policies 
will differ from nationally optimal ones. That, plus the fact that in 
many (especially developing) countries the enforcement of 
environmental policies is often less than optimal even from a 
national viewpoint, raises in some people’s minds (e.g., Chichilnisky 
1994) the question of whether liberalising trade between rich and 
poor countries is desirable. To begin to assess whether the standard 
gains from trade are sufficient to outweigh any loss in welfare due 
to added environmental damage, and to foreshadow the need for 
environmental policy changes to accompany trade reforms, 
empirical studies of the resource depletion and environmental 
degradation effects of such reforms are needed. 
This Chapter provides a methodology for doing that and illustrates 
it with a case study of Indonesia, a large newly industrialising 
country that is rich in natural resources and committed to taking 
part in major multilateral and regional trade liberalisations over the 
next two decades. The first section describes how a modified version 
of the global economy-wide model known as GTAP is used to 
project the world economy to 2010 and 2020 without and with those 
         Effects of AFTA and APEC reforms on agriculture   
Table 3.2: Impact of various trade liberalisations on sectoral 
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      US$ma 
Paddy rice -14.6 -14.8 -16.9 -6.7 145.1 0 
Grains 41.8 42.1 1816.2 44.4 46.7 9 
Non-grain crops 44.0 43.8 42.0 44.9 46.8 976 
Livestock 32.2 32.2 49.6 33.5 30.4 26 
Forestry 9.2 9.0 8.9 18.8 19.7 8 
Fishing 0.2 10.8 10.5 1.9 2.5 29 
Processed food 1.8 2.3 -0.1 -0.5 -2.6 -41 
Petroleum, coal, 
chemicals 
18.1 17.8 17.4 14.5 14.5 563 
Other mining -11.9 -12.3 -12.4 -9.7 -9.6 -1061 
Textiles/clothing 86.2 86.9 86.3 67.6 66.8 4014 
Other manuf. 34.0 33.5 33.0 24.0 24.3 2177 
Services 2.6 2.5 2.2 3.8 3.9 96 
 
Patterns of Trade 
The impact of trade liberalisation on the changing patterns of 
exports and imports are more significant that those of outputs. 
Table 3.2 shows that with all trade liberalisation scenarios, 
Indonesia’s exports increase in all sectors except Other mining, 
and substantially so on non-grain crops, textiles/clothing and 
other manufactures. Similarly, imports of all groups of comm-
odities are expected to increase with trade liberalisation, as 
shown in Table 3.3. 
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For the present purpose of projecting the world economy to 2020 we 
use Version 3 of the GTAP database and model of national and 
international markets for all products and countries/regions of the 
world (see Hertel 1997). There are numerous advantages of using 
such a global, economy-wide CGE model even if, as with the GTAP 
model used here, it is comparative static in nature. The economy-
wide approach makes explicit the assumed sources of economic 
growth that expand the demand for and supply of various products; 
it ensures countries can import only what they can pay for through 
exporting or borrowing; and it includes in the base scenario the 
inter-sectoral structural changes that normally accompany economic 
development. The advantage of using a global model rather than a 
national one, even though the primary focus of this Ch. is on results 
for Indonesia, is that the economic growth and structural and policy 
changes of other countries can be incorporated explicitly. This 
ensures that those changes abroad in combination with Indonesia’s 
changes are used to generate new terms of trade for Indonesia. But it 
also allows the resource depleting effects of international events on 
Indonesia to be compared with those effects on other economies. 
World Bank GDP, labor force, investment and population projections 
together with the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 3 
database and model are used to generate market projections to the 
year 2020. The full GTAP model divides the world economy up into 
37 sectors and 30 countries or country groups (including the 16 major 
APEC economies). In order to keep the present analysis and 
presentation of results tractable, however, the database is aggregated 
up to 23 product groups and to 4 other regions in addition to 
Indonesia. 
The GTAP model is a standard comparative-static multi-region 
computable general equilibrium model of the Johansen type that 
began as the SALTER model developed by the Australian 
Government in the 1980s but has been hugely improved during the 
1990s from its current home at Purdue University in the United 
States. The model, which is implemented and solved using 
GEMPACK (Harrison and Pearson 1996), is in use by over one 
hundred researchers in more than 30 countries on five continents. 
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Hence space is not used here to describe its myriad features and 
database.2 
The model utilizes a representation of consumer demands which 
allows for differences in both the price and income responsiveness of 
demand in different regions depending upon both the level of 
development of the region and the particular consumption patterns 
observed in that region. In the simulations presented below, many of 
the East Asian economies are projected to continue to experience very 
rapid economic growth rates (assuming a reasonably rapid recovery 
from the present financial crisis), so that the income elasticities of 
demand play an important role in the model. Non-homothetic 
preferences are captured through use of a constant difference of 
elasticities (CDE) function (Hertel and Tsigas 1997). This lies 
between the commonly used constant elasticities of substitution 
(CES) function and fully flexible functional forms. Such a demand 
system enables non-homothetic demand to be calibrated to replicate 
a pre-specified vector of own-price and income elasticities of 
demand. 
On the supply-side, differences in relative rates of factor 
accumulation interact with different sectoral factor intensities to drive 
changes in the sectoral composition of output. The GTAP production 
system used here distinguishes sectors by their intensities in five 
primary factors of production: land, other natural resources, unskilled 
labor, skilled labor, and physical capital. Thus in a region where 
physical capital is accumulating rapidly, relative to other factors, we 
expect the capital intensive sectors to expand at the expense of 
unskilled labor intensive sectors such as agriculture in East Asia. 
Producers are assumed to choose inputs that minimize production 
costs subject to separable, constant returns to scale technologies. 
Constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions describe 
substitution possibilities between primary factors and market 
clearing conditions equate supply with demand for each factor of 
production. For intermediate inputs, the assumption of a Leontief 
function implies no substitution between different intermediates or 
between them and a composite primary factor.  
                                                 
2 See Hertel (1997, especially Chs. 2 and 3) and McDougall (1997) for 
detailed descriptions of the GTAP model and data base. Updated information is 
available at the following website: http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap. 
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Land and other natural resources (minerals and energy raw 
materials) are assumed to be sector-specific in this study, except that 
some movement of land within agricultural sectors and between 
agriculture and forestry is allowed. It is assumed that 60 percent of 
value added by capital in each of the natural resource sectors is 
attributable to the specific factor (following Arndt et al. 1997). The 
single factor labour in GTAP is split into skilled and unskilled 
labour for this study, whereby the global GTAP database is adjusted 
using recent estimates of labour payments by skill level (Liu et al. 
1997, p. 17).3 A composite capital nest is created for human and 
physical capital, following Arndt et al. (1997).  
The present Ch. follows the methodology used in Hertel et al. (1996) 
and Anderson and Pangestu (1998) but projects the world economy 
from 1992 not just to 2005 but to 2010 before looking at the long-run 
effects of Uruguay Round trade policy reforms to be implemented 
between now and 2005. It does the same from 2010 to 2020, to get a 
more realistic measure of the long-run effects of APEC reforms. We 
use a carefully constructed set of Uruguay Round shocks, to take into 
account the reality that actual reforms in Indonesia and elsewhere, 
particularly for farm products, will be much less than was earlier 
expected, thanks to ‘dirty tariffication’ (see Hathaway and Ingco 
1996). 
Table 5.1 reports the assumed rates of growth in factors and real GDP 
(from which the implied rates of total factor productivity growth may 
be derived) in the reference case for the periods from 1992 to 2010 and 
2010 to 2020. Exogenous projections of each region’s endowments of 
physical capital, unskilled and skilled labor, and population are 
utilized. These are based on combinations of historical data and 
World Bank projections of the growth in population, labor force, real 
GDP and investment.4 It is clear from these estimates that 
                                                 
3 Version 4 of the GTAP data base includes this split between skilled and 
unskilled labour. It will also break out a natural resource input calibrated to the 
target elasticity of supply in resource-constrained sectors (McDougall, Elbehri, 
and Truong (1998). 
4 Growth rates for 1992-2010 are adapted from Anderson et al. (1997) and 
Arndt et al. (1997), while growth rates for 2010-2020 are adapted from the latest 
(at the time) estimates prepared by Christian Bach for the World Bank. 
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Table 5.1: Projected cumulative [and annual] percentage changes 
in GDP and factor endowments assumed for various 


















































































































































Source: Strutt (1998, Ch.4) drawing on Anderson and Strutt (1996), Arndt et al. 
(1997) and, for 2010-2020, Bach (1997). 
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the structure of the world economy will change in a number of 
important ways in this base case, with the developing countries 
constituting a considerably larger share of the global economy by 
2020. Furthermore, given the particularly high rates of savings and 
investment in East Asia, the capital-labor ratios of these economies 
are expected to increase, creating supply-side pressures for changes 
in the composition of output in these economies (Krueger 1977; 
Leamer 1987). The relatively high rates of accumulation of human 
capital in developing economies also are likely to contribute to 
pressures for structural change as developing countries upgrade the 
skill-intensity of their product mix. Taking all these things into 
account and starting with the 1992 baseline, the model generates 
projections of the world economy assuming no changes to existing 
trade and other policies. That base scenario is then compared with 
scenarios involving trade policy reforms. 
For Indonesia, the assumed rates of factor and GDP growth are close 
to government expectations and are in line with past trends. Over the 
13 years from 1980, for example, the population and labor force 
growth rates were a little higher than those being projected here for 
the 18 years to 2010 (1.7 and 2.3 percent historically compared with 
assumed rates of 1.4 and more than 2.0 in Table 5.1), while the rates of 
growth of physical capital and real GDP were a little lower than those 
projected here (7.1 and 5.8 percent historically compared with 
assumed rates of 7.4 and 6.6 in Table 5.1). 
The model can be closed with either gross domestic product (GDP) 
or total factor productivity (TFP) as exogenous targets. Since 
projections for GDP are available, these are imposed on the model, 
while total factor productivity is endogenized. Empirical evidence 
suggests that agriculture has a higher total factor productivity 
growth rate than other sectors (see Martin and Mitra 1996). 
Therefore, the assumption made here is that agricultural 
productivity increases at a rate of 0.7 percent per annum higher than 
other sectors.  
With these and myriad other assumptions including those 
incorporated in the GTAP model (see Hertel 1997), a projection of 
the world economy to 2010 is generated assuming no trade policy 
changes. Then the model is re-run several times: with the Uruguay 
Round being fully implemented; with China first excluded but then 
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included in the WTO (the main difference being whether China is 
excluded or included in getting expanded access to US and EU 
textile and clothing markets -- see Anderson et al. 1997); and then 
with APEC liberalisation commitments also being implemented by 
2020. The scenario for 2010 with the Uruguay Round fully 
implemented is the starting point from which to project the world 
economy to 2020. This too is done assuming no further trade policy 
changes as a base case, and that scenario is then compared with one 
in which the remaining trade barriers of APEC countries are 
removed. Indonesia’s nominal rates of import protection for each 
sector at the beginning of each of these reform scenarios are shown 
in Appendix Table 5A. 
How do all these changes affect the world economy? Even without 
the Uruguay Round being implemented, the real value of global 
output is projected to increase by 65 percent between 1992 and 2010, 
and then by a further 35 percent by between 2010 and 2020 after the 
Uruguay Round is implemented but without any APEC regional 
liberalisation. Developing countries are projected to gain 
enormously in significance, particularly developing APEC 
economies which are projected to more than double their share of 
world output, from 6 to 14 percent during the 1992-2020 period, and 
treble their share of world trade.  
Indonesia in particular is projected to almost treble its contribution 
to world output (from 0.5 to 1.5 percent), to increase its real volume 
of output and trade more than six-fold over the projection period, 
and to change the sectoral shares of its GDP substantially. The latter 
are summarised in Table 5.2. It shows Indonesia’s agricultural and 
other natural resource based sectors continuing to decline in relative 
importance as textiles and other light manufacturing industries 
grow. The grain sectors’ share of GDP is projected to roughly halve 
by 2010, for example, and to fall by a further one-third or more in 
the subsequent decade (columns 5 and 6) – even though the absolute 
level of output keeps rising in these as in all other sectors (columns 3 
and 4). Another example is that while the depletion of natural 
resources continues, forestry, fishing and mining outputs are 
projected to grow much less rapidly than aggregate national output. 
Against these massive structural changes that traditionally 
accompany economic growth, the model’s projected changes caused 
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even by very large policy shocks are relatively modest. Table 5.3 
shows, for example, how much additional impact by 2010 the 
Uruguay Round’s implementation would have on the output of 
different sectors in Indonesia, both without and then with China 
included, and then how much extra impact the APEC reforms to 
2020 would add. Since liberalisation is expected to raise GDP 
growth rates as well,5 we also simulate the APEC reform assuming 
each APEC economy’s annual GDP growth rate over the 20-year 
implementation period (2000 to 2020) is half a percentage point 
higher than in the base case, due to faster total factor productivity 
growth. The impact of these reforms would have to be judged as 
rather small in most sectors, relative to the large changes that 
normal economic growth is projected to generate (compare Tables 
5.2 and 5.3). Nonetheless they bring substantial increases in 
Indonesia’s economic welfare as traditionally measured even by 
comparative static models such as the one used here: the Uruguay 
Round with China included boosts real GDP for Indonesia by 1.4 
percent (or 1.9 percent if China were to be excluded), and the APEC 
reform (to 2020) adds another 1.2 percent – even ignoring the 
likelihood that GDP growth would be accelerated by reform. 
However, such welfare measures ignore changes in resource 
depletion and the environment as a consequence of the increased 
level and changed composition of Indonesia’s output. Many 
environmental groups would claim that adverse resource depletion 
and environmental degradation effects of trade policy reform will be 
substantial, but very few empirical studies have sought to test that 
hypothesis. On environmental degradation, the following section 
suggests a way to examine how the changes in the aggregate level of 
output, the composition of that output and in the inputs and 
technologies used is likely to impact on air and water pollution 
levels. The Ch. then provides some empirical results for Indonesia’s 
environment, followed by a discussion of results on resource 
depletion. 
                                                 
5 See, for example, the theoretical reasons presented in Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), and the rapidly growing empirical evidence presented by 
Baldwin (1992), Dollar (1992), Edwards (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Harrison 
(1996), and USITC (1997) and the references therein. 
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Table 5.2: Percentage changes in sectoral output levels and in 
sectoral shares of GDP due to economic growth, 































Paddy rice 7.5 14.1 87 35 -41 -31 
Other grains 0.8 1.0 23 1 -61 -48 
Non-grain crops 12.4 19.5 58 15 -50 -41 
Livestock 3.2 6.9 113 36 -32 -30 
Forestry 2.5 5.1 100 43 -36 -26 
Fisheries 3.8 7.0 85 23 -41 -37 
Coal 0.8 1.8 124 49 -29 -23 
Oil 7.4 15.8 114 64 -32 -16 
Gas 6.1 12.4 103 59 -36 -18 
Other minerals 3.1 7.1 131 82 -27 -7 
Food processing 24.0 44.7 87 34 -41 -31 
Textiles, clothing, 
leather 
14.1 77.4 449 177 74 42 
Wood products 7.2 12.5 73 32 -45 -32 
Paper products 2.7 11.7 331 132 37 19 
Petroleum & coal 
products 
5.3 18.8 253 121 12 13 
Chemicals, rubber & 
plastics 
9.4 35.8 282 120 21 13 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
1.9 6.8 267 125 17 15 
Other manufactured 
products 
20.0 95.0 375 201 51 55 
Electricity, water & gas 2.8 10.2 268 118 17 12 
Construction 22.1 75.4 241 125 8 16 
Trade & transport 25.0 101.0 304 120 28 13 
Other private services 36.2 142.5 293 114 25 10 
Other public services 8.6 46.9 447 61 74 -18 
Total, all sectors 227.0 769.5 215 95   
a The projections for the period to 2010 maintain initial protection data, while those for 
the period 2010 to 2020 in columns 5 and 7 assume that the Uruguay Round, including 
China, has been fully implemented by 2010. 
Source: GTAP V3 database and authors’ model results. 
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Table 5.3: Percentage changes in sectoral output levels following 
Uruguay Round and APEC trade reforms, Indonesia, 



















of 0.5% pa in 
APEC 
economies) 
Paddy rice -0.6 -0.3 -1.6 5.9 
Other grains 3.2 4.7 14.9 22.6 
Non-grain crops -5.1 -4.6 -13.4 -4.5 
Livestock -0.2 0.1 3.1 13.2 
Forestry -3.4 -1.1 -0.2 9.4 
fisheries -1.1 -0.7 -4.1 5.8 
Coal -12.1 -7.1 18.4 31.1 
Oil -5.4 -3.3 0.6 11.9 
Gas -5.4 -3.4 0.7 11.1 
Other minerals -8.1 -5.2 -1.6 8.3 
Food processing -0.6 -0.3 -1.7 5.8 
Textiles, clothing, leather 61.9 38.5 -2.6 2.9 
Wood products -6.9 -2.4 1.2 11.5 
Paper products -7.8 -3.7 6.7 17.8 
Petroleum & coal products 0.9 0.5 -2.1 7.0 
Chemicals, rubber & 
plastics 
1.1 2.5 9.2 20.8 
Non-metallic mineral 
products 
-7.5 -4.4 23.8 33.6 
Other manufactured 
products 
-19.6 -12.3 -1.9 7.4 
Electricity, water & gas 2.5 1.5 1.1 10.7 
Construction 0.5 -0.1 -1.5 5.9 
Trade & transport -2.4 -1.3 4.9 16.3 
Other private services -2.0 -1.4 1.3 12.1 
Other public services -0.6 -0.5 -1.0 9.3 
Real GDP growth 1.9 1.4 1.2 10.8 
 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
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Adding an environmental module to the projections 
model  
Accompanying economic growth and market reform are changes in 
the scale of output, in tastes, in the relative size of sectors, and in 
inputs and production technologies. These can all affect the level of 
pollution. How can we model these interacting forces and 
decompose the projected changes in environmental degradation to 
determine how they drive environmental change? 
The model providing the projections of structural change and trade 
liberalisation presented above provides a starting point, to which 
needs to be added environmental side modules to analyse the 
implications of these economic changes for environmental 
degradation.6 In this Ch. we use side modules to project 
environmental outcomes in Indonesia for water use, water pollution 
and air pollution. The data for the side modules are based on a 
comprehensive environmental input-output data set prepared by 
Duchin et al. (1993) using data collected in Indonesia for 1985 and 
2020 by industry for various types of environmental degradation. 
The authors use a case study approach to project anticipated 
changes in technology to 2020. Twelve case studies generated data 
reflecting the views of experts assuming a continuation of current 
policies. Specialists such as chemical engineers, hydrologists, 
environmental scientists, energy experts and agricultural scientists 
were consulted on the technologies likely to be adopted in coming 
decades.7 For water use there are data on the volume of water used 
and discharged by sector. Four measures of the water pollution 
content of the effluent are provided: biological oxygen demand 
                                                 
6 The approach of augmenting CGE models with environmental side 
models has been taken by a number of researchers. For example, Bandara and 
Coxhead (1995) look at soil erosion in a single country model. Perroni and 
Wigle (1997) use an innovative side model to analyse global externalities and 
abatement costs with GTAP. There have also been attempts to incorporate 
environmental equations and parameters more directly into a CGE model (for 
example, Xie 1996).  
7 Other scenarios are also presented where the government is assumed to 
place heavier emphasis on environmental protection and resource conservation. 
Since we do not explicitly model improved environmental policies here, only 
the scenario of current trends is used.  
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(BOD), chemical oxygen demand (COD), dissolved solids (DS), and 
suspended solids (SS). The available air pollutant indicators are 
carbon dioxide and oxides of sulphur and nitrogen.8  
Based on the data from Duchin et al. (1993), we assemble a matrix of 
environmental coefficients to estimate the environmental impact per 
unit of economic activity in each sector for 1992, 2010 and 2020 by 
assuming trends in environmental parameters per unit of output are 
linear over the period 1985-2020. The GTAP 1992 benchmark 
database for Indonesia is calibrated to this 1992 matrix of total 
emissions to derive environmental damage coefficients per unit of 
GTAP sectoral output in that base year. The proportional changes in 
these environmental coefficients over time are then multiplied by 
the GTAP 1992 environmental coefficients to obtain GTAP 
environmental coefficients for 2010 and 2020. This approach 
captures the expected change in environmental coefficients in a 
consistent way that is used to augment GTAP analysis.  
Three sources of environmental effects of policy changes are able to 
be identified: the change in the level of aggregate economic activity, 
the change in the contribution of each sector to output, and the 
change in production technology. This decomposition is useful for 
disentangling the causes of changes in environmental damage.9 
Define the total change in pollution ( )P  as the sum of the changes in 









The change in pollution in each sector j is the sum of the “aggregate 
activity” effect ( )Ajo , the “intersectoral composition” effect ( )Cjo , and 
the “technology” effect ( )Tj : 




j= + +  
                                                 
8 Pollution from final consumption by households is not included in the 
model, for want of data.  
9The decomposition developed here is in some ways similar to the “scale”, 
“composition” and “technique” effects of income growth on the level of 
environmental emissions discussed by Dean (1996, 1999). Beghin et al. (1997, 
1999) also discuss such a three-way decomposition. 
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In the aggregate activity effect, increased economic activity leads to 
increased demand for all goods and services and therefore increased 
emissions. The change in output due to the aggregate activity effect 
is the proportional change in aggregate real output in the economy 
( )g  multiplied by the initial output in each sector ( )X j . This gives the 
change in the scale of output in each sector with all sectors growing 
at the aggregate growth rate of the economy. The change in the scale 
of output in each sector is then multiplied by the initial 
environmental coefficient for each sector ( )E jo  to give the change in 
environmental emissions in each sector due to the aggregate activity 
effect: 
A X g Ej
o
j j
o= ∗ ∗  
The second effect is the intersectoral composition effect. Because 
some sectors are more polluting than others, changes in the 
composition of output will change pollution, even if aggregate 
output were to remain constant. The intersectoral effect is measured 
by allowing the composition of output to change while maintaining 
aggregate output at its initial level. Some sectors contract and others 
expand. This has some similarities with Dean’s (1996) composition 
effect, where emissions decrease if income growth shifts preferences 
toward income elastic cleaner goods, but we model the general 
equilibrium-determined intersectoral effects. Both producers and 
consumers respond to the changed incentives, given their 
behavioural functions and the various constraints on the economy. 
Demand and supply of each commodity in each region of the world 
respond to changing relative prices, given the elasticities implicit for 
each sector. The change in sectoral output due to the intersectoral 
composition effect is found by multiplying the initial output in each 
sector by the difference between the proportional change in output 
in that sector ( )x j  and the aggregate proportional change in output 
in the economy ( )g  to give the change in the relative size of each 
sector. This change in the contribution of each sector is multiplied 
by the initial environmental coefficient for each sector to give that 
sector’s change in environmental emissions due to the intersectoral 
composition effect, 0jC , where 
C X xj g Ejo j jo= ∗ − ∗( )  
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Thirdly, there is the “technology” effect, which is modelled using 
Duchin et al.’s (1993) set of environmental parameters reflecting 
expert opinion on anticipated changes to production methods.10 
Changes in technology will change the amount of degradation 
caused by each unit of output in each sector. Total emissions with 
the new coefficients are compared to total emissions with the old 
environmental coefficients in place. The first square bracketed term 
of the following equation reflects the new environmental coefficient 
( )E jn  applied to both the aggregate activity and the intersectoral 
composition components of changes in output. The second square 
bracketed part of the equation reflects the idea that the initial output 
in each sector will also be produced using the new technology and 
will therefore contribute to a change in emissions. 
( ) ( )[ ]T A A C Cj jn jo jn jo= − + − + ( )[ ]X E Ej jn jo∗ −  
where 
A X g Ej
n
j j
n= ∗ ∗  
and 
C X xj g Ej
n
j j
n= ∗ − ∗( )  
However, for policy changes such as trade liberalisation where we 
start from the appropriate updated database, we assume that the 
new technology is in place and that the trade reform itself does not 
change the environmental damage coefficients.  
Empirical projections of environmental impacts in 
Indonesia of structural and policy changes to 2020 
Projected environmental effects due to growth and structural 
changes 
This section uses the detailed environmental side modules to 
analyse some of the environmental implications of first the growth 
                                                 
10 For a discussion of other possible components of the technique effect, 
see Fredriksson (1999). 
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and structural changes projected for Indonesia and then the trade 
policy changes by 2010 and 2020.  
Table 5.2 shows the 1992 and projected 2010 output levels for each 
sector, evaluated at 1992 prices, and the proportional changes in 
output due to structural changes associated with economic growth 
projected over that period, assuming no trade policy changes. 
Changes over the subsequent decade also are shown. With the large 
growth in the economy projected from 1992 to 2010 and 2010 to 
2020, all sectors exhibit increased output levels in Indonesia but 
some expand much more than others. We use environmental side 
modules to estimate the effects of these changes in output on air and 
water pollution. 
Air pollution 
Atmospheric emission changes are estimated for carbon dioxide and 
oxides of sulphur and nitrogen. Table 5.4 lists the initial 1992 level 
and projected new levels of emissions for 2010 without the Uruguay 
Round or APEC being implemented, and 2020 after the Round’s 
implementation but without APEC trade reform. Large increases are 
projected for all of these air pollutants. Since the Indonesian 
economy is projected to grow by 215 percent between 1992 and 2010 
and a by further 95 percent by 2020, this finding is not surprising. 
Carbon emissions increase by 134 percent in the first projected 
period and by 56 percent for the decade to 2020. Sulphur oxides 
increase by 132 and 50 percent and nitrogen oxides increase by 162 
and 65 percent.  
The aggregate output effect increases each sector’s output, while the 
technology and intersectoral composition effects may add to or 
dampen the impact of increased aggregate output on emissions. 
Table 5.5 decomposes these air pollution effects to give a more 
precise indication of the relative magnitudes of the aggregate 
activity, the intersectoral composition and the technology effects. 
The table suggests the aggregate activity effects are the main driving 
force behind the increase in projected emissions, but that the 
intersectoral composition effects of structural change adds to that 
effect for all air pollutants. This is because there is a relatively high 
increase in the contribution to output of high air polluting sectors 
such as the electricity, water and gas sector and the trade and 
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transport sector. Sectors that are not very high air polluters, such as 
agricultural sectors, tend to decline in relative importance.  
While the aggregate activity effect, and to a much lesser extent the 
intersectoral composition effect, increase air pollution during the 
period to 2020, many sectors’ emissions of carbon and oxides of 
sulphur and nitrogen grow less rapidly than output because of 
improvements in energy efficiency. This is shown by the technique 
effect which is negative for all air pollutants in Table 5.5, reflecting 
the improved technologies expected to become available. 
Water use and pollution 
Table 5.6 presents water use and water pollution results, calculated 
for the various sectors using GTAP simulation results and a water 
use and pollution side module.11 Manufacturing sectors face two 
offsetting trends in their use of water. Growth occurs in water-
intensive sectors like pulp and paper, but new technologies for 
conserving water are expected to be adopted over time. Overall 
there is a significant increase in water uptake in the textiles, other 
manufacturing and pulp and paper sectors. Even by 2010 these more 
than double their water use, while household water use increases by 
almost 50 percent. However increases in water use are dwarfed by 
the savings in water uptake for paddy rice, which is the largest user 
of water in our model. That comes from the significantly improved 
efficiencies anticipated in irrigation delivery systems as well as from 
the changing intersectoral composition of output. As a consequence, 
total water withdrawals fall over the projection periods, by 4 percent 
to 2010 and by a further 36 percent by 2020. Between 1992 and 2010, 
we project water discharge to increase by 126 percent, with a further 
29 percent increase by 2020 (column 2 of Table 5.5). The 
decomposition in Table 5.5 shows that the intersectoral composition 
effect augments the aggregate activity effect a little. The relative 
increases are in textiles, pulp and paper and other manufactures, 
which are all large producers of waste water. However, improved 
technologies dampen the effect of increases in water discharged. 
                                                 
11Increases in household water use are taken from estimates in Duchin et 
al. (1993) and entered exogenously, assuming Indonesia’s population increases 
to 263 million by 2020. 
 
 
Table 5.4: Recent and projected levels of atmospheric emissions in base cases, Indonesia, 1992, 2010, and 2020a (kt) 
  1992   2010   2020  
 carbon sulphur nitrogen Carbon sulphur nitrogen carbon sulphur nitrogen 
Paddy rice 1 0.0 0.1 2 0.0 0.1 3 0.0 0.2 
Other grains 16 0.0 0.9 20 0.0 1.1 21 0.0 1.2 
Non-grain crops 241 0.3 14.0 378 0.5 22.0 415 0.5 24.2 
Livestock 310 0.4 17.9 677 0.8 39.1 931 1.1 53.8 
Forestry 246 0.3 14.4 485 0.6 28.3 682 0.8 39.8 
Fisheries 531 0.6 31.1 882 1.1 51.6 1,014 1.2 59.3 
Coal 853 25.2 5.8 956 28.2 6.5 589 17.4 4.0 
Oil 4,463 53.4 31.1 9,187 109.9 64.0 14,244 170.3 99.2 
Gas 4,096 0.8 39.2 6,129 1.2 58.7 7,549 1.5 72.3 
Other minerals 409 11.1 1.5 650 17.6 2.4 837 22.7 3.1 
Food processing 489 13.0 1.8 752 19.9 2.8 890 23.5 3.3 
Textiles, clothing, leather 293 7.7 1.1 770 20.1 3.0 1,160 29.9 4.6 
Wood products 481 12.9 1.8 880 23.6 3.2 1,167 31.3 4.2 
Paper products 217 6.3 1.5 712 20.8 5.0 1,317 38.9 9.7 
Petroleum & coal products 1,305 17.4 8.3 4,047 54.4 25.7 8,302 112.4 52.8 
Chemicals, rubber & plastics 3,330 35.6 26.6 5,930 65.9 47.3 4,867 60.8 38.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 894 25.6 5.4 2,503 73.0 16.8 4,448 131.9 32.5 
Other manufactured products 880 23.0 3.4 1,997 52.0 7.8 2,074 53.5 8.2 
Electricity, water & gas 7,843 168.2 102.8 18,045 347.1 241.6 26,637 434.2 366.8 
Construction 10,547 69.2 37.9 25,007 164.1 89.9 42,587 279.5 153.1 
Trade & transport 10,322 129.8 532.5 30,564 384.5 1,578.4 52,865 665.4 2733.0 
Other private services 193 1.2 0.8 559 3.4 2.2 943 5.7 3.7 
Other public services 709 4.1 2.8 2,882 16.8 11.4 3,724 21.6 14.8 
Total, all sectors 48,668 606 882 114,014 1,405 2,309 177,264 2,104 3,782 
a 2020 levels include Uruguay Round implementation. Source: Authors’ model results
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Table 5.5: Decomposition of changes in pollution as a 
consequence of economic growth and structural 
changes, Indonesia, 1992-2010 and 2010-2020 
 (a) 1992-2010 











Carbon (kt) 65,346 [134] 104,607 10,149 -49,409 
Sulphur (kt) 799 [132] 1,302 214 -716 
Nitrogen (kt) 1,427 [162] 1,897 392 -862 
Water in 
(bm3)b 
-12     [-
4] 
685 -388 -309 
Water out 
(bm3) 
0.8   
[126] 
1.3 0.7 -1 
BOD (kt) 81   [52] 337 176 -433 
COD (kt) 341   [64] 1,149 726 -1,534 
DS (kt) -17 [-46] 79 -47 -48 
SS (kt) 105  [23] 1,002 638 -1,536 
(b) 2010-2020 











Carbon (kt) 63,982  [56] 107,244 16,904 -60,166 
Sulphur (kt) 707  [50] 1,323 276 -893 
Nitrogen (kt) 1,495  [65] 2,165 366 -1,035 
Water in (bm3)b -109   [-36] 296 -167 -236 
Water out 
(bm3) 
0.4    [29] 1.3 1.0 -2 
BOD (kt) -13   [-5] 223 146 -382 
COD (kt) -2   [-0] 822 587 -1412 
DS (kt) -13 [-65] 19 -12 -19.5 
SS (kt) -211 [-37] 545 474 -1231 
a Percentages changes from base case are shown in square parentheses.  
b This does not include the change in household water use. 
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Source: Authors’ model results. 
The water pollution changes we model are biological oxygen 
demand (BOD), chemical oxygen demand (COD), dissolved solids 
(DS) and suspended solids (SS). These emissions are assumed to be 
determined by the quantity of waste water produced. Once we have 
calculated the proportional change in water output for each sector, 
we can estimate the change in water pollution by sector. Because of 
the aggregate activity effect, emissions of all water pollutants except 
for dissolved solids rise between 1992 and 2010 (Table 5.5(a)). 
However, emissions rise by significantly less than the proportional 
increase in total output in Indonesia. This is mainly due to the 
improved technology assumed to be available in 2010. The 
intersectoral composition effect for all water pollutants, with the 
exception of dissolved solids, is positive due to the increased 
relative significance of the polluting industries. The composition 
effect in both projected periods moves production into the sectors 
we model as being the most important producers of water 
pollutants, particularly textiles, pulp, paper, and other 
manufactures. For dissolved solids, the composition effect is 
negative with the reduced significance of the food processing sector.  
For the period to 2010, the assumed technology effect offsets over 80 
percent of the aggregate activity and intersectoral effects for all 
water pollutants. And for the period to 2020, the technology effect is 
sufficiently strong to overturn the positive aggregate activity and 
intersectoral effects to give a net reduction in pollution for all water 
pollutants.  
Projected environmental effects of Uruguay Round and APEC trade 
reforms 
How much difference will it make to those environmental effects of 
economic growth to impose on Indonesia and others some trade 
reforms? The first two columns of Table 5.3 show the proportional 
change in output due to Uruguay Round liberalisation, first without 
and then with the inclusion of China as a WTO member. The second 
pair of columns show the projected sectoral changes in output due 
to APEC liberalisation. Leaving aside the final scenario in which 
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economic growth is assumed to be boosted by APEC liberalisation 
(discussed separately below), some sectors reduce and other sectors 
(continued p.83) 
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Table 5.6: Recent and projected levels of water use and quality in 
the base cases, Indonesia, 1992, 2010, and 2020a  












Paddy rice 313,072 0 0 0 0 0 
Livestock 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Food processing 124 97 21 30 37 49 
Textiles, clothing, 
leather 
102 102 18 72 0 87 
Paper products 217 97 64 217 0 70 
Chemicals, rubber, 
plastics 
5 4 0 0 0 0 
Other manufactures 307 307 54 216 0 261 
Households 10,704 0 0 0 0 0 
Total, all sectors 324,538 608 157 534 37 466 












Paddy rice 300,439 0 0 0 0 0 
Livestock 16 0 0 0 0 0 
Food processing 132 104 12 17 20 24 
Textiles, clothing, 
leather 
278 278 32 127 0 129 
Paper products 519 262 111 402 0 83 
Chemicals, rubber, 
plastics 
9 9 0 0 0 0 
Other manufactures 720 720 82 329 0 334 
Households 15,712 0 0 0 0 0 
Total, all sectors 317,825 1,372 238 875 20 571 












Paddy rice 190,557 0 0 0 0 0 
Livestock 21 0 0 0 0 0 
Food processing 104 82 5 7 7 7 
Textiles, clothing, 
leather 
460 460 37 147 0 115 
Paper products 645 390 115 449 0 37 
Chemicals, rubber, 
plastics 
11 10 0 0 0 0 
Other manufactures 822 822 65 263 0 206 
Households 18,494 0 0 0 0 0 
Total, all sectors 211,114 1,764 223 866 7 365 
a 2020 levels include Uruguay Round implementation. 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
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increase their output level because of trade reform, in contrast to the 
middle columns of Table 5.2 for structural change projections where 
all sectors increase their output. We therefore can expect the 
composition effects to be much stronger relative to the aggregate 
activity effects in these reform cases, in contrast to the growth and 
structural change scenarios discussed above.  
The results in Table 5.3, coming from a global model, include the 
effects on output levels in Indonesia of changes in protection and 
relative prices in other regions. The sector that experiences the 
greatest proportional increase in Indonesia with Uruguay Round 
implementation is textiles and clothing, with a 60 percent boost to 
output anticipated if China is kept out of the WTO, or just under 40 
percent if China is able to join (as indeed it did, in December 2001). 
With additional APEC liberalisation, the effects on the textile sector 
are much less pronounced because MFA quotas are assumed to 
have been already phased out as part of the Round’s 
implementation. The sectors that tend to do well with APEC reform 
are instead the coal and non-metallic minerals -- sectors which 
Indonesia’s own policies tend to discriminate against. The corn 
(coarse grains) sector also is projected to do well. 
What do these output changes do to pollution levels? Again, we 
consider effects on first air and then water, recognising that 
emissions will increase in some sectors and fall in others in response 
to Uruguay Round and APEC trade reforms. 
Air pollution 
Table 5.7 indicates that a reduction in air pollution is projected for 
Indonesia under Uruguay Round liberalisation (including China), 
rather than the increase feared by environmentalists. The reduction 
from 2010 baseline levels is 0.6 percent for carbon and sulphur 
oxides and 1.0 percent for nitrogen oxides. The decomposition in 
Table 5.7 shows that the aggregate activity effect adds to air 
pollution but the change in the intersectoral composition of output 
reduces air pollution by more. 
When the total change in emissions is examined by sector (Table 
5.8), we find that the most significant reduction is contributed by the 
trade and transport sector. The output of textiles rises more than 
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that in any other sector, but since it is starting from a relatively low 
base of air emissions, the increase in air pollutants from this sector is 
more than outweighed by reductions occurring in other sectors. If 
China is not included in the WTO and hence by assumption does 
not liberalise its trade, the reductions in Indonesia’s air pollution 
almost double relative to the reductions shown in Table 5.7 when 
China is included. This is primarily because the Indonesian textile 
and clothing sector does not grow as much when China is included 
and hence that sector does not pull as many resources away from 
other more-polluting sectors. However, the greater carbon and other 
emissions in Indonesia are possibly more than offset by a reduction 
in emissions in China following its accession to WTO and thereby its 
assumed greater access to textile markets in the United States and 
the EU.1 
With additional APEC trade liberalisation, air pollution is projected to 
increase but, as shown in Table 5.9, the increases are only between 2 
and 4 percent. Moreover, a small number of sectors drive the results. 
For example, the trade and transport sector contributes over 45 percent 
of the increase in air pollution (unreported further decomposition of 
results in Table 5.9). This makes it relatively easy to target that pollution 
with environmental taxes to reduce the impact of trade reform on 
emissions, should that small increase be considered a problem. The key 
point to draw from these results, however, is that the air pollutive 
effects of even these major trade liberalisations is tiny (at less than 4 
percent of the base level), and is especially small compared with the 
increases that will accompany normal economic growth and 
structural changes, as can be seen by the numbers in square 
parentheses in Tables 5.7 and 5.9. 
Water use and pollution 
Water withdrawals are reduced by both trade liberalisations. Table 
5.7 shows a reduction in withdrawals of 0.3 percent with Uruguay 
Round implementation, while Table 5.9 shows that water 
withdrawals reduce by a further 1.6 percent with APEC 
                                                 
1 When China is excluded, the group of ‘Other APEC developing 
economies’ (which includes China) expand their output of textiles and clothing 
by only 8 percent following Uruguay Round implementation, whereas with 
China included, that sector expands 25 percent (Strutt 1998, Ch. 5). 
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liberalisation. These water use reductions are largely due to a 
reduction in paddy output.  
Table 5.7: Decomposition of pollution effects from Uruguay 
Round trade reform (incl. in China), Indonesia, 2010  
(percentage change from 2010 baseline level in curved parentheses, 
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Source: Authors’ model results. 

 
Table 5.8: Sectoral decomposition of the total change in emissions due to Uruguay Round implementation, Indonesia, 2010  










BOD (kt) COD (kt) DS (kt) SS (kt) 
Paddy rice -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other grains 0.93 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-grain crops -17.33 -0.02 -1.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Livestock 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Forestry -5.09 -0.01 -0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fisheries -6.35 -0.01 -0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coal -67.89 -2.00 -0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Oil -301.33 -3.60 -2.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Gas -207.77 -0.04 -1.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other minerals -33.86 -0.92 -0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Food processing -2.03 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 
Textiles, clothing, leather 296.17 7.71 1.15 0.11 0.11 12.20 48.81 0.00 49.57 
Wood products -21.47 -0.58 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Paper products -26.13 -0.76 -0.18 -0.02 -0.01 -4.08 -14.74 0.00 -3.05 
Petroleum & coal products 21.45 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Chemicals, rubber & plastics 150.03 1.67 1.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Non-metallic mineral products -108.88 -3.17 -0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other manufactured products -246.05 -6.40 -0.96 -0.09 -0.09 -10.14 -40.55 0.00 -41.18 
Electricity, water & gas 276.08 5.31 3.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Construction -27.51 -0.18 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Trade & transport -385.10 -4.84 -19.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other private services -7.71 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other public services -13.83 -0.08 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total, all sectors -732.75 -7.74 -22.09 -0.78 0.01 -2.05 -6.53 -0.05 5.27 
Source: Authors’ model result
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Most water pollutants also decline with Uruguay Round 
implementation, as shown in Table 5.7. The declines are just under 1 
percent for BOD, COD and dissolved solids, but there is an increase 
of just under 1 percent in suspended solids. For APEC liberalisation, 
Table 5.9 reports a 2.4 percent increase in BOD and COD but 
reductions in solids of between 1 and 2 percent. Thus as with air 
pollution, these results show that trade reform will at most add only 
a very small amount to water use and pollution, an amount that 
would not be discernible alongside the increased BOD and COD 
pollution associated with the general expansion of the economy over 
time. 
Resource depletion 
The impact of trade liberalisation on natural resource depletion can 
be crudely inferred from changes in primary production. In the case 
of the Uruguay Round, the first column of Table 5.10 shows that 
most primary production is reduced by that liberalisation. This 
suggests that less rather than more depletion of Indonesia’s natural 
resources will take place because of the Uruguay Round reforms. Of 
course there are some offsetting changes in other economies, but the 
final column of Table 5.10 shows that in aggregate the changes to 
natural resource use from the Round will be tiny. 
What if trade reform boosts economic growth? 
The above simulations of trade reform are from a comparative static 
model and so do not include the impact that trade reform would 
have in boosting economic growth. Hence it understates the extent 
of pollution that might result. To get a feel of how large that bias 
might be, we re-ran the APEC liberalisation but assumed that APEC 
economies’ GDPs would grow substantially faster (by half a 
percentage point per year over the 20-year implementation period to 
2020) through a boost to their total factor productivity growth. The 
impact of APEC reform including that faster growth on the 
pollution results is shown in Table 5.11, based on the output effects 
summarised in the final column of Table 5.3. Not surprisingly, that 
change in assumption raises the effect of liberalisation on pollution. 
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Table 5.9: Decomposition of pollution effects in Indonesia under 
APEC liberalisation, 2020 (percent change from 2020 
baseline level shown in curved parentheses, percent of 
the 1992-2020 absolute change is in square parentheses) 
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Source: Authors’ model results. 
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Table 5.10: Percentage changes in resource-sector output levels in 
various regions of the world following Uruguay Round 
























Paddy rice -0.3 2.9 -1.3 -1.0 -3.1 0.48 
Non-grain 
crops 
-4.6 4.3 -0.4 2.0 -2.9 0.59 
Livestock 0.1 -1.4 -1.6 0.9 1.2 -0.06 
Forestry -1.1 -0.7 -0.1 -0.0 1.9 -0.03 
Fisheries -0.7 -7.4 0.1 -0.4 5.1 -0.21 
Coal -7.1 -0.6 0.2 -0.3 1.0 0.03 
Oil -3.3 -2.9 0.2 0.1 0.4 -0.04 
Gas -3.4 -1.4 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.06 
Other 
minerals 
-5.2 -5.0 -0.7 -1.4 1.9 -0.39 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
Even so, the numbers are relatively small: air pollution is 12-15 
percent greater and water pollution 6-12 percent greater, than would 
have been the case in 2020 (instead of no more than 4 percent as 
when we assume no growth effect of APEC reform). This amount is 
less than one fifth of the air pollution (and a somewhat larger 
fraction of the water pollution) that would result from the normal 
output expansions and structural changes that would take place 
without reform. Moreover, that extra pollution due to accelerated 
growth is accompanied by a much greater boost to economic welfare 
as conventionally measured than when we assume there is no 
growth effect of trade reform: Indonesia’s GDP in 2020 is 10.8 
percent higher in this growth-enhancing case, compared with only 
1.2 percent higher in the earlier APEC reform case that assumed no 
growth effect. This provides considerable compensation for the extra 
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Table 5.11: Decomposition of pollution effects in Indonesia under 
APEC liberalisation, with 0.5 percent p.a. extra GDP 
growth in APEC economies, 2020  
(percentage change from 2020 baseline level shown in curved 
parentheses, percent of the 1992-2020 absolute change is in square 
parentheses) 
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Source: Authors’ model results.  
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What if we include the impact of East Asia’s growth interruption? 
Chapter two above discusses the impact of an interruption to East 
Asian economic growth in the late 1990s. Here we use the sectoral 
outputs generated in those projections to briefly discuss the 
environmental implications of the slowdown.1 
The growth interruption has significant implications for the change 
in pollution projected from 1992-2005. Table 5.12 compares the effect 
on pollution of the standard projection to 2005 with the interrupted 
growth scenario (2005ig). As anticipated, the much smaller change 
in aggregate output with interrupted growth gives rise to much 
smaller environmental effects. Our assumption is that GDP growth 
rises by only 48 percent over the 13-year period compared with 130 
percent when there is no interruption to growth. The large reduction 
in cumulative growth leads to the significantly reduced aggregate 
activity effects. Intersectoral composition effects  
Also are smaller in magnitude since the Indonesian economy 
undergoes less structural transformation. With less production to 
take advantage of improved technology, the positive environmental 
impact of the technology effects are not as strong in the interrupted 
growth scenario. However, the dominant effect for most pollutants 
is the aggregate activity effect which does lead to less environmental 
damage in the interrupted growth scenario. 
The slower cumulative growth also has implications for the 
environmental impact of the Uruguay Round. Table 5.13(a) shows 
the environmental impact of the Uruguay Round from the standard 
2005 projection, while Table 5.13(b) is for the Uruguay Round from 
the interrupted growth projection. The relative magnitudes of the 
various pollution changes are similar and are still negative for most 
pollutants (for reasons discussed earlier). However the projections 
for the interrupted growth scenario are much smaller in absolute 
terms since the Uruguay Round implementation is now occurring 
from an assumed lower level of economic activity.  
                                                 
1 These projections are only to 2005, therefore results are not directly 
comparable with the 2010 Uruguay Round results reported earlier in this 
Chapter. 
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Table 5.12: Changes in pollution as a consequence of economic 
growth and structural changes, Indonesia (a) 1992-2005 














Carbon (kt) 42,857 63,040 4,897 -25,079 
Sulphur (kt) 533 785 109 -360 
Nitrogen (kt) 926 1,143 218 -435 
Water in 
(bm3)a 
9 417 -210 -197 
Water out 
(bm3) 
0.5 0.8 0.3 -0.6 
BOD (kt) 65 203 83 -221 
COD (kt) 267 692 345 -770 
DS (kt) -11 48 -26 -32 












Carbon (kt) 9,895 23,142 2,398 -15.644 
Sulphur (kt) 105 288 37 -220 
Nitrogen (kt) 217 420 57 -259 
Water in 
(bm3)a 
-58 160 -58 -160 
Water out 
(bm3) 
0.04 0.29 0.82 -0.33 
BOD (kt) -30 75 22 -126 
COD (kt) -85 254 92 -431 
DS (kt) -16 17 -8 -25 
SS (kt) -140 222 74 -436 
a This does not include the change in household water use. 
Source: Authors’ model results. 
Conclusions and future research directions 
If present environmental policies remain unchanged, projected 
economic growth and structural changes over the next two decades 
would, according to the above simulations, add to environmental 
degradation and resource depletion in Indonesia. This is not an 
argument against economic growth of course, but rather for the 
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need to introduce or strengthen the enforcement of environmental 
and resource policies to internalize some of the externalities 
associated with output and consumption expansion. When optimal 
environmental (and other) policies are in place and are continually 
adapted to remain optimal over time, it follows that economic 
growth enhances social welfare. There may be more environmental 
degradation or further resource depletion, but at least those changes 
would be optimal from that society’s viewpoint, given the actual or 
opportunity cost of avoidance or abatement. Likewise, trade reform 
can contribute to environmental damage and resource depletion, but 
again that will not be nationally welfare-reducing so long as optimal 
environmental (and other) policies are always in place.  
A concern of some people, though, is that developing countries’ 
environmental and resource policies may not be optimal even 
nationally, let alone from a global perspective, and that trade 
liberalisation with no change in those environmental and resource 
policies therefore could be bad for the environment. Hence the 
reason in the present empirical study for looking at trade reform 
without changing environmental and resource policies.2 
This case study of Indonesia suggests that trade policy reforms 
slated for the next two decades in some cases would improve the 
environment (at least with respect to air and water pollution) and 
reduce the depletion of natural resources in that country and in the 
worst cases would add only very slightly to environmental 
degradation and resource depletion even without toughening the 
enforcement of existing environmental and resource regulations or 
adding new ones. The increases in pollution, where they occur, are 
driven primarily by a small number of sectors which could be 
targeted with policies to help ensure no increase in emissions. The 
economic gains from the trade reforms and the scope for adopting 
well-targeted environmental and resource policies to reduce any 
serious damage are such that social welfare almost certainly is going 
to be improved by these liberalisations.3 
                                                 
2 For more on modelling the responses of environmental policies to trade 
reforms (something which has not been attempted in the present study), see the 
recent paper on Mexican agriculture by Beghin et al. (1997). 
3 Furthermore, a related study which focuses on land degradation through 
soil erosion and associated off-site damage draws a similar conclusion (see Ch. 
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Table 5.13: Decomposition of pollution effects from Uruguay 
Round trade reform (including in China), Indonesia 
 (a) 2005 and (b) 2005ig 






Carbon (kt) -641 1,266 -1,907 
Sulphur (kt) -7 16 -23 
Nitrogen (kt) -20 25 -45 










BOD (kt) -1.2 3.1 -4.3 
COD (kt) -2.9 11.1 -13.9 
DS (kt) -0.14 0.36 -0.5 
SS (kt) 8.9 8.1 0.8 






Carbon (kt) -452 803 -1,255 
Sulphur (kt) -5 10 -15 
Nitrogen (kt) -12 15 -27 
Water in (b. m3) -2.4 3.5 -5.8 
Water out (b. m3) 0.012 0.008 -0.004 
BOD (kt) -0.4 1.7 -2.1 
COD (kt) -0.02 6.2 -6.2 
DS (kt) -0.19 0.28 -0.48 
SS (kt) 8.1 4.4 3.6 
Source: Authors’ model results 
                                                                                                                                               
4 above). That study incorporates feedback effects of that damage on land 
productivity and thereby is able to value the loss of production associated with 
that erosion. Again using GTAP to model the effects of implementing the 
Uruguay Round agreements, the study finds that the aggregate output 
expansion and shift in its composition does add slightly to soil erosion, but that 
the cost of the damage caused by that increased erosion is miniscule, amounting 
to less than 0.2 percent of the national economic welfare gain (as traditionally 
measured) from the Uruguay Round liberalisation. This is not inconsistent with 
the finding by Lindert (1996) that there is virtually no evidence over many 
decades of net soil degradation in Indonesia. 
96 Indonesia in a reforming world economy 
Our study uses environmental side modules to focus primarily on 
one country’s resources and environment. We set up a framework 
or modelling and decomposing the major environmental impacts 
of growth and policy reform in as transparent a way as possible. 
The results presented indicate sectors of particular concern, given 
available environmental data and our choice of model.4 Needless 
to say, caution should be used in interpreting the above results, 
particularly given the still poor quality of much environmental 
data. For example, there are sectors and types of environmental 
damage that are not adequately represented here5 and 
considerable humility is needed, given the limits on our 
knowledge of many environmental parameters (Martin 1999). 
However, aggregate studies such as this can provide an overview 
of the anticipated trade-environment interactions. Such work will 
clearly be complemented by studies at the local level to examine 
issues or sectors of particular concern. Micro studies by 
multidisciplinary teams will be an important input to improving 
future national and global studies (Anderson and Strutt 1996). 
 
Use of a global trade model means it is possible to make inferences 
about the effects of trade reform on the environment and resources 
in other countries as well. The natural resource impact of the 
Uruguay Round can be seen in Table 5.10 to be positive rather 
than negative in most regions. It is negative mainly in Western 
Europe (‘Other high-income economies’), where resource policies 
are well developed and could easily be adapted to cope with any 
undesired increase in exploitation. And it happens that when 
environmental damage occurs in Indonesia because of the change 
in the composition of its output following trade reform, damage to 
the environment of other countries is often lessened. Consider, for 
example, what happens if China is given greater access to US and 




4 There are of course more sophisticated methods of projecting economic 
growth, using endogenous growth and incorporating imperfect competition and 
scale economies.  
5 For example, the most excessive pollutant in Indonesian rivers is faecal 
coliform which exceeds recommended standards by more than a thousandfold in 
some places (World Bank 1990, p. xxxi). We have not been able to include this in our 
present analysis. Nor have we accounted for the human health effects of pollution (as 
was done for Chile in Beghin et al. 1999). 
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may reduce Indonesia’s capacity to expand exports of light 
manufactures and so keep resources in more-polluting activities in 
Indonesia -- but it may mean China moves away from some of its 
very pollutive coal-intensive heavy manufacturing, thereby 
potentially reducing not only local air pollution in China but also 
global warming. Those environmental effects for other countries and 
globally could be quantified by extending the environmental side 
modules developed here for Indonesia to the other countries and 
regions included in the GTAP model. 
 
As improved environmental data become available, improved 
modelling of pollution across countries will be facilitated. For 
example, future versions of the GTAP database will have an 
upgraded energy component that will enable improved modeling of 
air pollution across all regions.6 Direct inclusion of emissions and 
abatement activities in the GTAP model may eventually be desirable, 
rather than having just side modules.7 Among other things, the 
model could then be modified to enable induced substitution 
towards less environmentally damaging output and the adoption of 
less-polluting technologies when environmental taxes are imposed or 
increased. Endogenizing environmental policies to income growth,8 
trade policy changes and changes in pollution, and including 
consumption pollution by various types of households (only one 
household exists in the present model), would be other useful 
extensions. Modified versions of the model could also be used to 
examine the economic effects of underpricing environmental or 





6 The weakness of the energy data in version 3 of GTAP led us to not focus 
particularly on energy in the current work. Those data have since been improved, 
and the process of incorporating them directly into the GTAP model is explained in 
Malcolm and Truong (1999). 
7 This will be particularly important for environmental degradation which 
impacts on production. Strutt in Ch. 4 above focuses on land degradation in 
Indonesia and by incorporating the feedback effects of erosion damage on land 
productivity, she has been able to value the loss of production associated with that 
erosion. 
8The reasons for expecting citizens to seek a tightening of environmental 
standards and regulations/taxes on pollution and resource depletion as incomes rise, 
at least after middle-income status is reached, have been canvassed by, among 
others, Selden and Song (1994), Grossman and Krueger (1995), and Hettige, Mani 
and Wheeler (1998). 
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most countries: what would happen to world markets and the 
environment if all, or a subset of countries, created property rights 
over water or otherwise properly charged for water?  
The policy debate will increasingly demand informed answers to 
questions on the environmental effects of international agreements, 
and the environmental-economic interactions are too complex for 
adequate answers to be forthcoming without formal modelling. 
However, our ability to model environmental impacts is not as well-
developed as is our modelling of the traditional welfare effects of 
economic policy changes. Given the current paucity of many types 
of environmental data, only modest environmental modules may in 
many cases be appropriate, at least until more progress is made in 
estimating environmental damage functions. A global model such as 
GTAP seems an appropriate base from which to add environmental 
side modules or, better still, to build environmental data, equations 
and parameters directly into that economic model. The subsequent 
challenge will be to place monetary values on the environmental 
changes, as is attempted in Cole, Rayner and Bates (1998). Clearly 
this topic has a rich future research agenda, and one which is likely 
to be added to as the World Trade Organization moves into the next 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations.  
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Appendix Table 5A: Import tariffs without and with Uruguay Round 
liberalisation, by sector, Indonesia, 2010 (percent) 
 2010 base 2010 after UR 
Paddy rice 9.0 9.0 
Other grains 0.0 0.0 
Non-grain crops 54.7 38.3 
Livestock 4.8 4.8 
Forestry 14.4 14.4 
Fisheries 29.8 29.8 
Coal 5.0 5.0 
Oil 0.0 0.0 
Gas 5.0 5.0 
Other minerals 4.9 4.9 
Food processing 12.3 11.3 
Textiles, clothing, leather 28.7 22.5 
Wood products 34.4 31.0 
Paper products 8.0 8.0 
Petroleum & coal products 4.7 4.7 
Chemicals, rubber & plastics 6.6 6.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 14.1 12.9 
Other manufactured products 15.6 15.4 
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Electricity, water & gas 0.0 0.0 
Construction 0.0 0.0 
Trade & transport 0.0 0.0 
Other private services 0.0 0.0 
Other public services 0.0 0.0 
Source: GTAP database and authors’ model results. 
 
6 
Impacts of agricultural protection growth at 
home and the WTO’s Doha Round on 
Indonesian agriculture 
KYM ANDERSON, ERWIDODO, TUBAGUS 
FERIDHANUSETYAWAN AND ANNA STRUTT 
There is a mixture of views within East Asia about agricultural trade 
reform and hence about its inclusion in the Uruguay Round agreements 
and subsequent negotiations under the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). On the one hand, governments in the wealthier densely 
populated countries are under pressure to continue to protect their 
farmers from import competition and to be seen to be providing an 
adequate degree of food security. In the countries with a stronger 
comparative advantage in agricultural products, on the other hand, 
governments are keen to secure more access to markets for their farmers' 
exports.1 This difference of views within East Asia surfaces periodically 
in APEC as well as WTO fora. Since it is mirrored in other parts of the 
world too, agriculture is guaranteed to be a controversial part of the 
Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations, just as it was in the 
Uruguay Round.  
Given the high degree of distortion in world food markets that existed in 
the 1980s (Tyers and Anderson 1992), every impartial observer agrees 
that one of the great achievements of the Uruguay Round (UR) was to 
start to bring agricultural policies under GATT discipline, and to agree 
                                                 
1 The recent financial crisis in East Asia strengthened the agricultural 
comparative advantage of several developing countries in the region, as capital 
withdrawal effectively 're-agriculturalised' these economies soimewhat (Anderson 
and Strutt 1999). 
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to return to the negotiating table by the turn of the century.2 Following 
the signing of the UR accord in 1994, non-tariff barriers to agricultural 
imports have been tariffied and bound and the tariff bindings are 
scheduled for phased reductions. As well, farm production and export 
subsidies also have been reduced, mostly between 1995 and 2000 (with 
developing countries having an extra four or more years). That UR 
Agreement on Agriculture, together with the SPS Agreement (to limit 
the use of quarantine import restrictions to cases that can be justified 
scientifically as a risk to human, animal or plant health) and the Dispute 
Settlement Agreement (which has greatly improved the process of 
resolving trade conflicts), hopefully means that agricultural trade will be 
less chaotic in future than prior to the formation in 1995 of the new 
WTO. Much remains to be done, however, before agricultural trade is as 
fully disciplined or as liberal as world trade in manufactures.  
This chapter has four main parts. It first explores empirically the scope 
for further gains from liberalising agricultural markets in OECD 
countries, both absolutely and relative to the welfare gains from cutting 
those countries’ barriers to imports of textiles and other manufactures. 
The second section explores what is likely to be included in the next 
agricultural negotiations. We then ask if the likelihood of the Doha 
Round delivering sizeable agricultural protection cuts and benefiting the 
world’s poor (the vast majority of whom are developing country 
farmers) would be significantly greater if negotiations include protection 
cuts for other sectors and at least some of the new issues on the WTO’s 
agenda. The fourth section examines whether rule-making efforts to 
accommodate new issues should be de-linked from the agricultural 
negotiations on border measures, rather than simply included under the 
three headings used in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(import market access, export subsidies, and domestic support). The 
latter approach may be more expedient, but it prolongs the day when 
agriculture is fully integrated with other sectors in the WTO. In the final 
section of the chapter we list the next steps needed, as we see it, to 
maximize the chances through WTO disciplines of keeping the 
agricultural reform process going. 
 
                                                 
2 On the long history of exceptional treatment of agriculture in the GATT, see 
Josling, Tangermann and Warley (1996). 
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The potential gains from further agricultural policy reform 
The post-1950s period saw substantial growth in agricultural protection 
and insulation in the advanced industrial economies and its subsequent 
spread to newly industrialising economies (Johnson 1973; Anderson and 
Hayami 1986; Lindert 1991; Tyers and Anderson 1992). That tendency 
accelerated in the 1980s to the point where some protectionist countries 
went beyond self-sufficiency to generate surpluses that could be 
disposed of only with the help of export subsidies. While this led to 
serious budgetary pressures and increasing domestic opposition to the 
cost of agricultural support policies, protection growth none the less 
continued. Traditional agricultural-exporting countries thus insisted that 
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations must focus on 
reversing this agricultural protection trend. The Round’s Agreement on 
Agriculture that resulted from that effort has altered the climate of farm 
policy making, to the point where reforms in OECD countries—e.g., 
attempts to shift from price and trade measures to more direct forms of 
farm income support—have laid the foundations for reducing 
international price-depressing assistance to farmers. 
The Uruguay Round is scheduled to be fully implemented in all sectors 
and regions by 2005. At that time, what will be the potential for further 
gains from reforming agricultural markets of OECD countries compared 
with the gains from protection cuts in other sectors? That question has 
been addressed in a recent paper that make use of the global economy-
wide model known as GTAP. Anderson, Hoekman and Strutt (2001) use 
Version 3 of GTAP to project the world economy to 2005 following full 
implementation of the Uruguay Round. Their estimates of the extent of 
distortions to world trade that will remain in 2005 is given in Table 6.1, 
assuming China and Taiwan joined the WTO by then (as indeed they 
have). According to those estimates, the agriculture and processed food 
sector will still be a major anomaly. Globally, it has twice the import tariff 
average of textiles and clothing and nearly four times that for other 
manufactures. At the same time, significant distortions to farm production 
and exports will still be in place if no further policy reforms occur. The 
pattern of distortions will still differ between regions, with the numbers in 
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parentheses in Table 6.1 showing OECD countries subsidising, and 
developing countries taxing, farm production and exports.3  
What is the economic significance of these projected distortions in the 
different sectors? That depends not only on the size of those ad valorem 
price wedges but also on the value society places on the production and 
consumption distortions induced by them. Those quantity distortions 
depend largely on the value of production of each sector and the 
importance of its products in consumption. Table 6.2 provides an 
indication of the relative importance of the various sectors in regional 
and world production, consumption and trade.  
Consider first the effects of removing distortions to OECD country 
markets for (1) agriculture and processed food, (2) textiles and clothing, 
(3) other manufacturing, and (4) all goods combined, and then for (5) all 
developing economies' goods markets, and finally for (6) all OECD and 
developing economies' goods markets together.4 
The welfare consequences of these alternative comparative static 
scenarios are summarised in Table 6.3. If both OECD and developing 
countries were to liberalise all their goods markets in 2005 post-UR, 
these results suggest global welfare would be greater by US$260 billion 
per year.5 Almost one-third (32 percent) of the estimated global gains  
                                                 
3 Version 4 of the GTAP data base gives lower estimates of protection levels for 
2005 than Version 3, but the relativities across sectors are quite similar in the two 
version. See Hertel and Martin (1999, Table 3). On reasons for this pattern of distortions 
across countries, including its anti-trade bias, see Anderson (1995). There are of course many 
other distortions to markets that are not captured in Table 6.1, the most notable being those 
affecting services trade and government procurement. Until estimates of the extent of those 
latter distortions are available for a wide range of countries, however, their magnitude or 
effects cannot be compared with those that are captured in Table 6.1. 
4 The relatively very small economies of ‘Former Soviet Union and Central 
Europe’ and ‘Rest of the World’ are assumed not to change their policies in these 
scenarios. 
5 This is a gross underestimate of the aggregate gains from trade liberalisation 
for several reasons: because services and government procurement policies are 
excluded; because no account is taken of the benefits of increasing the degree of 
competition and the scope for scale economies; because of the high degree of 
regional and product aggregations in the version of the model used; and because the 
dynamic growth-enhancing consequences of reform are not captured. Those 
omissions may not distort greatly the estimated relativity of the gains from reforming 
the various markets for goods, however. 
108  Indonesia in a reforming world economy 
 
Table 6.1: Post-Uruguay Round tariffs (and agricultural production 
and export subsidies)b, various country groups, 2005 
(percent) 









1.Western Europe 30 (2, 21) 0 11 4 
2.NAFTA 15 (3, 2) 0 18 7 
3.Australia + New Zealand 3   (0, 0) 0 25 9 
4.Japan + Korea 57 (-2, 0) 3 9 4 
5.China, Hong Kong, Taiwan 22 (-5, 0) 1 2 2 
6.Southeast Asia (ASEAN) 19 (-3, -3) 3 15 11 
7.South Asia 19 (0, 0) 8 55 29 
8.North Africa + Middle East 24 (-4, 0) 19 38 24 
9.Sub-Saharan Africa 13 (-1, -9) 10 18 9 
10.Central + South America 12 (-1, -1) 6 27 18 
11. Central Europe + FSU 8   (0, 0) 1 6 5 
12.Rest of the World 50 (-1, -7) 23 60 28 
All OECD economies (1-4)  36 (1, 7) 1 14 6 
All developing econs. (5-10) 20 (-2, -2) 6 12 11 
ALL ECONOMIESa (1-12) 29 (0, 3) 2 14 8 
a Includes ‘Former Soviet Union+Central Europe’ and ‘Rest of World’  
b Production and export subsidy rates for agriculture are shown in parentheses in column 1. 
Source: Anderson, Hoekman and Strutt (2001). 
 
from goods trade liberalisation are estimated to come from agricultural 
reform in OECD countries – even though farmers in those countries 
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contribute only 4 percent of global GDP and less than one-tenth of world 
trade (see Table 6.2).  
Textiles and clothing reforms appear to pale by comparison with farm 
reform: their welfare contribution is only one-eleventh that of 
agriculture’s. The reasons for this big difference are several. One is that 
distortions to prices for agriculture are more than twice those for textiles 
and clothing, according to Table 6.1. Another is that the latter products 
contribute only 1.5 percent to the value of world production and 5 
percent to the value of world trade, half or less the shares for farm 
products (Table 6.2). But two assumptions made by the modellers also 
contribute to this result. One is that it is assumed China and Taiwan join 
the WTO before 2005 and enjoy the same accelerated access to OECD 
markets under the UR Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) as 
other developing countries that already are WTO members. The other 
crucial assumption is that OECD countries fully implement the ATC. 
The latter is far from certain to happen though, particularly if China 
were to join the WTO soon and be given more access to textile markets 
in the next five years. Dropping either of those assumptions reduces 
very substantially the estimated gains from Uruguay Round 
implementation (Anderson et al. 1997b), and therefore would raise the 
potential gains from textile and clothing reform in the Doha Round. 
Even so, agricultural protection would remain far more costly to the 
world economy than barriers to textiles and clothing trade – and more 
costly even than protection to other manufactures, despite the latter 
having much bigger shares in the value of world production and trade 
than farm products. 
The WTO membership was right, therefore, to insist that OECD 
agricultural reform must continue into the new century without a pause. 
Developing countries have a major stake in that process continuing: 
according to the above GTAP results, the farm policies of OECD 
countries are almost as harmful to developing economies as their own 
trade-distortionary policies. Certainly OECD textiles and clothing 
policies harm them greatly, but less than half as much as OECD farm 
policies (middle row of Table 6.3). Barriers to OECD imports of ‘Other 
Manufactures’, by contrast, actually help developing economies. The 
reason is that those trade restrictions lower international prices of those 
products, thereby improving the terms of trade of developing countries.  

 
Table 6.2: Sectoral shares of GDP, post-Uruguay Round in 2005, of private household consumption in 1995, 
and of trade in 1997                                                (percent) 











SECTORAL SHARES OF 
REGIONAL GDP: 
      
All OECD economies  5 3 0.8 19 72 100 
All developing economies 19 9 4.4 16 52 100 
ALL ECONOMIESa 8 4 1.5 18 68 100 
REGIONAL & SECTORAL 
SHARES OF GLOBAL GDP: 
      
All OECD economies  4 2 0.6 15 58 80 
All developing economies 3 1 0.7 3 8 16 
ALL ECONOMIESa 8 4 1.5 18 68 100 
SHARES OF REGIONAL 
HOUSEHOLD ONSUMPTION 
      
All OECD economies  11 0 b 18 71 100 
All developing economies 30 1 b 24 45 100 
SECTORAL SHARES OF 
WORLD TRADE: 
9 9 5 57 20 100 
 a Includes ‘Former Soviet Union and Central Europe’ and ‘Rest of the World’, hence is not just the weighted sum of rows 1 and 2. 
b Included with 'Other Manufactures'. 
Source: Anderson, Hoekman and Strutt (2001) and Hertel and Martin (1999), calculated using the GTAP model. 
 
 
Table 6.3: Effects on economic welfare (equivalent variation in income) of removing distortions to various 
goods markets post-Uruguay Round, major economic regions, 2005b 
  (percent, and 1992US$ billion p.a. difference from post-UR base case in 2005) 
Contribution from removing distortions in OECD economies’ markets for: 












distortions in all 
goods markets of 
OECD economies 




distortions in all 




Net benefit from 
removing 
distortions in all 




($ billion p.a.) 
       
























ALL ECONOMIESa 32 3 27 62 38 260 
 a Includes ‘Former Soviet Union and Central Europe’ and ‘Rest of the World’, hence is not just the sum of OECD and developing 
economies. 
b Numbers in parentheses are the percentage of each result that is due to the change in the terms of trade, most of the rest being the 
change in allocative efficiency. 
Source: Anderson, Hoekman and Strutt (2001), using the GTAP model. 
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Welfare decomposition of the GTAP results shows that three-
quarters of the loss to developing economies from OECD countries 
removing restrictions on their imports of ‘Other Manufactures’ is 
because of the raised international price of these products (see 
numbers in parentheses in Table 6.3). 
Furthermore, Anderson, Hoekman and Strutt (2001) find that each 
of the major developing-country regions benefits in terms of real 
income gains from OECD agricultural policy reform. The net gains, 
on a per capita per year basis, range from $1 in South Asia to $4 in 
Southeast Asia, $6 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and $30 in Latin America. 
The gains per farm household in those regions would be many times 
greater, however, after consumers losses are subtracted from the net 
national gains.  
Even for the OECD economies themselves, despite the fact that 
agriculture and food represent only about 5 percent of their GDP, 
abolishing their remaining agricultural protection in 2005 would 
contribute more than one-quarter of their welfare gains from 
liberalising all goods trade globally – and more than two-fifths of 
the gains from liberalising trade in all goods in the OECD alone.1  
What to include in the agricultural negotiations of the 
next WTO round 
Given the enormous potential for gains from farm trade 
liberalisation, there is great pressure from farm-exporting countries 
to ensure further substantial agricultural reforms occur in the next 
few years. Japan and Korea, however, remain reluctant to embrace 
further reform. The European Union, too, is finding it difficult to get 
a consensus for more than modest reform of its Common 
                                                 
1 By contrast, textile and clothing trade reform appears to harm OECD 
economies slightly. Recall that VER quotas on developing country textile and 
clothing exports are scheduled to be replaced by OECD import tariffs on those 
goods by 2005 under the Uruguay Round’s ATC. The very considerable 
projected efficiency gains from subsequently lowering those tariffs in the next 
WTO round are just slightly more than offset by the rise in the international 
price of those goods, according to the welfare decomposition results 
summarised in parentheses in Table 6.3. 
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Agricultural Policy under its Agenda 2000 (on which its WTO 
negotiating position will be based -- see Tangermann 1999). 
How should the next round of agricultural negotiations proceed? 
The fact that (often discriminatory) farm export subsidies are still 
being tolerated continues to distinguish agricultural from industrial 
goods in the GATT, a distinction that stems from the 1950s when the 
United States insisted on a waiver for agriculture of the prohibition 
of export subsidies. Moreover, even by the turn of the century farm 
export subsidies need be only about one fifth lower than they were 
in the late 1980s to comply with the agreement. True, the budgetary 
expenditure on export subsidies is to be lowered by 36 percent from 
the base period, but for some commodities it may be only the agreed 
cut in the volume of subsidised exports (21 percent for industrial 
countries, 14 percent for developing countries) that bites because 
international food prices are now higher than in the base period, so 
exportable surpluses can be disposed of with lower subsidy outlays.  
The extent of reductions in bound tariffs by the end of the decade 
will be even more modest than for export subsidies: the unweighted 
average tariff cut must be 36 percent (24 percent for developing 
countries), but it could be less than one sixth as a weighted average, 
since each tariff item need be reduced by only 15 percent of the 
claimed 1986-88 tariff equivalents (10 percent for developing 
countries).2 
Moreover, the claimed tariff equivalents for the base period 1986-88, 
and hence the initial tariff bindings, are in many cases far higher 
than the actual tariff equivalents of the time. The European Union, 
for example, has set them on average at about 60 percent above the 
actual tariff equivalents of the CAP in recent years, while the United 
States has set theirs about 45 percent above recent rates – and 
developing countries are even more involved in the practice (Ingco 
                                                 
2 Tangermann (1994) gives the example of a country with four items 
subject to tariffs, three sensitive ones with 100 percent duty rates and one with a 
4 percent duty. Reducing the three high rates to 85 percent (a 15 percent cut) 
and eliminating the 4 percent rate (a 100 percent cut) would give an unweighted 
average cut of 36.25 percent. This would meet the requirement for an 
unweighted average cut of 36 percent and minimum cuts per item of 15 percent, 
but it would allow high protection on sensitive products to remain and it may 
increase the dispersion of rates. 
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1995, 1996). ‘Dirty’ tariffication has two consequences. One is that 
actual tariffs may provide no less protection by the turn of the 
century than did the non-tariff import barriers of the late 
1980s/early 1990s. The other consequence of binding tariffs at such a 
high level is that it allows countries to set the actual tariff below that 
but to vary it so as to stabilize the domestic market in much the 
same way as the EU has done in the past with its system of variable 
import levies and export subsidies -- and has continued to do since 
1995 (Tangermann 1999). This means there has been little if any of 
the reduction in fluctuations in international food markets this 
decade that tariffication was expected to deliver.  
It is true that some countries have agreed also to provide a 
minimum market access opportunity, such that the share of imports 
in domestic consumption for products subject to import restrictions 
rises to at least 5 percent by the year 2000 under a tariff quota (less 
in the case of developing countries). But that access is subject to 
special safeguard provisions, so it only offers potential rather than 
actual access (another form of contingent protection). As well, 
market access rules formally introduce scope for discriminating in 
the allocation of import quotas between countries, where within-
quota imports attract a much lower tariff than above-quota imports. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the administration of such quotas 
tends to legitimize a role for state trading agencies. When such 
agencies have selling rights on the domestic market in addition to a 
monopoly on imports of farm products, they can charge excessive 
mark-ups and thereby distort domestic prices easily and relatively 
covertly -- just as such agencies can hide export subsidies if they are 
given a single-desk selling monopoly. There are thus elements of 
quantitative management of both export and import trade in farm 
products now legitimized under the WTO, including scope for 
discriminatory distortions to trade volumes as well as prices.  
The third main component of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture is that the aggregate level of domestic support (AMS) 
for industrial-country farmers is to be reduced to four-fifths of its 
1986-88 level by the turn of the century. That too will require only 
modest reform in most industrial countries because much of the 
decline in the AMS had already occurred by the mid-1990s. This has 
been possible because there are many forms of support that need not 
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be included in the calculation of the AMS, the most important being 
direct payments under production-limiting programs of the sort 
adopted by the US and EU. A risk that needs to be curtailed is that 
the use of such “blue box” instruments, as with exempt “green box” 
instruments such as quarantine and environmental provisions, may 
spread to other developed countries and other commodities as farm 
income support via trade and direct domestic price support 
measures become WTO-constrained.  
Given the limited progress over the past five years in making 
agriculture more market-orientated, the first priority for the next 
WTO agricultural negotiations must be to further that process. That 
may not be as difficult to agree to now as it was when the Uruguay 
Round was being launched, given unilateral farm policy reforms in 
the United States and -- at least to some extent -- in the EU and 
Japan during the mid-1990s (IATRC (1997, Chs. 1, 2 and 6) and 
Tracy (1997)).  
Nothing less than a ban on farm export subsidies is needed to bring 
agriculture into line with non-farm products under the GATT. With 
respect to domestic subsidies, an early decision needs to be taken as to 
whether to strengthen or abandon the attempt to constrain domestic 
policies under the WTO. Even though a plausible case can be made 
for the latter (Snape 1987), the Cairns Group may well decide to 
pursue the former. The ‘blue box’ items, containing the US and EU 
direct payments to farmers who restrict their output or at least some 
inputs, were granted exemption through to 2003 from challenge 
under the Blair House agreement as a way of moving the Uruguay 
Round talks forward. But with the policies of the US and EU 
gradually being reformed for internal reasons in recent years, and in 
particular with the further de-coupling of farm income support 
measures from production as with America’s FAIR Act of 1996, it 
may be possible to remove the ‘blue box’ in the next round of talks. 
Then efforts to tighten the ‘green box’ criteria could be made, so as 
to reduce the loopholes they provide for continuing output-
increasing subsidies, and to further reduce the Aggregate Measure 
of Support. One of the possible benefits of getting countries to 
commit to reduce further their AMS is that it will encourage them to 
make more of their policies conform to the ‘green box’ criteria, the 
rewards for which are exemption from the AMS and avoidance of 
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challenge (IATRC 1997, Ch. 11). That in turn makes it all the more 
important that the ‘green box’ criteria are tightened such that policy 
instruments so exempted are not in practice encouraging further 
production. 
The third and perhaps most important area requiring attention has 
to do with import market access. Tariffication has made restrictions to 
imports much more transparent, but the degree of ‘water’ currently 
in those tariffs exaggerates the barriers and makes most bindings 
ineffective. The combination of dirty tariffication by developed 
economies and the adoption of very high ceiling bindings by 
developing economies allows countries still to vary their protection 
as they wish in response to changes in domestic or international 
food markets. Getting those bound tariffs down from 50-250+ 
percent to the 0-15 percent range of tariff rates for manufactures is 
the challenge ahead. If the steady rates of reduction of the past are 
used, it will be several decades before that gap is closed. 
At least three options for reducing tariffs on farm products present 
themselves. One is a large across-the-board tariff cut. Even if as 
much as a 50 percent cut by, say, 2005 is accepted, however, that 
would still leave some very high tariffs. A second option is the 
“Swiss formula” used for manufactures in the Toyko Round, 
whereby the rate of reduction for each item is higher the greater the 
item’s tariff level. This has the additional economic advantage of 
reducing the dispersion in rates that was introduced or exacerbated 
during the Uruguay Round. And a third option is the one used 
successfully in the information technology negotiations, namely, the 
“zero-for-zero” approach whereby, for selected products, tariffs are 
eliminated altogether. In contrast to the second option, this third 
option would increase the dispersion of tariffs across products, 
increasing the risk that resources will be wastefully diverted from 
low-cost to higher-cost activities. While that might appeal as a way 
of allowing attention to then focus on the politically difficult items 
such as dairy and sugar, the manufacturing sector experience with 
long-delayed reductions in protection of textiles and cars makes it 
difficult to view this option optimistically as a quick solution. 
The above tariff reductions refer to out-of-quota imports. There is 
also a pressing need to focus on in-quota imports, that is, those that 
meet the minimum access requirements in the UR Agreement on 
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Agriculture (generally 5 percent of domestic sales by 2000 for 
developed economies). Agricultural-exporting countries are 
understandably reluctant to suggest the tariff-rate quota (TRQ) be 
removed, because the TRQ provides at least some market access at 
low or zero tariffs3. Nor would allowing TRQs to be auctioned be 
seen by all as a solution, because that would be like imposing the 
out-of-quota tariff on quota-restricted trade that the TRQ was 
designed to avoid.  
Perhaps the best alternative to banning TRQs is to expand them, so 
as to simultaneously reduce their importance, increase competition, 
and lessen the impact of high above-quota tariffs. One can imagine 
an outcome that is either optimistic or pessimistic from a reformer's 
viewpoint. On the one hand, the optimists would say: if the TRQs 
were to be increased by, say, the equivalent of one percent of 
domestic consumption per year, it would not be very long in most 
cases before the quota became non-binding. Expanding the TRQ 
could thereby be potentially much more liberalising in the medium 
term than reducing the very high out-of-quota tariffs. Such an 
approach may require binding within-quota tariffs at a reasonable 
level (such as that for manufactures), and perhaps allowing 
countries not to have to reduce those bound within-quota tariffs 
before the quota becomes redundant. 
Negotiators familiar with the tortuous efforts to reform the quota 
arrangements for textiles and clothing trade, on the other hand, see 
the agricultural TRQs as yet another MFA: a multilateral food 
arrangement!4 Since the first inception of textile quotas was around 
1960, it looks like it will take fifty years or so before they are finally 
abolished. If that is the expected lifetime of agricultural TRQs, a 
strong case could be made by the Cairns Group and others for the 
total elimination of agricultural TRQs (along with export subsidies 
and credits) and a radical reduction in bound (out-of-quota) tariffs. 
The quid pro quo could be to give up on trying to discipline farm 
domestic supports: the almost infinite scope for re-instrumentation 
makes that very difficult anyway and, as Snape (1987) has pointed 
                                                 
3 Nearly 1,400 TRQs have been notified to the WTO so far, about 200 of 
which are country-specific rather than global. On the complexities of TRQs, see 
Skully (1999). 
4 Credit goes to Joe Francois for suggesting that aconym. 
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out, constraints on border measures would ensure the cost of 
domestic supports was exposed via the budget and thereby 
subjected to regular domestic political scrutiny.  
The above agenda for those seeking more liberal agricultural 
markets will be resisted by those seeking a continuation of special 
favours for protected agricultural sectors. The latter are forming 
coalitions with other groups to find reasons/excuses for not 
lowering trade barriers and/or to lobby for interventions abroad 
that would raise their competitors’ costs. The key issues being raised 
by these groups that are likely to be more prominent in the next 
WTO negotiations than in the Uruguay Round, are discussed below. 
In assessing the implications of these priorities for farm and trade 
policies, the following should be kept in mind: that where there are 
several policy objectives, typically an equal number of policy 
instruments is required to deal efficiently with them; that the most 
efficient policy instrument for achieving a particular objective will 
be that which addresses the concern most directly; that trade 
measures in particular are rarely the most efficient instruments for 
addressing non-trade concerns; and that trade reforms will be 
welfare-improving so long as optimal domestic interventions are in 
place to deal with those non-trade concerns.5 
The claim is often made that a high level of food self-sufficiency is 
necessary before a nation feels food-secure. This is inconsistent with 
the usual definition of food security though, which is that everyone 
always has access to the minimum supply of basic food necessary 
for survival. Lower rather than higher consumer prices for food 
would by that definition boost the number of food-secure people, 
suggesting lower import barriers and export subsidies should be 
called for.  
However, becoming more dependent on food imports does raise 
questions about the preparedness of exporters to always supply 
foreign markets. For that reason, food importers may call for 
stronger disciplines on the exceptions to GATT Article XI.1 which 
prohibits export restrictions other than export taxes. For example, 
GATT Article XI.2(a) permits temporary quantitative export 
restrictions to relieve critical food shortages in an exporting country. 
                                                 
5 What follow draws on Anderson (1998b). 
120  Indonesia in a reforming world economy 
 
True, the URAA’s Article 12 added some discipline to that 
provision, requiring that due consideration be given to the effects of 
such a restriction on WTO members who are food importers, that 
such affected members be consulted, and that the WTO be notified 
of the nature and duration of the restriction. Even more discipline 
could be called for in the Doha and subsequent rounds. For 
example, if it were shown that in the past longer-term customers 
were being served first and charged less in years of shortfall, 
agricultural-exporting countries could be asked to cease that 
practice and instead provide non-discriminatory access to their 
supplies of basic foodstuffs at all times.  
In addition to concerns about food security, there are also concerns 
about food safety. The demand for higher quality, safer food rises 
with per capita incomes. However, perceptions about the safety of 
different foods and food production and processing methods, and 
conformity assessment procedures, differ greatly -- even among 
countries with similar income levels. These differences can be 
exaggerated when groups with an economic interest in trade 
restrictions join forces with extremist lobby groups pushing for 
excessive food safety measures. The rapid rise in media hype over 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) is a clear case in point: it 
has fueled consumer concerns in Western Europe to such an extent 
that this issue may well be on the agenda for the next agricultural 
negotiations in some form. Developing countries' farmers are 
concerned for different reasons: because intellectual property 
protection in their country is so poor that producers of GM seeds 
may not sell the new varieties to them, causing their agricultural 
comparative advantage to diminish; and because some high-income 
countries may erect barriers to prevent GMOs originating in 
developing countries from penetrating their markets. For the sake of 
farmers and consumers everywhere, and to reduce uncertainty for 
R&D firms seeking to invest further in GMOs, it is imperative that 
rules and standards governing trade in GMOs be clarified. 
Why agriculture needs other sectors and “new trade 
agenda” issues in the Doha Round 
The probability of the next WTO round delivering significant 
agricultural reforms and thereby benefiting the world’s poor (the 
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vast majority of whom are developing country farmers) will be 
greater if negotiators include protection cuts for other sectors and 
perhaps some of the new issues on the WTO’s agenda.  
Textile reform should be included, not least to reduce the likelihood 
that OECD countries renege on current obligations under the 
Uruguay Round's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing. The above 
simulation results suggest that further textile reform would give a 
major welfare boost to developing economies. It would boost the 
manufacturing exports of the most densely populated of Asia's 
developing countries. But since they in turn would then import 
more farm products, reductions in textile barriers indirectly also 
boosts the farm sectors of other countries.6 
In return for reducing barriers to agricultural and textile markets in 
rich countries, developing countries would be leant on to liberalise 
their manufacturing and services markets and their government 
procurement procedures. The welfare gains to developing country 
agriculture (and the overall economy) from such non-farm policy 
reform could well be as large as those countries' gains from farm 
policy reform by OECD countries. This is because of the direct 
impact those reforms would have on developing countries' farm 
input costs and the cost of services required to market their farm 
outputs, as well as the standard indirect general equilibrium effects 
on the cost of mobile labour and capital of reducing assistance to 
highly protected non-farm sectors. 
As for new trade agenda issues, their inclusion in the Doha Round is 
considered by some (including East Asian developing country) 
negotiators as undesirable because it would distract their attention 
from the current agenda items. On the other hand, however, their 
inclusion would have the advantage that more non-agricultural 
groups would take part in the round which could counter-balance 
forces favouring agricultural (and other sectoral) protection. As 
well, better rules on some of those new issues would reduce the risk 
of farm trade measures being replaced or made ineffective by 
                                                 
6 Similarly, if China were to be admitted to the WTO, and in the process 
restrained from raising protectionist barriers to farm imports and given more 
access to US and EU textile markets, the agricultural sectors of other East Asian 
countries would benefit (Anderson et al. 1997a,b). 
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domestic agricultural measures and technical barriers to trade that 
may be almost as trade-distorting – a risk that has grown 
considerably in recent years (Anderson 2000; Roberts, Josling and 
Orden 1999).  
The decline in traditional trade barriers will cause attention to focus 
increasingly on the trade-impeding effects of domestic regulatory 
regimes. This is what has given rise to the so-called “new trade 
agenda.” It revolves around policies such as the setting and 
enforcing of product standards, state-trading, subsidy regimes, 
export controls, competition law, and government procurement 
practices. Such policies can effectively distort competition, even if 
applied on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
Virtually all these new issues have relevance to the agricultural 
liberalisation agenda. The Uruguay Round negotiations on 
agriculture focused only on some of them, notably production 
subsidies and product standards. In the Uruguay Round progress 
was made in designing rules for the application of sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPS), and disciplining the ability of 
governments to grant agricultural production subsidies. However, 
disciplines are either weak, country-specific or nonexistent in many 
other areas, including the extra-territorial application of production 
process standards and competition-related policy and regulation. 
The latter include the nexus of state-trading, export taxes and 
cartels, and intellectual property (broadly defined to include 
indications of geographic origin, traditional expressions, breeder’s 
rights and seed varieties). 
While attempts to discipline and regulate the use of domestic 
subsidies under GATT auspices have been pursued for decades with 
little success, somewhat greater progress was made in the Uruguay 
Round with sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) standards. The SPS 
Agreement seeks to ensure that any SPS measures are imposed only 
to the extent necessary to ensure adequate food safety and animal 
and plant health on the basis of scientific information, and are the 
least trade-restrictive measures available to achieve the risk 
reduction desired. Although there is substantial “wiggle room” in 
the wording of disciplines, consultations between WTO members 
are leading to conflict resolution in numerous cases. The dispute 
settlement evidence to date shows that exporting countries can 
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succeed in obtaining rulings against the most egregious cases of 
protectionist abuse of standards (Roberts 1998). A problem that 
confronts developing countries in this area, however, is that they 
may find it difficult to satisfy partner countries that their domestic 
institutions can be trusted to enforce the required standards. 
Alternatively, such institutions may not be able to perform testing 
and certification functions effectively without imposing significant 
burdens on trade. 
The focus of GATT/WTO negotiations has always been on 
increasing the contestability of markets by reducing/eliminating 
discrimination against foreign products and producers. One way to 
apply this rule of thumb to the new trade agenda is to seek to extend 
the reach of the non-discrimination principle to issues such as 
subsidies, competition legislation, foreign investment regimes, and 
government procurement practices. In all these areas governments 
are currently free to pursue discriminatory policies, and often do.  
Liberalising foreign investment and extending the national 
treatment principle to foreign suppliers of goods and services would 
have a significant impact in terms of  “leveling the playing field”. 
An open investment regime in general, complemented by a 
commitment to apply national treatment to the supply of service 
sectors in the GATS context would go a long way in making markets 
more contestable. Investment liberalisation is already on the agenda 
of the GATS for service sectors, as nations can make specific 
commitments on market access and national treatment for foreign 
providers who seek to establish a “commercial presence”, that is, to 
engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). This approach could be 
extended to investment more generally, including in agriculture 
where restrictions are often very severe (as in Indonesia).  
Why “new trade agenda” issues for agriculture should be 
treated generically 
Should rule-making efforts to accommodate the new issues be de-
linked from the agricultural negotiations on border measures? A 
suggestion by Josling (1998) is to incorporate all the new issues as 
they apply to agriculture under the three headings used in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, viz. import market 
access, export subsidies, and domestic support. While such an 
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approach may be more expedient, it simply prolongs the day when 
agriculture is fully integrated with other sectors in the WTO. While 
that separation remains, WTO rules are less clear, and exceptional 
(i.e, less-liberalising) treatment is encouraged. Thus a more generic 
approach to the new issues should be entertained. 
Conceptually, the matter is relatively clearcut: what is required is a 
determination as to whether domestic policies that have detrimental 
effects on foreign suppliers can be justified on public interest 
grounds. More specifically, it can be asked whether a more-efficient, 
less trade-distorting policy instrument can be identified to achieve a 
particular objective. If so, the presumption would be that the 
measure can be contested. Of course, making this basic economic 
principle operational in the international context is not 
straightforward, not least because in practice measures may be 
pursued because a nation has the power to influence the terms of 
trade in its favour, and because there will always be differences in 
opinion as to whether alternative instruments are feasible or not.  
Snape (1987) has argued that, with respect to subsidies, 
governments should be left free to pursue whatever domestic 
policies they wish -- an argument that can be extended to regulatory 
policy more generally. A rationale for this argument is that in 
practice it is impossible to determine when subsidies are 
economically “legitimate” in the sense of offsetting market failures 
or being the least-cost instrument to pursue certain non-economic 
objectives, and that governments and interest groups will always be 
able to identify instruments that are not subject to multilateral 
disciplines to pursue their aims. The result of pursuing multilateral 
disciplines is then a never-ending process with uncertain benefits.  
This argument is unlikely to be acceptable to policymakers, 
however. If negotiations on domestic policies are to be pursued, 
though, a strong case can be made that specific rules just for 
agriculture are not necessary. Consider four sets of examples. 
Domestic subsidies 
Agreements on subsidies (and countervailing duties) should apply 
to all sectors of economic activity equally. The WTO Subsidies 
Agreement is supposed to be reviewed in 1999. Currently, that 
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agreement takes a similar approach to the Agriculture Agreement 
and defines a set of general non-actionable subsidies. These include 
support for research, aid for disadvantaged regions, and assistance 
to firms adapting plants to new environmental measures. 
Disciplines in the area of services are yet to be developed and are 
likely to figure on the agenda of the prospective negotiations on 
services. Given a general desire by WTO members to define clearer 
rules on subsidy practices, efforts should be made to merge the 
agricultural disciplines with those applying to other merchandise 
and to be developed for services, so that a common set of rules and 
principles emerge. 
Competition policies, including state trading 
Similar arguments apply to competition policies. For example, many 
countries have government-sanctioned single-desk selling 
agencies/export monopolies for agricultural commodities, and the 
activities of such entities have become a concern to the international 
community. State trading was considered a relatively minor aspect 
of policy among the original signatories of the GATT, and is not 
subject to serious constraints under GATT law. Partly this reflects 
the fact that it was most prevalent in agriculture⎯a sector that 
remained largely outside the purview of multilateral discipline until 
the Uruguay Round. However, with the re-introduction of 
agriculture in the WTO, the adoption of multilateral disciplines for 
services (GATS), and the prospective accession to the WTO of many 
economies in transition, state trading has become a higher-profile 
issue that is part of the much bigger complex of policy questions to 
do with the conditions of competition in markets.  
Two distinct approaches currently are pursued in the WTO 
regarding state trading (Hoekman and Low 1998; Ingco and Ng 
1998). The first is to subject the behaviour of such entities to 
multilateral disciplines such as nondiscrimination and transparency, 
enforced through WTO dispute settlement (Art. XVII of GATT). The 
second is to negotiate on national treatment and market access on a 
case-by-case basis (Arts. XVI and XVII of GATS). As it stands, 
Article XVII is worded quite broadly and potentially covers a wide 
range of activities, but its disciplines are weak. Specifically, STEs are 
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simply to abide by MFN and not to impose price mark-ups on 
domestic sales that exceed the relevant tariff bindings. 
The issue of STEs is a subset of the more general problem of dealing 
with the possible anti-competitive effects of entities with dominant 
positions or exclusive rights and privileges. In the recent WTO 
agreement on basic telecommunications, a set of pro-competitive 
regulatory principles were adopted by countries that require the 
establishment of independent regulatory authorities to monitor the 
behaviour of dominant telecom suppliers and ensure 
interconnection on the basis of cost. Efforts to extend the reach of 
such principles more broadly to both STEs and other firms with 
exclusive rights should be pursued, with common rules applying to 
all such entities whatever the sector of activity in which they are 
engaged.  
Technical standards, including SPS measures 
Many countries use very blunt quarantine instruments such as 
import bans that excessively restrict imports well beyond what is 
necessary for protecting the health of their plants and animals (and 
citizens in the case of food safety concerns). For example, there are 
outright bans on imports of many products, including from 
agricultural-exporting countries seeking to preserve a disease-free 
image. The levels of protection involved are in some cases 
equivalent to tariffs of more than 100 percent.7 Without some form 
of notification requirement on WTO members that forces them to 
disclose the degree to which trade is restricted by such measures, 
reform in this area is likely to be confined to the very small 
proportion of those cases that are brought before the WTO’s dispute 
settlement body. The expense of such legal proceedings and the time 
involved in concluding each case ensures the pace of reform by that 
means alone would be glacial. 
Perceptions about the safety of different foods and food production 
and processing methods, and conformity assessment procedures, 
                                                 
7 See James and Anderson (1998) and Roberts and DeRemer (1997). The 
latter study reports more than 300 technical barriers to imports in 63 countries 
that are believed to threaten, constrain or block almost US$5 billion of US farm 
exports. 
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differ greatly even among countries with similar income levels. The 
WTO Dispute Settlement case between the US and EU on beef 
hormones showed that differences of opinion on standards are 
difficult to resolve even with the best scientific advice. Other 
examples are irradiated food, cheese made from unpasturised milk, 
and genetically modified organisms (Mahe and Ortalo-Magne 1998, 
Henson 1998). Increasingly over time such issues will arise under 
the Uruguay Round’s SPS and Technical Barriers to Trade 
agreements. But they will also arise in other, non-agriculture-related 
contexts. As with state-trading, subsidies, and competition and 
industrial policies more generally, here again there is a strong case 
for developing common disciplines for all types of products, 
whether agricultural or not. There is nothing special about food as 
compared to, say, regulation of dangerous chemicals or heavy 
metals which may enter into the production and disposal of 
manufactured goods. 
Environmental standards 
Attempts to “export” environmental or social standards have 
become particularly controversial in recent years. Agriculture’s 
contribution to the natural environment is most probably negative 
in a net sense. Some claim that it is adding to biodiversity and the 
landscape by preserving, for example, hedgerows in Europe, but 
that could be done simply by paying some landowners not to 
destroy their hedgerows. Others in rich countries claim that farmers 
need to be compensated for adopting less-environmentally 
damaging farming practices. This pay-the-polluter idea is the 
opposite of the OECD-sponsored polluter-pays principle, whereby 
farmers would be taxed according to the extent of the damage their 
practices cause.8  
Of major importance to developing country exporters of farm 
products is the erection of trade barriers against foreign products 
because of the way they are produced. Mexico won its case at the 
GATT against the US ban on imports of tuna that were deemed to be 
caught in nets unfriendly to dolphin, and the shrimp/turtle case had 
                                                 
8 Presumably it is rationalised as subsidising the use of an abatement 
technology that provides a positive externality, but that logic ignores the source 
of the abated damage in the first place. 
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a similar outcome, but both cases have made the GATT/WTO very 
unpopular with environmental groups. Developing countries will 
need to continue to argue against import restrictions being allowed 
on products produced by methods not liked by importing countries 
– otherwise there would be no end of restrictions being imposed on 
such grounds (Anderson 1998). As with all the other issues 
discussed in this section, there is no need or rationale for 
agriculture-specific approaches. The issues are generic; rule-making 
(and opposition to certain types of rules) should also be general in 
nature. 
Final remarks 
Traditional agricultural market access liberalisation should continue 
to be the key priority issue for developing countries. From an 
agricultural perspective, attention should focus also on reducing 
protection granted to manufacturing and services industries in 
developing countries themselves, as protection in those sectors 
bestows a significant anti-agricultural bias in many low- and 
medium-income economies, making it more difficult for them to 
benefit from the agricultural trade reform of OECD countries. Those 
reforms can be done unilaterally, but the WTO offers an opportunity 
to obtain a quid pro quo, and can be a useful instrument through 
which to lock in such reforms. As far as the multilateral agricultural 
agenda is concerned, the focus should be on further reducing 
agricultural protection in industrialised countries so as to give 
developing country farmers better access to export markets.  
The next stage of agricultural reform will, however, be conducted in 
an environment in which globalisation forces (including ever-faster 
international transfers of information, ideas, capital, skills and new 
technologies) will be having ever-stronger impacts on markets but 
simultaneously may trigger sporadic policy backlashes. Examples of 
the former forces affecting agriculture include the new genetically 
engineered crop seeds that are part of the biotechnology revolution 
in the seed and pesticide industries. Both industries are also 
experiencing surges in economies of scale which, together with the 
liberalisation of the world’s financial markets over the past 15 or so 
years, is encouraging rapid expansion of foreign direct investment 
by large multinational corporations. The WTO is a contributor to 
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that expansion (e.g., in providing more secure property rights for 
seeds through the TRIPs agreement). The privately optimal 
international location of production may well change in non-trivial 
ways as a result, bringing forth new forces for adjustment. The 
current East Asian financial crisis reminds us that in stressful 
circumstances governments may be tempted either to embrace the 
forces of change and facilitate efficient and rapid adjustment to the 
new market-driven circumstances, or to try to resist change by 
turning their back on reform and intervening in those markets. 
Given that attempts to reduce, let alone eliminate, traditional 
measures of farm protection will confront significant resistance in 
numerous countries, the mercantilist logic of trade negotiations 
requires that the agenda of the next set of multilateral negotiations 
should include “new trade agenda” items. High-income countries 
are demandeurs on services, investment and competition policies, 
creating the potential for beneficial issue linkages and tradeoffs. 
Many of the new regulatory issues are not sector-specific. Any new 
disciplines and agreements therefore should ideally apply across-
the-board.  
However, care should be taken not to pursue the benefits of 
international agreements on too many new trade issues. From an 
economic development perspective the main gains to poorer 
countries will come from market access liberalisation: reducing 
agricultural and textile protection in OECD countries at least to the 
levels applied to other manufactures, and reducing the anti-
agriculture bias in developing countries induced by their own 
protectionist and regulatory policies in manufacturing and services. 
Limited analytical and negotiating resources in developing 
countries make a number of them hesitant about the Doha Round 
having lots of new issues, to say the least. But developing countries 
may need to agree to discuss at least some of the new trade issues if 
they want to ensure agricultural market access remains high on the 
Doha Round’s agenda.  
There are clearly many challenges as well as opportunities ahead. 
For Cairns Group members and other developing countries 
interested in seeing agricultural market reforms continue in the 21st 
century, their key immediate priorities can be summarised as 
follows: 
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• ensure all the main forms of distortions to agricultural markets 
are high on the Doha agenda, to minimize the possibility that 
reforms in one area are offset by policy re-instrumentation to 
trade-distortive support measures not yet disallowed; 
• facilitate the accession of new members to the WTO, particularly 
those aspirants that are significant in world agricultural markets 
such as Russia, Ukraine and Vietnam; 
• keep explaining why trade reforms are desirable and why they 
need not be a threat to food security, to food safety, or to the 
environment, especially if appropriate first-best policy 
instruments are used to address the latter concerns; and 
• explore the prospects for more coalition-building among WTO 
members and for reducing animosity between members where 
that is based on incomplete or incorrect information. 
Agricultural-exporting countries also have a clear, if indirect, 
interest in ensuring the continuation and spread of rapid 
industrialisation in densely populated Asia and elsewhere, for that 
will expand those developing countries’ net imports of farm 
products. That industrialisation in turn depends heavily on 
advanced economies honouring and then extending their 
commitments to liberalise markets for labour-intensive 
manufactures, especially textiles and clothing. Scope may exist for 
agricultural exporters and textile exporters to work collectively to 
ensure the continuation of reform to textile and clothing trade. 
At home, food-exporting countries will do themselves a favour by 
removing their own remaining domestic or trade policy barriers to 
their agricultural exports. This includes reducing any under-
investment in public infrastructure in rural areas. That will enhance 
their chance of gaining further market openings following the Doha 
Round. 
As for densely populated food-importing developing countries, the 
idea of them following the steps of more-industrial economies, in 
the sense of protecting their farmers increasingly from import 
competition as economic growth proceeds, is no longer a long-run 
option under the WTO. The economically superior option, of 
facilitating adjustment by farmers to market forces, will yield far 
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greater dividends -- and yet will not lead to the feared 
disappearance of their agricultural sectors. Indeed it is likely to lead 
to specialisation in production that may even see some new niche 
firms/industries emerge with high value added differentiated farm 
products that are internationally very competitive. 
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7 
Effects of agricultural policy reform on 
household and regional income distribution 
in Indonesia 
PETER WARR AND PREM THAPA 
Introduction 
The economic crisis of the late 1990s had economic and political 
consequences which are still unfolding. Within the crisis affected 
countries, large numbers of rich and poor people were adversely 
affected. The effects on the poor operated through a contraction in 
the demand for labour, on the one hand, and increases in 
commodity prices, especially for internationally traded goods, on 
the other. These problems have apparently been more severe in 
Indonesia that anywhere else. Not all poor people in Indonesia were 
adversely affected. Some smallholder agricultural producers whose 
products are exported benefited substantially from the depreciation 
of the national currency, the rupiah. Nevertheless, most poor 
people, including most agricultural producers, seem to have been 
harmed, especially those who are net purchasers of food. Food 
prices have thus been a special concern in the policy response to the 
crisis.  
The staple food of Indonesia, rice, has been a special focus of 
government intervention for decades. The National Logistics 
Planning Agency, Bulog, has been charged with regulating food 
markets, especially rice, and has enjoyed a monopoly in rice 
imports. One objective of Bulog's interventions in the rice market 
has been to stabilise domestic rice prices relative to international 
prices and it has done this effectively (Timmer 1996). Another 
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objective has been to ensure adequate supplies to consumers and 
this has been reflected in suppression of the average level of 
domestic prices below the average levels of international prices.1  In 
the absence of Bulog's interventions, domestic rice prices would 
have been more variable and their average level would apparently 
have been somewhat higher. 
In the wake of the crisis, the large depreciation of the rupiah raised 
food prices to a degree that outstripped increases in money wages 
for those Indonesians fortunate enough to retain their jobs. The 
affordability of food for the poorest people thus became a special 
focus of policy concern and this was reflected in special measures 
intended to target additional food subsidies, especially for rice, to 
the poorest households. In these special market operations, rice is 
sold at prices equivalent to around 50 to 60 percent of market prices, 
themselves significantly below international prices. As the 
depreciation of the rupiah continued, following the crisis, these 
subsidies grew in importance. The gap between international prices 
and domestic rice prices increased and the level of rice imports also 
increased substantially. These subsidies are the principle focus of 
this paper.  
In addition to rice subsidies, the government has also subsidised 
fertilisers. Political forces have played a large role in determining 
the levels and composition of these subsidies, but in part, the 
fertiliser subsidies may be seen as an attempt to counteract the lower 
level of rice production which results from the production tax 
implicit in the suppression of average domestic rice prices below 
average levels of international prices. Beyond this, the government 
adheres to an objective of rice self-sufficiency and fertiliser subsidies 
have thus been considered to be justified well beyond the rates that 
would raise rice production to the level it might have taken under 
an non-interventionist policy. As with rice subsidies, the budgetary 
                                                 
1This description is controversial in that some observers have disputed 
that average rice prices have been significantly below international rates. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that it is true, it applies to prices averaged over 
many years. It does not apply in each individual year. There have been years in 
which rice prices have been above international prices and years of the 
opposite. See Timmer (1996) for a fuller discussion. 
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cost of fertiliser subsidies became much larger in real terms in the 
wake of the economic crisis. 
Under the special market operations (OPK) Bulog sets the price of 
rice to low income families at Rp.1,000 per kg., although there have 
been frequent claims that individual families are sometimes charged 
much more than this by local governments under the guise of 
transport or other costs. The rice concerned is usually third grade 
(25 percent broken). To calculate the approximate rate of subsidy 
implicit in that price, we may take the Bangkok price of US $250 per 
ton for 25 percent broken rice, add US $14 for transport cost and 
multiply by 1.2 for retail markups. At an exchange rate of 
Rp.8050/US$, this comes to approximately Rp.2,550 per kg. 
According to this calculation the rate of subsidy is currently around 
60 percent. Hard data on the distribution of subsidised sales by 
expenditure levels of recipient households is not currently available.  
Under the special market operations, Bulog sold around 350,000 
tons of rice at these subsidised prices between July, when the 
program started, and the end of December 1998. The monthly 
amounts of subsidised sales increased steadily over this period to 
just over 100,000 tons in December. At cif prices these sales were 
worth around US$ 110 million and the subsidy was worth around 
US$ 66 million. 
A package of deregulation agreed with the World Bank and 
announced on 1 December 1998, included the following features: 
• Liberalisation of the rice market in which prices are 
determined by market mechanisms and in which general 
importers are permitted to import rice; 
• Special market operations for rice at subsidised prices to be 
targeted to food insecure people, defined as those with 
incomes below the official poverty line; 
• The rates of rice subsidies to be reduced to no more than 20 
percent; 
• All food subsidies for commodities other than rice to be 
eliminated; and 
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• Fertiliser subsidies to be eliminated and their prices to be 
determined by market mechanisms.2 
These provisions were due to be implemented at the 
commencement of the new financial year, beginning 1 April, 1999. 
Clearly, they are very substantial policy changes. Measures (i) and 
(iv) apparently do not rule out the use of border interventions such 
as tariffs or import subsidies, but they do greatly reduce the scope of 
Bulog's role. According to the scheme, the rice subsidies would 
remain, but at reduced rates. Our objective in this chapter is to 
examine the effects of changing the subsidy rate within the 
neighbourhood of the 20 percent subsidy rate set as the target. In the 
course of this analysis we explore the effects of alternative schemes 
for targeting the rice subsidy by household group. For this purpose 
we utilise a general equilibrium model of the Indonesian economy 
recently constructed and named WAYANG, after the Indonesian 
puppet theatre. 
The following section describes the general features of the 
WAYANG model. The third section outlines the simulation 
exercises performed with it. We then summarise the results and 
conclude. 
The WAYANG Model 
A detailed paper describing the full model is available (Warr et al. 
1998 and Appendix 1 of this volume). The present summary is 
intended to be as non-technical as possible to enable non-specialist 
readers to grasp the essential features of the model. WAYANG is a 
conventional, real, micro-theoretic general equilibrium model of the 
Indonesian economy. Its features are designed primarily to enable it 
to address micro-economic policy issues relevant for Indonesia. The 
principal distinguishing features of WAYANG are: 
• its solid empirical basis;  
• its disaggregated industry and commodity structure; and  
• its detailed income distributional capabilities.  
                                                 
2This provision applies to urea, SP-36 and Potassium Chloride. 
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This section briefly describes the major elements of WAYANG 
model, its theoretical structure, its database, and features of the 
WAYANG parameter file.  
Overview of the model 
The structure of the model itself is relatively conventional. 
WAYANG belongs to the class of general equilibrium models which 
are linear in proportional changes, sometimes referred to as 
Johansen models, after the seminal work of Johansen (1964), which 
also used this approach. WAYANG shares many structural features 
with the highly influential ORANI general equilibrium model of the 
Australian economy (Dixon et al. 1982), which also belongs to this 
Johansen category, but these features have been adapted in light of 
the realities of the Indonesian economy.  
There are two principal versions of the WAYANG model: a national 
version and a regional version. The regional version is larger and 
somewhat more complex. For the purposes of this paper, it will be 
sufficient  to describe the national version. Five features of the 
model, described in turn, are its industries, commodities, factors of 
production, households, and market behaviour. 
Industries 
The national model contains 65 producer goods and services 
produced by 65 corresponding industries - 18 agricultural industries 
and 47 non-agricultural.3  Each industry produces a single output, so 
the set of commodities coincides with the set of industries. The 
various industries of the model are classified as either export-
oriented or import-competing. In the normal closure used for 
experiments with WAYANG the level of exports of an export-
oriented industry are treated as being endogenous, while the 
exports of an import-competing industry are treated as being 
exogenous.4  The criterion used to classify these industries is the 
                                                 
3'Agricultural' industries are here defined to include three natural resource 
extraction industries: wood (21), hunting and other forest products (22) and sea 
fishing and other marine products (23). 
4 Given that the exported and domestically sold good are treated as being 
identical, this assumption is necessary to make it possible to separate the 
domestic price of the import competing good from the price of the exported 
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ratio of an industry's imports to its exports. If this ratio exceeds 1.5, 
then the industry is regarded as producing an importable. If the 
import/export ratio is less than 0.5, then the industry is deemed to 
be export-oriented. For ratios between 0.5 and 1.5, additional 
relevant information is used in classifying the industry. 
Commodities 
WAYANG contains two types of commodities - producer goods and 
consumer goods. Producer goods come from two sources - 
domestically-produced and imported. All 65 producer goods are in 
principle capable of being imported, although in fact some have 
zero levels of imports in the database, services and utilities 
representing most of the examples. The 20 consumer goods 
identified in the model are each transformed from the producer 
goods, where the proportions of domestically produced and 
imported producer goods of each kind used in this transformation is 
sensitive to their (Armington) elasticities of substitution and to 
changes in their relative prices. 
Factors of production 
The mobility of factors of production is a critical feature of any 
general equilibrium system. 'Mobility' should be interpreted to 
mean mobility across economic activities (industries), rather than 
geographical mobility. The greater the factor mobility that is built 
into the model, the greater is the economy's simulated capacity to 
respond to changes in the economic environment. It is clearly 
essential that assumptions about the mobility of factors of 
production be consistent with the length of run that the model is 
intended to represent. 
Within the WAYANG structure, a wide degree of flexibility is 
permitted in the treatment of factor mobility. This is illustrated by 
the treatment of labour. Four types of labour are identified: 
agricultural labour, production labour, administration labour and 
professional labour. The first two forms of labour are relatively less 
skilled than the other two.  
                                                                                                                                               
good. Otherwise, the Armington structure we have described above would be 
redundant. 
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Obviously, agricultural labour is used primarily in agriculture and 
production labour is used primarily in industry. The degree to 
which they substitute of one another is a crucial question and one 
where the model user has considerable flexibility. If they are treated 
as perfect substitutes, this is equivalent to assuming and one factor 
of production, say 'unskilled labour', is mobile across the entire 
economy, implying that their wages must be equalised. If they do 
not substitute for one another at all, this is equivalent to assuming 
that agricultural and industrial labour are discrete types of labour 
and there is no need for their wages to move together. These two 
characterisations of the labour market may be expected to have 
quite different implications for adjustment of the various industries, 
as well as very different income distributional implications. 
The other two factors of production are capital and land and again 
the user has considerable flexibility in specifying the degree of 
mobility of these factors across industries. For example, it is possible 
to assume that capital is mobile across all industries, that it is 
immobile (fixed) in every industries, or that it is mobile among only 
some industries. A common assumption is that there are two kinds 
of capital - one that is mobile among agricultural industries and 
another mobile among non-agricultural industries, but with no 
mobility between them. In this treatment, agricultural capital is 
thought of as machinery such as tractors of various kinds, which can 
be used in a variety of agricultural activities. Non-agricultural 
capital is thought of as industrial machinery and buildings. Any 
combination of these treatments is possible within WAYANG. 
Land is used primarily in agriculture but its mobility among 
agricultural industries is a matter which users of the model can 
determine. Land can be mobile among all agricultural industries, 
fixed in each, or mobile among only some sets of industries. When 
factors are immobile - industry specific - changes in relative prices 
do not cause any reallocation of these inputs across industries. In 
some cases, as with capital, this may be thought of as a short run 
treatment, as a movement to other sectors is assumed to require 
sufficient re-tooling costs as to render such reallocations 
economically infeasible. In a long run setting, the amounts available 
of each of these region and sector-specific capital resources would 
adjust as a result of the investments made in each time period of the 
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model. When capital is treated as industry-specific the length of run 
implicit in the model's comparative static adjustment processes 
should be thought of as being between two and four years.  
Households 
The model contains ten households - seven rural and three urban - 
differentiated by socio-economic group. They are based on the 
households defined in the 1993 Social Accounting Matrix produced 
by the Central Bureau of Statistics in Jakarta (BPS)5. The households 
are described below. The sources of income of each of these 
households are different, depending on their ownership of factors of 
production, as derived from the BPS Social Accounting Matrix, and 
their demand behaviour also differs from one another, as reflected 
in the set of demand elasticities entering the WAYANG database.  
Market behaviour 
The microeconomic behaviour assumed within WAYANG is 
competitive profit maximisation on the part of all firms and utility 
maximisation on the part of consumers. Markets for final outputs, 
intermediate goods and factors of production all clear at prices 
which are determined endogenously within the model. Variations to 
this assumption are possible, however, and this is important for 
factors of production, especially labour. Labour can be unemployed 
in WAYANG and this is accomplished in modelling terms through 
closure decisions, by allowing real or nominal wages to be fixed 
(exogenous) and thereby allowing the supply of labour to be 
demand-determined (endogenous). Thus, 'market clearing' as 
defined here, does not necessarily mean full employment. 
Theoretical structure 
The analytical structure of the model includes the following major 
components:  
• A complete consumer demand system based on the 20 
consumer goods, for each of the 10 individual households; 
                                                 
5BPS is an Indonesian abbreviation for Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau 
of Statistics), Jakarta. 
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• A factor demand system which relates the demand for each 
primary factor to industry outputs and prices of each of the 
primary factors, which reflects the assumption that factors of 
production may be substituted for one another in ways that 
depend on factor prices and on the elasticities of substitution 
between the factors; 
• The distinction between skilled and unskilled labour, which 
are nested within the production functions of all non-
agricultural industries, using a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) aggregation; 
• An intermediate good demand system which assumes that 
intermediate goods are used in each industry in proportion to 
the output produced (the Leontief assumption); 
• Zero profit conditions for each industry determining specific 
factor returns from commodity prices, intermediate good 
prices and mobile factor returns; 
• Demands for imported and domestically produced versions of 
each good, incorporating Armington elasticities of substitution 
between the two; 
• Market clearing conditions for each commodity and factor of 
production ensuring that aggregate demand does not exceed 
aggregate supply for that commodity or factor; 
• A set of equations determining the incomes of the 10 
households from their (exogenous) ownership of factors of 
production, reflecting data derived from the 1993 Social 
Accounting Matrix, the (endogenous) rates of return to these 
factors, and any net transfers from elsewhere in the system;  
• Rates of import tariffs and excise taxes across commodities, 
rates of business taxes, value added taxes and corporate 
income taxes across industries, and rates of personal income 
taxes across households which reflect the structure of the 
Indonesian tax system, using data from the Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance; and 
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• A set of macroeconomic identities that ensures the standard 
macroeconomic accounting conventions are observed. 
The nominal exchange rate between the rupiah and the US dollar is 
fixed exogenously. The role within the model of the exogenous 
nominal exchange rate is to determine, along with international 
prices, the nominal domestic price level. Thus, for example, if all 
prices are flexible a ten percent increase in the exchange rate will 
result in a ten percent increase in all nominal domestic prices but no 
change in any quantity determined within the model.  
Production functions assume constant returns to scale. This 
assumption enters the model via the factor demand functions, which 
are homogeneous of degree one in output, and through the zero 
profit conditions, which equate unit commodity prices to unit costs 
of production. All behavioural functions are homogeneous of degree 
zero in prices. There are four mobile or semi-mobile primary factors 
of production: skilled labour, unskilled labour, agricultural mobile 
capital and non-agricultural mobile capital. In addition, each 
industry also uses an industry-specific fixed factor. Two factors are 
freely mobile across all 20 agricultural industries: unskilled labour 
and mobile agricultural capital. Three primary factors are freely 
mobile among the 40 non-agricultural industries: skilled labour, 
unskilled labour and non-agricultural mobile capital. Only unskilled 
labour is freely mobile across all 60 industries.  
Skilled labour is defined as those in the work force with more than a 
specified level of education. Skilled labour is not used in agriculture 
because agricultural census data confirm that very little educated 
labour is engaged in agricultural production. Mobile agricultural 
capital consists of equipment such as tractors and cultivation 
equipment with a variety of agricultural uses but little or no non-
agricultural use. Mobile non-agricultural capital includes non-
agricultural land and structures such as buildings not necessarily 
devoted to any particular production activity. When relative prices 
change, it is possible for owners of such assets to rent them out to 
other non-agricultural producers facing more profitable 
circumstances.  
Industry-specific capital, consisting of assets devoted to a particular 
line of production activity, also exists in each of the 60 industries. In 
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agriculture, this means land. Outside agriculture, it means industry-
specific production equipment. Changes in relative prices do not 
cause a reallocation of such capital inputs to other sectors in the 
short run, because of the re-tooling costs involved. The length of run 
implicit in the model's comparative static adjustment processes 
should be thought of as being between two and four years.  
Database 
This section provides a description of INDOSAM: a disaggregated 
social accounting matrix (SAM) for Indonesia, with a 1993 base. This 
SAM is intended to serve as the database for WAYANG, but it has 
other potential uses as well. The year 1993 is currently the latest for 
which it is possible to assemble the information required for 
construction of a social accounting matrix for Indonesia.  
Three principle data sources, all compiled by the government's 
principal statistical agency, the Central Bureau of Statistics, BPS, 
were used to construct INDOSAM-93: (i) the 1990 input-output 
tables (subsequently referred to as IO 90); (ii) the updated input 
output table for 1993 (subsequently IO 93); (iii) the 1993 social 
accounting matrix (subsequently SAM 93). The IO 90 and SAM 93 
are available from BPS in published form. The IO 93 is an 
unpublished and preliminary update of the 1990 input output 
tables, kindly provided to the authors by BPS. The table specifies 66 
sectors. Other, supplementary, data sources were also used in the 
construction of specific tables, as described below. Abbreviations are 
used for these supplementary sources in the text and full references 
are provided at the end of the paper.6 
The principal data sources 
The 1993 social accounting matrix produced by BPS (SAM 93) 
provided the starting point for the database but substantial 
additions to the information in SAM 93 were required. SAM 93 
contains 22 production sectors, which is insufficient for the purposes 
of this study. In addition, the SAM 93 does not include the detail of 
                                                 
6 The final two references listed, [Statistical Year Book 95] and [IFS 96], 
were also used to verify some data contained in the Indonesian sources cited 
when the meaning or accuracy of published data seemed to require checking. 
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tax payments and household sources of income that are required. 
The updated 1993 input output table (IO 93) is a revision of the 1990 
IO table (IO 90), published previously, and specifies 66 production 
sectors. For the purposes of the present study, modifications to the 
data contained in IO 93 were needed for the following reasons:  
• The table specifies only total intermediate goods and services 
transactions for each pair of producing and purchasing 
industries, at producer prices, and unlike the 1990 table, these 
transactions are not divided into goods and services from 
domestic and imported sources; 
• The table includes a sector (number 66, labelled "unspecified 
sector"), which is included as a balancing item, but it does not 
describe a true sector of the economy and in any case the data 
for this sector indicates negative final demand, an economic 
impossibility; 
• The updated table (IO 93) derived from BPS was not fully 
balanced. The major imbalances were that for most industries 
defined in the table, the industry-specific elements of row 210 
(total input) were not equal to those of row 600 (total output), 
and the elements of row 200 (total imports) plus row 600 (total 
output) were not equal to those of row 700 (total supply). 
These problems were overcome as follows: 
• The shares of imported intermediate goods and domestically 
produced intermediate goods for each cell of the table, as 
implied by the published 1990 IO table, were used to divide 
intermediate goods transactions into domestic and imported 
components; 
• Sector 66 was aggregated with the much larger sector 65 
(labelled "other services"), which eliminated the problem of 
negative final demands; and  
• The revised table was balanced using the RAS adjustment 
method to ensure that all required accounting identities were 
observed. 
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Elasticity files 
The elasticity files used in WAYANG were borrowed from empirical 
estimates derived econometrically for a similar model of the Thai 
economy, known as PARA. The elasticity files concerned were the 
consumer demand system and the factor demand elasticities. In 
both cases, these elasticities were amended to match the differences 
between the databases for WAYANG and PARA so as to ensure the 
homogeneity properties required by economic theory. The 
Armington elasticities of substitution between imports and 
domestically produced goods and the elasticities of export demand 
were set at default values. All Armington elasticities were set at 2 
and all export demand elasticities were set at 20. 
Characteristics of households 
Since our study focuses on the way external shocks affect the 
various households of the model it is important to summarise the 
characteristics of the ten households represented in WAYANG. 
Table 7.1 provides this summary. The seven rural households 
account for 73 percent of total population and 61 percent of total 
consumption expenditure. The four poorest household categories, 
measured in terms of expenditure, are all rural. Poverty, in 
Indonesia as elsewhere in the developing world, is overwhelmingly 
a rural phenomenon.  
Table 7.1:  Classification of households in Indonesia 





















RURAL Households  (73.2)  (60.9)  
HH1 Landless 18.70 10.0 8,878 4.7 475 
HH2 Small Cultivator (<0.5 
ha.) 
51.30 27.3 36,512 19.4 712 
HH3 Medium Cultivator (0.5 
to 1 ha.) 
11.60 6.2 9,146 4.8 788 
HH4 Large Cultivator  
(> 1 ha.) 
12.00 6.4 13,607 7.2 1,134 
HH5 Non-Agricultural 
labour: low income 
16.60 8.8 12,164 6.4 733 
HH6 Rural non-labour 
households 
2.90 1.5 3,317 1.8 1,144 
HH7 Non-Agricultural 
labour: high income 
24.30 13.0 31,309 16.6 1,288 
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URBAN Households  (26.8)  (39.0)  
HH8 Urban labour: low 
income 
23.30 12.4 21,273 11.3 913 
HH9 Urban non-labour 
household 
4.80 2.6 5,275 2.8 1,099 
HH10 Urban labour: high 
income 
22.10 11.8 47,080 25.0 2,130 
All households 187.60 100.0 188,599 100.0 1,005 
Source BPS, Sistem Neraca Sosial Ekonomi Indonesia 1993, p. 111. 
The sources of income for the various households are important for 
the general equilibrium properties of the model and these are 
summarised in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2: Sources of gross household factor incomes in Indonesia 
(percentage) 




Land Capital Total 
RURAL Households      
HH1 Landless 1.9 45.9 3.3 48.9 100 
HH2 Small Cultivator 
 (< 0.5 ha.) 
5.0 42.8 7.1 45.1 100 
HH3 Medium 
Cultivator (0.5 to 1 ha.) 
4.5 52.6 6.2 36.8 100 
HH4 Large Cultivator 
 (> 1 ha.) 
5.8 65.8 3.9 24.5 100 
HH5 Non-Agriculture 
labour: Low income 
26.1 33.2 5.2 35.5 100 
HH6 Rural non-labour 
households 
5.8 14.5 1.7 78.0 100 
HH7 Non-Agricultural : 
high income 
29.7 39.0 2.1 29.2 100 
      
URBAN Households      
HH8 Urban labour: low 
income 
20.7 11.2 3.4 64.7 100 
HH9 Urban non-labour 
household 
14.1 18.4 5.5 62.0 100 
HH10 Urban labour: 
high income 
37.2 14.8 0.5 47.5 100 
All Households 23.4 28.8 2.9 44.9 100 
Source: WAYANG models database 
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The simulations 
Our simulations required first amending the standard form of the 
model to incorporate subsidies on consumer goods. This required 
changes to the equation set and the database. The consumer demand 
equations were amended to incorporate household-specific 
subsidies on each commodity. The government revenue used to 
finance these subsidies was then allowed for by adding a new 
equation which aggregates government spending on consumption 
subsidies and incorporating this term into the overall government 
budget balance equation. The database was amended to allow for a 
base level of a 20 percent subsidy on rice consumption. To preserve 
the balance of the existing database the value of the reduced 
consumer spending this represented was added to household 
savings. The additional government revenue required to finance the 
consumption subsidies was similarly incorporated without 
disturbing the balance of the system by subtracting this amount 
from government savings. 
Model closure 
The objective of the simulations is, in part, to derive effects that 
changes in the levels of consumption subsidies have on household 
welfare. Within the single-period horizon of the model, the measure 
of household welfare is its real consumption. The macroeconomic 
closure must be made compatible with this measure by ensuring 
that the full economic effects of the shocks to be introduced are 
channelled into current-period household consumption and do not 
'leak' into other directions, with real-world welfare implications not 
captured by the welfare measure. In this context, issues of 
macroeconomic closure may thus be seen in part as devices for 
minimising inconsistencies between the use of a single-period model 
to analyse welfare results and the multi-period reality that the 
model represents. The real values of the current account balance, 
real government spending and real investment are each held fixed 
in the chosen closure because in all these cases, changes to the real 
value of the variables concerned have real world consequences not 
captured by the welfare measure.  
To prevent intertemporal and other welfare leakages from 
occurring, the simulations are conducted with balanced trade 
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(exogenous balance on current account), to ensure that the potential 
benefits from the export tax do not flow to foreigners, through a 
current account surplus, or that increases in domestic consumption 
are not achieved at the expense of borrowing from abroad, in the 
case of a current account deficit. For the same reason, real 
government spending and real investment demand for each good 
are each held fixed exogenously. The government budget deficit is 
held fixed in nominal terms and this is achieved by across-the-board 
adjustments to personal income tax rates, in response to changes in 
government revenue so as to restore the base level of the budgetary 
deficit.  
Closure decisions are also required for the markets for skilled and 
unskilled labour. The WAYANG model has no explicit labour 
supply behaviour within it and model closure decisions must 
provide the equivalent of labour supply information. The labour 
supply assumption employed here is that levels of aggregate 
employment are exogenous, and thus that the aggregate supply of 
skilled and unskilled labour are fixed.  
The shocks 
The shocks applied were in every case an increase in the rate of 
subsidy on rice from the base rates of 20 percent to 50percent. The 
simulations reported differ as to which household or combination of 
households receive this increased subsidy. This increase in the 
subsidy rate multiplies the rate of subsidy by 2.5 and thus 
corresponds to a 150 percent increase in the rate of the subsidy. This 
increase in the subsidy rate was first applied to all households and 
we refer to this as simulation A. Then we applied this rate of 
increase in the subsidy (an increase from a 20 percent subsidy rate to 
a 50 percent subsidy rate) for individual households only, holding 
the subsidy rate for all other households constant at the base rate of 
20 percent. We do this for each of the five poorest households 
identified in the model. The first four of these, households 1, 2, 3 and 
5, are the poorest rural households and the fifth is the poorest urban 
household, household 8. Thus simulation B1 increases the subsidy 
rate for household 1 alone, and simulations B2, B3, B5 and B8 apply 
the same rate of subsidy increase to households 2, 3, 5 and 8. 
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Results 
The results of the simulations are reported in Table 7.3.  
Simulation A  
An increase in the subsidy rate across all households from 20 to 50 
percent increases aggregate consumption of rice by around 7.5 
percent. The market price of rice, allowing for the subsidy, declines 
by 31 percent but net of the subsidy the price increases by 7.5 
percent. The relatively small increase in the unsubsidised price 
indicates that the aggregate market supply for rice as a consumer 
good is relatively elastic. This aggregate supply comes from two 
sources, domestic production and imports, which are imperfect 
substitutes (all Armington elasticities are set at 2.0). Imports of rice 
increase by 12.6 percent and domestic production of paddy 
increases by 6 percent. In the base year used for the database, 
imports were under 1 percent of total rice supplies.  
The increase in the producer price of paddy (3.8 percent) induces a 
large increase (14.6 percent) in the return to paddy land. Since 
paddy production is labour intensive, the increased profitability of 
rice also induces an expansion in the demand for unskilled labour 
which raises real wages for unskilled labour, economy-wide, by 5.1 
percent. Real wages for skilled labour increase also, but by a much 
smaller amount. Returns to capital outside agriculture decline, a 
consequence of the increase in real wages squeezing the return to 
capital. 
The decline in the consumer price of rice forces down the aggregate 
consumer price index by 4 percent (rice comprises 12.2 percent of 
total expenditure). This, combined with the factor income changes 
described above leads to an increase in the real gross incomes of all 
households. This is not the same as an increase in disposable 
incomes, however, because the government's subsidisation of rice 
has a budgetary cost. Aggregate budgetary expenditures increase by 
7.8 percent and deflating this by the consumer price index, real 
government expenditures increase by 11.8 percent. Financing this 
increased level of expenditure requires increased taxes and the tax 
that adjusts in our simulations is the personal income tax rate. This 
tax rate increases by 30.4 percent.  
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The households which emerge as the largest net gainers (largest 
increases real consumption expenditure) are those which benefit 
most from the increases in the return to land and unskilled labour, 
but which are not significant parts of the personal income tax base. 
These are the small, medium and especially the large land owners. 
Rural owners of capital (household 6) lose, primarily from the 
increase in their income tax obligations, as do urban owners of 
capital (household 9).  
 
Table 7.3 Estimated effects of increases in rice consumption subsidies with fixed aggregate employment, 
Indonesia 
(all numbers are percentage rate changes, unless otherwise specified) 
SIMULATION A B1 B2 B3 B5 B8 
SHOCKS: 
Rice consumption subsidy rate 



















A.  Macro Results:       
A.1. Overall Economy       
Gross Domestic Product       
Nominal (local currency) -1.31 -0.02 -0.28 -0.82 -0.03 -0.09 
Real -1.07 -0.02 -0.23 -0.07 -0.02 -0.08 
GDP Deflator -0.24 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Consumer Price Index -4.08 -0.07 -0.95 -0.27 -1.30  -0.25 
Wage       
Nominal  Skilled -2.21 -0.03 -0.46 -0.15 -0.05 -0.14 
Unskilled 1.03 0.01 0.21 0.07 0.02 0.07 
Real          Skilled 1.87 0.04 0.49 0.12 1.25 0.11 
Unskilled 5.11 0.08 1.16 0.34 1.33 0.32 
Returns to variable capital (nominal)       
Non-agriculture -0.54 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
Agriculture 3.71 0.05 0.78 0.25 0.09 0.24 
Returns to Land       
Paddy land 14.58 0.19 3.08 0.95 0.35 0.97 
Beans land 2.16 0.02 0.43 0.16 0.05 0.12 
Maize land 5.46 0.07 1.13 0.39 0.13 0.32 
 
 
Table 7.3 cont.       
 A B1 B2 B3 B5 B8 
Employment       
Skilled * * * * * * 
Unskilled * * * * * * 
A.2 External Sector       
Export revenue (foreign currency) 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Import bill (foreign currency) 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
A.3 Government Budget        
Nominal revenue (local currency) 7.75 0.10 1.70 0.50 0.20 0.58 
Nominal expenditure (local currency) 7.75 0.10 1.70 0.50 0.20 0.58 
Budget deficit (in levels)       
A4 Household Sector       
Nominal consumption (local currency) -2.16 -0.03 -0.46 -0.13 -0.05 -0.15 
Real consumption 1.92 0.04 0.49 0.14 1.25 0.10 
B. Sectoral Results (aggregates)       
Agriculture 1.51 0.02 0.31 0.10 0.04 0.10 
Manufactures 1.37 0.02 0.29 0.09 0.03 0.09 
Services -0.17 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Natural resources -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 
Agricultural processing 4.51 0.01 0.94 0.29 0.11 0.30 
C. Sectoral Results (by industry)       
Domestic supply       
Paddy 5.93 0.08 1.25 0.38 0.14 0.40 
Beans 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Maize 0.38 0.00 0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.07 
 
Table 7.3 cont.       
 A B1 B2 B3 B5 B8 
Imports       
Paddy * * * * * * 
Beans 4.20 0.05 0.88 0.28 0.10 0.27 
Maize 9.45 0.12 1.98 0.64 0.22 0.61 
Milled rice 12.66 0.16 2.68 0.82 0.31 0.85 
D. Government Budgetary Position       
Revenue:       
Personal Income tax collection 30.42 0.32 5.42 1.98 0.65 2.06 
(personal income tax rate shifter) 30.72 0.33 5.49 1.20 0.65 2.09 
Corporate tax 0.36 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.02 
Indirect taxes       
Excise 0.97 0.01 0.20 0.07 0.02 0.06 
Business 0.49 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.03 
Other 0.71 0.01 1.50 0.05 0.02 0.05 
Tariff 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Expenditure:       
Government consumption -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
Consumption subsidy 159.0 2.8 36.7 10.5 5.0 9.8 
Change in value of consump. subsidy** 7124 123 1645 470 224 439 
Change in total gov. expenditure ** 5132 68 1123 335 130 381 
** in billion Rupiah 1993 constant prices       
E. Income       
E.1  Nominal Gross Income       
Rural:  HH1 Landless 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 
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 A B1 B2 B3 B5 B8 
HH2 Small cultivator 0.38 0.01 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.02 
HH3 Medium cultivator 0.45 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 
HH4 Large cultivator 0.51 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.03 
HH5 Non-agriculture labour: low income -0.23 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
HH6 Non-labour  -0.19 -0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
HH7 Non-agricultural labour: high income -0.32 -0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Urban: HH8 labour: low income -0.56 09.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
HH9 non-labour  -0.28 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
HH10 labour: high income -0.89 -0.01 -0.19 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
E.2 Real gross income changes (deflated by household)       
Rural:   HH1 Landless 2.33 1.67 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.04 
HH2 Small cultivator 5.34 0.00 5.21 0.01 0.00 0.01 
HH3 Medium cultivator 6.07 0.00 0.01 6.02 0.00 0.00 
HH4 Large cultivator 6.14 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 
HH5 Non-agriculture labour: low income 1.96 0.00 0.04 0.01 1.76 0.01 
HH6 Non-labour  2.56 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 
HH7 Non-agricultural : high income 5.17 -0.01 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
Urban: HH8 labour: low income 1.73 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 
HH9 non-labour  1.91 0.00 -0.20 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
HH10 labour: high income 3.44 -0.01 -0.20 -0.06 -0.02 -0.06 
E.3 Real Consumption       
Rural:   HH1 Landless 1.28 1.64 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
HH2 Small cultivator 3.29 -0.02 4.81 -0.11 -0.04 -0.13 
 
Table 7.3 cont.       
 A B1 B2 B3 B5 B8 
HH3 Medium cultivator 3.60 -0.03 -0.55 6.49 -0.07 -0.21 
HH4 Large cultivator 4.05 -0.03 -0.50 -0.19 -0.06 -0.19 
HH5 Non-agriculture labour: low income 0.15 -0.02 -0.28 -0.11 1.73 -0.11 
HH6 Non-labour  -0.27 -0.02 -0.40 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 
HH7 Non-agricultural : high income 2.83 -0.04 0.69 -0.25 -0.1 -0.25 
       
Urban:  HH8 labour: low income 0.63 -0.01 -0.21 -0.08 -0.03 1.72 
HH9 non-labour  -0.66 -0.02 -0.40 -0.15 -0.05 -0.16 
HH10 labour: high income 1.48 -0.04 -0.64 -0.23 -0.08 -0.23 
F.  Prices       
F.1 Domestic producer prices       
Agricultural commodities       
Paddy 3.79 0.05 0.80 0.25 0.09 0.25 
Beans 1.57 0.02 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.10 
Maize 2.33 0.03 0.49 0.16 0.05 0.14 
Cassava 0.26 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.01 
Vegfruit -0.21 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
F.2 Consumer price of rice       
Market price (without subsidy) 7.52 0.02 0.34 0.11 0.04 0.11 
Price to subsidise consumer households -31.5 -39.0 -38.7 -38.9 -39.0 -38.9 
F.3 CPI BY Household       
Rural:  HH1 Landless -1.92 -1.67 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
HH2 Small cultivator 4.96 0.00 -5.14 0.02 0.01 0.01 
HH3 Medium cultivator  -5.62 0.01 0.08 -5.98 0.01 0.02 
 
 
Table 7.3 cont.       
 A B1 B2 B3 B5 B8 
HH4 Large cultivator -5.62 0.01 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.03 
HH5 Non-agriculture labour: low income -2.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 -1.76 -0.03 
HH6 Non-labour  -2.75 -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 
HH7 Non-agricultural : high income -5.49 0.00 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Urban:  HH8 labour: low income -2.29 -0.01 -0.13 -0.04 -0.14 -1.72 
HH9 non-labour  -2.19 -0.01 -0.12 -0.04 -0.01 -0.04 
HH10 labour: high income -4.34 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
G. Rice consumption quantity by household       
Aggregate rice consumption 7.52 0.10 1.59 0.49 0.18 0.50 
Rural:    HH1 Landless 6.60 7.83 -- -- -- -- 
HH2 Small cultivator 7.50 -- 9.36 -- -- -- 
HH3 Medium cultivator 7.68 -- -- 10.71 -- -- 
HH4 Large cultivator 7.98 -- -- -- -- -- 
HH5 Non-agriculture labour: low income 5.82 -- -- -- 8.11 -- 
HH6 Non-labour  5.34 -- -- -- -- -- 
HH7 Non-agricultural : high income 7.08 -- -- -- -- -- 
Urban:  HH8 labour: low income 8.64 -- -- -- -- 11.92 
HH9 non-labour  7.02 -- -- -- -- -- 
HH10 labour: high income 7.86 -- -- -- -- -- 
-- = negligible      
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It is by no means the case that the households which gain the most 
from the rice subsidy are those for which rice forms the largest part 
of their total expenditure. The poorest households tend to be those 
for which the share of rice in their total expenditures is the highest. 
The response of factor returns and their implications for households' 
real incomes is what is overlooked by this perspective and this is 
one of the contributions a general equilibrium treatment can 
provide. 
Simulations B1 to B8 
When the increased rice subsidy is applied to household 1 (the 
poorest rural household) alone, it gains in terms of aggregate real 
consumption and its gain is somewhat larger than the case where all 
households receive the subsidy. Comparing the return to household 
1 in these two cases, the reduction in the price of rice to household 1 
is larger in simulation B1 because when the subsidy is also applied 
to all other households, the unsubsidised price of rice is bid up, 
making the subsidy inclusive price larger in simulation A than in B1. 
This effect outweighs the benefit household 1 receives from the 
bidding up of the return to unskilled labour that results when all 
other households also receive the subsidy.  
Similarly, when other households are the sole recipients of a rice 
subsidy (simulations B2, B3, B5 and B8), household 1 is a small net 
loser, resulting from the bidding up of the unsubsidised price of rice 
which it faces. Each household gains from being a recipient of the 
subsidy, but is a small net loser from the granting of the subsidy to 
other households.  
Simulations C and D1: changing the labour market closure 
The above results were derived with fixed levels of total 
employment. While this must no be confused with an assumption of 
full employment, in the post-crisis environment the assumption of 
exogenous employment is clearly artificial. How do the results 
change when this assumption is amended. The economic crisis 
reduced real wages considerably. It could not be argued that real 
wages were fixed. That assumption would be as unrealistic as fixed 
aggregate employment. Nominal wages showed much greater 
stability. Accordingly, we experiment with this labour market 
closure for both skilled and unskilled workers. Nominal wages are 
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assumed to be 'sticky'. Supplies of skilled and unskilled labour were 
thus assumed to be infinitely elastic and these exogenous nominal 
wages. 
Table 7.4 shows the results. They are presented only for an across 
the board increase in rice subsidies and for an increase applied only 
to household 1. These results may then be compared with results for 
simulations A and B1. The results are surprisingly insensitive to the 
change of labour market treatment. The decline in the consumer 
price index is similar to above and real wages for skilled and 
unskilled labour rise, but in the case of the unskilled the increase is 
smaller than that obtained under simulations A and B1. 
Employment for skilled workers declines but the increase in 
demand for unskilled labour in paddy production induces an 
increase in aggregate employment of unskilled workers. The net 
effect on the interests of the various households is very similar to 
that obtained with completely inelastic labour supply assumptions. 
Artificial assumptions about labour supply are therefore not the 
source of our results. 
Conclusion 
A consumption subsidy on rice has effects on different consumers 
that are not identical to those that would be predicted on the basis of 
the share of rice in the total expenditure of these households. 
Household incomes and household tax obligations are affected as 
well. Household incomes are affected by the factor market 
consequences of the subsidies. In so far as domestic producer prices 
of rice are increased by the consumption subsidies, factors of 
production that are used intensively in rice production enjoy 
increased returns. Households who own these factors benefit. The 
way factor markets respond depends on labour market conditions as 
well as other factors and in the post-crisis environment the way 
these circumstances are modelled will affect the simulated results. 
Finally, subsidies have to be paid for. The manner in which the 
government revenue cost of the subsidies is met will therefore 
influence the distributional consequences across households. These 
issues illustrate the value of a general equilibrium treatment of the 
effects of interventions such as a rice subsidy through exposing the 
general equilibrium mechanisms that are involved.  
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Table 7.4: Estimated effects of increases in rice consumption 
subsidies with fixed nominal wages, Indonesia 
(all numbers are percentage rate changes, unless otherwise specified) 
 C D1 
SHOCKS: 
Rice consumption subsidy rate 
increased from 20% to 50% 
All households HH1 only 
A. Macro Results:   
A.1  Overall Economy   
Gross Domestic Product   
Nominal (local currency) -1.05 -0.01 
Real -1.10 0.06 
GDP Deflator 0.04 0.00 
Consumer Price Index -3.88 -0.70 
Wage   
Nominal   Skilled   
Unskilled   
Real           Skilled 3.88 0.70 
Unskilled 3.88 0.70 
Returns to variable capital (nominal)   
Non-agriculture -0.28 -0.00 
Agriculture 3.76 0.05 
Returns to land   
Paddy land 15.24 0.20 
Beans land 3.70 0.05 
Maize land 67.62 0.10 
Employment   
Skilled -0.92 -0.01 
Unskilled 0.58 0.01 
A.2 External Sector   
Export revenue (foreign currency) 0.19 0.02 
Import bill (foreign currency) 0.18 0.02 
A.3 Government Budget   
Nominal revenue (local currency) 8.60 0.11 
Nominal expenditure (local currency 8.06 0.11 
Budget deficit (in levels)   
A.4 Household sector   
Consumption   
Nominal (local currency) -1.88 -0.03 
Real 2.00 0.04 
Nominal gross income changes   
Rural:  HH1 Landless 0.40 0.00 
HH2 cultivator 0.46 0.00 
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Table 7.4 cont. C D1 
HH3 Medium cultivator 0.46 0.00 
HH4 Large cultivator 0.42 0.00 
HH5 Non-agriculture labour: low 
income 
0.11 0.00 
HH6 Non-labour  0.02 0.00 
HH7 Non-Agricultural : high 
income 
-0.00 0.00 
Urban: HH8 labour: low income -0.11 -0.00 
HH9 non-labour  0.08 0.00 
HH10 labour: high income -0.35 -0.00 
Real Gross Income Changes (deflated by household-specific CPI) 
Rural:  HH1 Landless 2.11 1.67 
HH2 Small cultivator 5.30 0.00 
HH3 Medium cultivator 6.02 0.00 
HH4 Large cultivator 6.01 0.00 
HH5 Non-Agriculture labour: poor 2.06 0.00 
HH6 Non-labour  2.41 0.00 
HH7 Non-Agricultural : rich 5.34 -0.00 
Urban: HH8 labour: low income 1.81 0.00 
HH9 non-labour  1.94 0.00 
HH10 labour: high income 3.77 -0.00 
Real Consumption Expenditures   
Rural:  HH1 Landless 1.06 1.63 
HH2 Small cultivator 3.22 -0.02 
HH3 Medium cultivator 3.51 -0.03 
HH4 Large cultivator 3.87 -0.03 
HH5 Non-Agriculture labour: low 
income 
0.24 -0.01 
HH6 Non-labour  -0.44 -0.02 
HH7 Non-Agricultural : high 
income 
3.00 -0.03 
Urban: HH8 labour: low income 0.70 -0.01 
HH9 non-labour  -0.65 -0.02 
HH10 labour: high income 1.82 -0.03 
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Effects of farm policy reform on Indonesia’s 
secondary food crops 
SJAIFUL BAHRI, RENI KUSTIARI AND GLYN WITTWER 
The economic crisis of the late 1990s led to an overhaul of 
Indonesia’s agricultural policies. Influenced by the conditional loan 
requirements set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
other donor institutions, the government has liberalised trade 
policies. As pre-crisis policies imposed less interventions on 
secondary food than other crops, however, the impact of policy 
reform (especially trade policies) on these commodities is expected 
to be less.  
This chapter has several objectives. It provides background data on 
secondary crops. It also contains details of institutional 
arrangements concerning these crops. Finally, it contains analysis of 
the assumed effects of altering R&D investments, so that they favour 
secondary food crops (i.e. maize, soybean and cassava) more than in 
the past, using the economy-wide WAYANG model (described in 
Appendix 1 of this volume).  
Production and trade 
Indonesia’s agricultural land decreased around 1.1 million hectares 
during the period 1983-1993 (Kasryno, 1997). However, the 
harvested area of agricultural commodities has increased: an 
increase of cropping intensity has compensated for a decrease in 
land usage. During the period from 1969 to 1999, the harvested area 
of rice increased by 1.6 percent, maize 1.4 percent and soybean 3.5 
percent annually, while cassava slightly decreased by 0.5 percent. 
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Up to mid-1997, the agricultural sector was very instrumental in 
supporting Indonesia’s economic development. Growth in 
agricultural output, which was around 3 percent over 25 years, 
made it possible to provide relatively cheap food for the domestic 
population of more than 200 million people. Agriculture absorbs 
around 50 percent of employment, and supports the development of 
manufacturing industries by providing raw materials and cheap 
labour.  
In the second half of 1997, El Nino hit the country causing the worst 
drought for half a century. This led to a temporary decline of 
agricultural production capacity of the country. Moreover, the 
financial crisis exacerbated the decline in farmers’ real incomes. The 
price of agro-inputs also increased with the rupiah’s collapse. 
Consequently, food production in 1997 and 1998 was lower than in 
1996.  
Rice production declined from 51 million tons (unhusked paddy) in 
1996 to 49 million tons in 1997, and dropped again to 49 million tons 
in 1998 (Figure 8.1). The decline of rice production in 1997 was 
mainly due to a decrease in harvested area of around 430,000 
hectares. In 1998, the government launched its special effort to 
increase production by expanding planted acreage and increasing 
cropping intensity. As a result, in 1998 harvested acreage was 
around 500,000 hectares higher than that of 1997. But because 
farmers could not afford key inputs, notably fertiliser, the rice yield 
in 1998 was lower than that of the previous two years.  
Production of maize declined from 9.3 million tons (dry kernel) in 
1996 to 8.8 million tons in 1997. This was largely due to the decline 
of harvested acreage from 3.7 million hectares in 1996 to 3.4 million 
hectares in 1997, even though yields increased from 2.5 tons to 2.6 
tons per hectare. In 1998, production of maize increased from 8.8 
million tons to 10.2 million tons due to an increase in harvested 
acreage (from 3.4 million to 3.8 million hectares) and yields (by 0.03 
tons per hectare). These increases resulted from government 
programs to boost the production of three main food-crop 
commodities, namely rice, maize and soybean. 
Unlike rice and maize, which recovered in 1998 as a result of 
government intervention, production of soybean decreased from 1.5 
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million tons in 1996 to 1.3 million tons in 1999. This was largely due 
to a decrease in harvested acreage (from 1.3 million hectares to 1.1 
million hectares) and yield increases from 1.19 tons to 1.21 tons per 
hectare. The relatively wet dry season in 1998 hindered soybean 
production. 
President Habibie’s administration, with its Cabinet of Reformation, 
paid close attention to food supplies (rice in particular) for the 
majority of Indonesians. Two policies included permitting imports 
of rice, and Gema Palagung (a self-reliance movement that sought to 











Source: Erwidodo and Prayogo Hagi (1999). 
 
 
Even though Gema Palagung showed some success, food imports in 
1997 and 1998 increased sharply. Imports of rice were 3.6 million 
tons in 1997 and 5 million tons in 1998. Among other foods, soybean 
imports increased from 0.6 million tons in 1996 to 0.7 million tons in 
1998, and imports of maize increased from 0.6 million to 1.1 million 
tons. Exports of cassava decreased from 0.29 million tons in 1996 to 
0.18 million tons in 1997. 
 





















Effects of reform on secondary food crops  167 
Table 8.1: Shares of food in household expenditure by income 
group, Indonesia, 1999 
 Group of yearly expenditure (Rp.000) 






>= 750 Average 
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Rice       
   Share (%) 35.2 23.8 11.9 8.7 8.4 26.6 
   Participation (%) 99.1 98.6 89.6 80.1 81.1 96.1 
Maize       
   Share (%) 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.7 
   Participation (%) 11.1 7.2 5.1 3.6 6.1 8.0 
Soybean       
   Share (%) 2.6 2.5 1.9 1.4 1.3 2.4 
   Participation (%) 59.8 66.7 65.3 63.3 59.0 63.7 
Cassava       
   Share (%) 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 
   Participation (%) 39.6 33.4 21.3 15.4 15.1 32.4 
Instant noodle       
   Share (%) 0.7 1.4 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.2 
   Participation (%) 28.1 40.5 53.2 53.8 47.8 39.0 
Chicken meat       
   Share (%) 0.5 1.6 2.9 3.1 3.2 1.4 
   Participation (%) 6.3 20.4 39.4 44.1 44.7 20.1 
Eggs       
   Share (%) 1.7 2.6 2.8 2.4 2.5 2.3 
   Participation (%) 45.4 61.5 70.0 67.5 70.0 57.7 
Total food       
   Share (%) 74.9 67.4 53.0 44.5 31.3 68.5 
Total  expenditure 
(Rp.000) 
361.6 630.3 1,208.4 1,785.9 3,511.5 606.0 
No. of  HH 
samples 
17,282 30,545 3,137 678 272 51,914 
Source: Calculated from BPS's SUSENAS 1999 
How important are secondary food crops for Indonesia? 
According to Shindo (1991) many countries in Asia during the 1970s 
and 1980s pushed their secondary food crops onto marginal and 
rain-fed lands. In Indonesia, this is also the case, despite maize 
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accounting for 40 to 60 percent, and soybean meal for 20 percent of 
animal feed.  










    
Rice :    
1996 51,102 11,570 4.42 
1997 49,377 11,140 4.43 
1998  48,472 11,613 4.17 
1999 b) 48,663 11,494 4.23 
    
Maize :    
1996 9,307 3,743 2,49 
1997 8,771 3,355 2,61 
1998  10,059 3,834 2,62 
1999 (b) 8,682 3,267 2,64 
    
Soybean :    
1996 1,517 1,279 1,19 
1997 1,357 1,119 1,21 
1998  1,306 1,091 1,20 
1999 b) 1,296 1,076 1,21 
    
a Rice (unhusked paddy), maize (dry kernel) and soybean (dry seed) 
b Estimate 
Source: Suryana et al. (1999) and Solahuddin (1999). 
 
During the past 30 years rice accounted for almost 65 percent of 
harvested area, maize around 20 percent and both soybean and 
cassava around 7 percent each (Table 8.2). Secondary food crops are 
not competing with rice in terms of land use. Indonesian farmers 
use irrigated land for rice. Farmers plant secondary food crops on 
irrigated land only in the dry season, when water is not sufficient for 
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rice to grow. Such crop rotations help reduce the incidence of pests 
and diseases. However, there is a trend to push secondary food 
crops to less fertile, non-irrigated lands. 
Table 8.1 shows that only 8 percent of the population consumes 
maize, 33 percent cassava and 64 percent soybeans, compared with 
96 percent for rice. Out of the 69 percent of aggregate income spent 
on food, maize and cassava account for less than 1 percent and 
soybean 2 percent. For rice, the proportion is 27 percent. About 39 
percent of households consume instant noodles, which are 
processed from wheat, a fully imported raw material. 
Rice is the main food of 96 percent of the Indonesian population. 
Beyond its economic value, it also has political and social 
importance. Only after 1985, when Indonesia achieved rice self-
sufficiency, did the government turn to maize and soybean as crops 
worthy of attention in terms of policy targets and R&D funding. 
Since the economic crisis, the government has turned back to rice. 
Old political and social considerations have resulted in a return to a 
policy bias towards rice, regardless of the economic possibilities for 
other crops.  
The growth of animal feed industries, the increase in demand for 
fresh and processed products due to income increases, and derived 
demand due to increasing demand for chicken and eggs are driving 
an increase in demand for secondary food crops. In addition, 
secondary crops are becoming increasingly important as staple 
foods.  
Pre-crisis policies on secondary food crops 
By presidential decree in 1978, BULOG’s mandate was to maintain 
the price of rice, sugar, wheat and other main food (including maize 
and soybean). The role of BULOG decreased after the economic 
crisis, in response to the demands of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). A floor price policy, implemented in 1980 and applied 
to maize, soybeans and mung beans, was terminated in 1990.  
The following are some details of policies implemented for each of 
the secondary crops. 
170  Indonesia in a reforming world economy   
 
Maize  
The floor price policy of maize was initially implemented on 
February 1978 on the basis of production costs, the market price of 
the previous year and the expected possible producers’ margin. The 
floor price was adjusted every year. This policy was ineffective, as 
the prevailing farm gate market price was generally higher. 
An input subsidy was implemented to encourage farmers to use 
improved technology such as fertilisers. Yet fertiliser subsidies were 
















Source: Erwidodo and Prayogo Hadi (1999).  
 
considerations, the government gradually reduced the subsidy. In 
1998, only a subsidy on urea fertiliser remained, but it too was 
removed in 1999. 
BULOG and village cooperatives (KUD) had a large influence on  
marketing and distribution policies. KUD purchased maize from 
farmers and then sold it to BULOG. In the early years, the 
procurement policy was considered manageable, and up to 1988 
BULOG had control over inter-island and inter-provincial 
marketing.  
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However, major production areas of maize spread to new cropping 
lands in Sulawesi and Sumatra, while consumption remained 
concentrated in Java. Transport costs became increasingly 
expensive, as BULOG centralised sales to maintain price 
stabilisation. In 1988, BULOG relinquished its role for all crops other 
than rice.  
Self sufficiency in maize fell over the mid-1990s (Figure 8.2). In 1998, 
domestic production of maize increased, but the demand by feed 
industries sharply declined due to the economic crisis: most poultry 
farms collapsed, the farm gate price dropped and farmers suffered 
substantial losses and increasing insolvency. In trade policy, the 
main instrument was an import tariff, but this was eventually 
removed. 
Soybean  
Soybean received special attention because of its importance as a 
main source of protein. Indonesia has been a net importer of 
soybean. To reduce Indonesia’s dependence on the international 














Source: Erwidodo and Prayogo Hadi (1999). 
 
objective of self-sufficiency in soybean in 1986. A series of 
intensification programs were implemented to increase soybean 
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production. The government defined areas for expansion, and 
improved seed distribution and credit provision. 
Import controls have insulated the domestic price of soybeans from 
the international market. BULOG imported and sold soybeans to 
private traders or producers of tofu and tempe (the cooperatives 
called KOPTI) at a higher price. However, since 1988, soybean 
imports have been mainly in the form of beans since domestic 
soybean meal industries began operating. To protect that infant 
processing industries, an import tariff of 35 percent was imposed on 
soybean meal. The government also used a floor price policy, but 
without effect as again it was usually lower than the farm gate price. 
In June 1991, the government removed BULOG’s monopoly on 
soybean meal importation. In addition, the import tariff was 
reduced from 10 to 5 percent, but a 30 percent surcharge was 
implemented. In 1993, this surcharge was removed and in return the 
government implemented a local content requirement: the feed 
industries were obliged to purchase 40 percent of their need from 
domestic sources. In June 1994, the local content requirement was 
reduced to 30 percent, and the import tariff was eliminated. Local 
content was further reduced to 20 percent and then in April 1996, all 
trade regulation on soybean meals was completely removed. 
Cassava  
There has been no prominent government policy related to 
production of cassava, with attention instead paid to marketing and 
trade. In domestic marketing, business associations were expected to 
deal within the cassava marketing system. The association has to 
ensure the procurement of dried and sliced manioc at the minimum 
price of 70 percent of current FOB price at the exporter level. The 
association also has to buy cassava from farmers at the price of 13.6 
percent of the current tapioca price. 
The government imposed an export quota and import tariff on 
cassava. The quota applied only to exports to Europe, ostensibly to 
prevent the price of cassava falling, despite Indonesia’s small share 
(8 percent) of global cassava trade. This annual quota increased from 
500,000 tons in 1982 to 700,000 tons in 1983-1984, and eventually to 
825,000 tons in 1985-1988. This remained unchanged, but was 
attained only between 1988 and 1993 (see Figure 8.4). 
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An import tariff was imposed on various cassava products. The 
highest rate, 30 percent, was imposed on primary products 
including dried-sliced cassava and pellet. The lowest, on manioc 
starch, was 5 percent. The entire tariff remained unchanged until 













Source: Erwidodo and Prayogo Hadi (1999). 
 
Wholesalers and factory owners dominated the marketing structure 
of cassava, setting the price. Prices of fresh and dried cassava 
fluctuated erratically year by year, leading to generally low farm 
gate returns. In response, a price agreement policy was 
implemented in 1987. This was between farmers and cassava flour 
millers, and between traders and millers. The price for fresh cassava 
was agreed at 13.6 percent below the selling price of cassava flour 
and the price of dried cassava was 70 percent below the selling price 
of cassava chips/pellets. The average of fresh cassava at the farm 
gate in the year 1987 and 1988 was above the agreement level and 
hence encouraged farmers to increase production. Subsequently 
Indonesia was able to fulfil the cassava chip and pellet export quota 
to the European Community. However, the prices of fresh and dried 
cassava dropped in the year of 1989 and 1990 when the price 
agreement ceased. 
Post-crisis agricultural policy changes 
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On December 2, 1998 the government announced various 
deregulations. One was to end BULOG’s monopoly on imports of 
rice. Another was to impose an import tariff on food (including rice) 
of just 5 percent. Recognising the differences in production  costs 
across regions, the government set three regional floor prices for 
rice, i.e. Java plus several neighboring provinces (with floor price at 
Rp.1,400/kg unhusked rice, equivalent to Rp.2,390/kg rice), 
Sumatra (Rp.1,450/kg) and Eastern Indonesia (Rp.1,500/kg). 
The distribution of cheap rice was targeted to the poor (the families 
of laid-off workers and people under the poverty line). Each poor 
household was entitled to get 20 kg of rice at Rp.1,000/kg (about 
one third of the market price). 
Also, the subsidy on fertiliser was eliminated, as had already 
happened to pesticides and other agro-chemicals. PT PUSRI’s 
government-sanctioned monopoly on fertiliser distribution ceased. 
Any firm can now import and distribute fertiliser down to, and 
including, the district level. Cooperatives and local traders are 
encouraged to become local suppliers at the farm level. However, 
for specific remote areas, a distribution subsidy is still provided. PT 
PUSRI retains its responsibility to provide fertilisers to remote areas 
for the KUT program.  
Subsidised farm credit has widened its scope and its credit limit per 
hectare. The coverage of crops eligible for KUT was increased from 
19 to 34 commodities. The government has increased the ceiling of 
allocated credit funds from Rp.150 billion in 1997 to Rp.3,500 billion 
in 1998, and to Rp.6,500 billion in 1999. In Java, 50 percent of the 
total amount covers rice farming, compared with only 25 percent 
elsewhere. 
The interest rate of farm credit was lowered to only 10.5 percent. 
This implies a huge subsidy compared to even the pre-crisis period, 
let alone the current market interest rate. In 1996, the market interest 
rate was 20 percent and the rate in recent years has been well above 
30 percent (which includes a substantial risk premium).  
These deregulations may, in the long term, encourage Indonesian 
farmers to modernise, become self-reliant and business oriented. 
The role of government in this environment should be to improve 
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transport and communications infrastructure, particularly in more 
remote areas. These, together with the remarkable efforts of the 
government in raising literacy rates over the past three decades, 
should improve the access of farmers to necessary market 
information.  
What can secondary food crops expect from current policy 
adjustment? 
An important issue concerns greater regional autonomy that leads 
to decentralisation of development activities. The intent is that each 
province will focus on its own programs. Suryana et al. (1998) 
predict that in the future Java will concentrate on high value 
commodities such as horticulture, beef and dairy cattle, broiler and 
hens, fresh fish, prawns, and high quality rice to fulfill urban 
demand and provide export revenues.  
There is a rapid conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural 
uses in Java. Hence, the opportunity cost of agricultural land keeps 
increasing, indicating that secondary crops appear unlikely to have 
a bright future in Java. Any positive impact arising in Java from 
secondary crops will be through indirect impacts leading to lower 
input costs for feed industries and processed food. As the economy 
returns to growth, incomes will increase and so too will demands 
for secondary food crops. 
We now turn to modelling a scenario in which we assume that R&D 
funds have been diverted from rice to three secondary crops, 
soybeans, maize and cassava. We use WAYANG, a 65 sector model 
of the Indonesian economy with features designed to capture key 
elements of a strongly agrarian economy (see Warr, Marpudin, 
daCosta and Tharpa 1998; Wittwer 1999 and Appendix 1 of this 
volume). WAYANG is designed to depict a medium-term time 
horizon, possibly of two to four years, in which we compare the 
effects of a modelled shock to a base case. In agricultural industries, 
unskilled labour and variable capital are mobile between industries. 
The land allocation, which accounts for about one-fifth of total costs 
of production, is assumed fixed. And fertiliser is a fourth primary 
factor of production, substitutable with labour, capital and land in 
agriculture. These assumptions imply that there is a moderate 
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degree of supply responsiveness, but not as much as if we assumed 
that land also was transferable between activities.  
The modelled scenario is an all-input productivity increase of 10 
percent for these three crops relative to the base case. Our reasoning 
is based on the economic principle that in activities with a sub-
optimal level of investment, the rate of return or realised earning on 
that investment will be higher than if such activities receive an 
optimal level of investment. Therefore, on the premise that 
increasing investment on these crops moves R&D investment closer 
to an optimal allocation between activities, we impose a 
productivity gain to denote the increase in returns arising from this 
reallocation.  
First, we consider the impact of the assumed productivity gain on 
these secondary crops (Table 8.3). Each of the three crops gains. For 
soybeans and maize, most of the output gain is import replacing. 
For cassava, the local market absorbs all the increased output. The 
only other industry we note is fertiliser: as output growth for both 
maize and cassava is slightly smaller than the reduction in input 
requirements, in percentage terms, derived demands for inputs 
decrease in each of these industries. The reduced derived demand 
for fertiliser results in a slight decrease in fertiliser output.  
Table 8.3: Effects of productivity gains in soybean, maize and 
cassava cropping in Indonesia 
(percentage change from base case) 
Industry 
output 
Local market Import Export Total output 
Soybeans 0.4 6.7 0.0 7.1 
Maize 0.9 7.8 0.0 8.8 
Cassava 6.3 0.0 0.0 6.3 
Fertiliser -0.3 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Household real consumptiona 
Rural 1 0.11 Rural 6 0.18  
Rural 2 0.21 Rural 7 0.12  
Rural 3 0.12 Urban 1 0.18  
Rural 4 0.15 Urban 2 0.09  
Rural 5 0.05 Urban 3 0.27  
Regional impacts  Labour income Output Employment 
Java/Bali  0.05 0.23 0.00 
Sumatra  0.06 0.19 0.07 
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Other  -0.25 0.30 -0.07 
a Rural 1 = landless; Rural 2 = < 0.5 ha; Rural 3 = 0.5-1.0 ha; Rural 4 = > 1.0 ha; Rural 5 = 
low income, non-ag.; Rural 6 = medium income, non-ag., Rural 7 = high income, non-
ag; Urban 1 = low income; Urban 2 = medium income; Urban 1 = high income. 
Source: Authors’ WAYANG model projections.  
All households gain from productivity growth in secondary crops. 
Aggregate consumption is the only macroeconomic entity on the 
consumption side to be endogenous, so that all variations from base-
case welfare are reflected in household consumption.  
Finally, at the regional level, there is an increase in output in each 
region, although returns to labour decrease in regions other than 
Java/Bali and Sumatra. Consequently, there is a small 
transmigration from other regions to Sumatra. The issue of what 
happens to agricultural land with urban encroachment in Java is not 
modelled, and in all probability would result in output and 
employment declines in Java relative to other regions. 
In conclusion, we believe that Indonesia will gain from a greater 
emphasis on secondary crops via a re-allocation of R&D funds. 
Output gains depend both on the assumed magnitude of 
productivity growth arising from a partial redirection of funds, and 
on the ability of individual industries to export.  
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Effects of agricultural policy reform in 
Indonesia on its food security and 
environment  
ERWIDODO, GLYN WITTWER AND RANDY STRINGER  
The ongoing socioeconomic crisis enveloping Indonesia has 
dramatically reversed decades of rapid economic growth, steady 
progress in poverty reduction, and substantial improvements in 
food security.1  Before the crisis, Indonesia was frequently cited as 
one of the highest performing Asian economies with per capita GDP 
growth in the top 10 percent of all developing countries. Since the 
crisis began in August 1997, however, the rupiah’s value dropped 
by as much as 80 percent before a partial recovery. In 1998, inflation 
soared to an estimated 100 percent; and GDP fell by an estimated 14 
percent in 1998 (World Bank, 1998). Indonesia’s poor are especially 
vulnerable to the falling incomes, increasing prices and rising 
unemployment and underemployment brought on by these crisis-
induced events. World Bank simulations suggest a 12 percent 
decline in real GDP in 1998 would add some 9 million people to the 
more than 20 million living in poverty before the crisis began 
(World Bank, 1998). 
                                                 
1There were four key microeconomic causes of Indonesia’s crisis: the rapid 
build up of private debt; well-recognised flaws in the banking system; 
inadequate governance; and the timing of the crisis in relation to political events 
(World Bank, 1998). 
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Indonesia’s capacity to address the crisis initially was complicated 
by forest fires, drought, floods and a sharp decline in crude oil 
prices. During 1997, one million hectares of forest fires in 
Kalimantan and Sumatra damaged ecosystems, destroyed crops, 
disrupted transport and tourism, increased the incidence of 
respiratory problems and strained Indonesia’s relations with 
neighbouring Singapore and Malaysia (Solahuddin, 1998). Estimates 
of the economic damage to Indonesia’s logging and timber 
industries (excluding environmental and health costs) are set at 
more than US$900 million (Tay, 1998). One estimate of the 1997 
fire’s impact on increased health care costs and foregone tourism 
income for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore is US$1.4 billion 
(Tay, 1998). 
A prolonged drought throughout 1997/98 reduced export crop 
production and, more importantly for the country’s food security 
objectives, contributed to a large drop in paddy production. Initial 
estimates suggest that the 1998 paddy crop is nearly 10 percent 
below the 1996 production level (FA0, 1998; CBS, 1999). The 
drought’s impact has been worse in the islands of the country’s east, 
which is drier and contains a higher proportion of low-income 
households than Java. 
Around one-third of the country’s population spend 69 percent or 
more of their total expenditures on food (SUSENAS, 1996). Thus, the 
collapsing demand, rising unemployment, falling food production, 
increasing food prices and rapidly expanding numbers of 
malnourished has stressed the fundamental role agriculture must 
play in revitalizing the economy. The agricultural sector’s potential 
to contribute has been greatly enhanced by crisis-induced policy 
reforms that have removed many of the long-standing disincentives 
facing producers, traders and processors. This dramatically changed 
policy environment provides an important foundation for a partial 
re-agriculturalisation of the economy. 
One purpose of this chapter is to provide insights into how 
agriculture can contribute to overcoming the negative consequences 
of the crisis in the medium-term period. A computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of Indonesia, WAYANG, is used to model 
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the consequences of a real devaluation, a productivity decline and a 
loss of the country’s endowment of productive factors. WAYANG is 
a single-country, 65-sector CGE model of the Indonesian economy.2 
The analysis focuses on medium-term shifts in production across 
industries to provide some indication of expected output changes 
arising from one key crisis-related impact: a real devaluation of the 
rupiah.  
This chapter is organised into five sections. An overview of how the 
socio-economic crisis has impacted on the agricultural sector is 
followed by details the agriculture-related policy responses induced 
by the crisis. The modelling scenarios and results are then discussed, 
before finishing with some concluding comments.  
Crisis-related impacts on rural communities and 
agriculture 
Among the on-going concerns facing agricultural policymakers is 
what the devaluation means for food security and what can be done 
to minimize the negative consequences for both food production 
and access to food. The devaluation’s direct and indirect impacts on 
food consumers and producers work in opposing directions. For 
example, while agricultural wages represent an important cost 
component for food production, they are also the primary income 
source for many households. In part, the crisis shocks should 
encourage food production since drops in real wages reduce food 
production costs, which would provide incentives to boost 
production. 
For wage-dependent landless workers, however, falling incomes 
reduce food demand, counteracting the production-enhancing 
effects of lower production costs. Likewise, as the price of export 
crops increase relative to non-exported food crops, producers will 
                                                 
2 The model, detailed in Wittwer (1999) and summarised in Appendix 1 of 
this volume, is adapted from an earlier version developed at ANU by Peter 
Warr and associates, and ORANI-G. 
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shift land, labour and other inputs towards the more-profitable 
opportunities.   
It is ironic that in Indonesia, agricultural households tend to be more 
vulnerable to food insecurity than urban residents. Before the crisis, 
the average per capita expenditure of agricultural households was 
about 57 percent higher than the poverty line (World Bank, 1998). In 
contrast, average per capita expenditure among households in both 
manufacturing and construction was more than twice the poverty 
line. Unskilled agricultural wages have fallen in real terms as urban 
workers whose jobs have been lost in construction, manufacturing, 
and import-dependent food processing activities migrated back to 
the countryside to look for work. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that this influx of labour into the 
countryside is placing downward pressure on agricultural wages. 
Table 9.1 presents evidence of real wage declines in Indonesia 
during the period of January 1997 to January 1998. As expected, 
regions closest to Jakarta, Central and East Java saw the largest 
declines (12 percent and 13 percent, respectively). 
Table 9.1: Changes in real wages for weeding in selected 
provinces of Indonesia, 1997-98 
Province 12 Month Change 6 Month Change
  Jan 97 to Jan 98 July 97 to Jan 98
West Java -6.8 -10.0 
Central Java -12.1 -13.4 
East Java  -13.1 -11.2 
West Sumatra -5.2 -5.0 
South Sulawesi -8.0 -5.7 
West Nusa Tenggara -8.2 -12.0 
Source: World Bank (1998b).he devaluation provides increased opportunities for 
expanding traditional exports crops (cocoa beans, coffee, tea and fishery and forestry 
products), as well as exports of fruits and vegetables (See Figure 9.1). As prices of 
vegetables increase relative to rice prices, producers tend to substitute vegetables for rice 
production. Table 9.2 highlights the trend in relative output prices. The price ratio of 
paddy to agricultural wages changed significantly compared with the price ratio of 
vegetables to agricultural wages between August 1997 and June 1998. As the relative 
output prices of these two commodities continued to diverge, policymakers attempting to 
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control rice prices through generalised subsidies found it increasingly difficult to 
compensate rice producers via input subsidies. 
Figure 9.1:  Wholesale price indices for export commodity groups, 
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workers and consumers who depend on the market for their food 
supplies. For agricultural workers, declining real wages harm their 
ability to feed their families, to school their children, and to provide 
adequate health care.  These are especially important concerns for 
Indonesia where 11 million rice producers cultivate less than 0.35 
hectares and an estimated 7 million rural households are landless 
(Tabor, Dillon and Sawit, 1998). 
Figure 9.2 provides data showing just how much faster food prices 
rose relative to the average wage. The partial equilibrium impact on 
income of a 40 percent rise in the real price of rice (the estimated 
price rise if trade were liberalised at prices prevailing in late 1998) is 
simulated in Table 9.3. The income losses range from 7.5 percent to 
14 percent. Income declines of this proportion for the poorest one-
third of the country’s population have serious implications for the 
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taken into account in the simulations presented in Table 9.3, is that 
rice producers gain from the real price rise. 
Table 9.2  Increase in the price of paddy and vegetables relative to 
wages, various regions of Indonesia, 1997-98 
 August 1997 to June 1998 
Province (% change) 
 Paddy Vegetables
West Java 35 79
Central Java 30 44
Yogyakarta 54 156
East Java 31 89
North Sumatra 9 86
South Sulawesi 32 23
Source: Authors' calculations based on BPS (1998). 
 
 
Figure 9.2:  Indices of farm household consumer prices, food 
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Table 9.3: Effects of a 40 percent real price rise for rice, Indonesia, 
1998 












Rice expenditure share  44% 34% 26% 21% 15% 
Income elasticity 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.3 
Compensated demand 
elasticity 
-0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
Price elasticity (Slutsky 
Equation) 
-0.44 -0.34 -0.30 -0.25 -0.19 
Kg purchased/mth before 
price rise 
6.25 7.39 8.26 8.70 8.73 
Price per kg before price 
rise 
850 850 850 850 850 
Real rice price rise (=40%) 1190 1190 1190 1190 1190 
Kg purchased/mth after 
price rise 
5.14 6.35 7.11 7.78 6.97 
Food expenditure share  83% 72% 69% 66% 62% 
Expenditure on food 
(Rupiahs/month) 
10,095 13,475 18,305 23,384 31,100 
Expenditure on cereals  
(Rupiahs/month) 
6,467 7,115 7,705 7,998 8,377 
Expenditure on rice 
(Rp/month) 
5,315 6,280 7,024 7,392 7,418 
Total monthly 
expenditure  
12,210 18,676 26,537 35,463 49,896 
Loss in consumer income -14% -12% -9% -8% -6% 
Source: SUSENAS, 1996 and authors’ partial equilibrium calculations 
 
The Ministry of Population’s (BKKBN) estimates for May 1998 were 
that 16.7 percent of the households in Indonesia (some 34 million 
individuals) could be classified as badly impoverished -- households 
that were unable to satisfy their basic needs. Table 9.4 presents data 
on changes in poverty since 1976, including estimates of the growth 
in poor since the crisis. The Ministry of Food and Horticulture 
estimates that 40 percent could have been classified as food insecure. 
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The highest absolute number of food insecure rural households are 
in Java. 
Food insecurity and malnutrition have immediate consequences for 
those households effected. Chronic malnutrition blinds, otherwise 
debilitates and kills, reducing physical capacity, lowering 
productivity, stunting growth, and inhibiting learning. In the 
world’s poorest regions and countries, one-third of deaths among 
children are due to malnutrition (Del Roso 1992). Decreased access 
to food and nutrition leads to declining learning capacity, school 
performance, and school attendance; to more school and work days 
lost to sickness; and to lower earnings, shorter work lives and a less 
productive work force. 
Table 9.4:  Incidence of poverty in Indonesia, 1976 to 1998a 
 Millions Percentage 
Year Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
1976 9.5 44.2 54.2 38.8 40.4 40.1 
1980 9.4 32.8 42.3 29.0 28.4 28.6 
1990 7.2 17.2 25.9 16.8 14.3 15.1 
1996 10.0 15.3 22.5 9.7 12.3 11.3 
1998 (est.) 15.0 32.0 53.0 20.0 30.0 26.0 
1998 severely 
food insecure 
9.6 24.3 32.0  
a 1976-1996 are BPS statistics while the 1998 values are estimated by Tabor et al. 
Source: BPS (1998) and Tabor et al. (1998).  
In a review of the crisis, Tabor, Dillon and Sawit (1998) argue that 
three events contributed to a significant increase in absolute 
poverty: a fall in average real incomes of 10 to 14 percent, a rise in 
urban unemployment (estimated to be as high as 15 million 
persons), and a rise in food prices facing the poor. Between January 
1996 and May 1998, food prices rose 11 percent in real terms. Tabor 
et al. (1998) estimate that the crisis could have caused an increase of 
8 million urban poor and 23 million rural poor; and there would be 
approximately 9.6 million urban and 24.3 million rural food-
insecure individuals in mid-1998 (Table 9.4). 
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The highest estimate of poverty levels was that of the Ministry of 
Women’s Affairs. This ministry classified 56 percent of the 
population, or around 113 million persons, as poor. In 1996, 22.5 
million persons were classified as absolutely poor of which about 7.2 
million were in urban area and 15.3 in rural area. Another 37 million 
were reported as “nearly poor”. With falling real wages and shocks 
to food production, the great majority of these “nearly poor” 
households would have fallen below the poverty line. This implies 
that 50-55 million persons could be classified as absolutely poor, of 
which 38 million live in the rural areas.  
These crisis-related impacts have long-term consequences for future 
income, agricultural productivity and aggregate production 
possibilities. Many households respond to negative economic shocks 
by pulling their children out of school. An estimated 17.5 million 
school age children (out of a total 53 million) in 1997 were reported 
to be out of school to earn an income (Tabor et al. 1998). Even with 
the planned abolition of school fees, these numbers would have 
risen as the increased opportunity cost of keeping children in school 
rose. Government estimates suggest that about 6 percent of primary 
school students and 13 percent of junior secondary school students 
were at risk of dropping out (approximately 1,650,000 and 1,100,000 
students respectively), while an additional 400,000 primary school 
graduates were expected to not continue their education (World 
Bank, 1998)3. 
The outlook for health is also sobering. The sharp exchange rate 
depreciation raised the prices of medicines, vaccines, contraceptives 
and other medical supplies. Drug prices increased two- to three-fold 
relative to when the crisis began. In some communities, health 
centres have had to close because of a lack of medicines. 
Recent estimates suggest that primary, junior and secondary school 
drop-out rates rose rapidly. Government estimates presented in 
                                                 
3 As cited by Tabor et al. (1998), UNICEF estimates that 8 percent of the 30 
million primary school children and 14 percent of the 10 million junior high 
school students droped out of school as a result of the economic crisis. 
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Table 9.5 show that drop-out rates more than doubled from 1997/98 
to 1998/99. Evidence from the much smaller 1986/87 shock, 
however leads one to expect the overall impacts to be large. During 
that period enrolment rates fell from 62 percent to 52 percent at the 
junior secondary level and took a decade to recover. Virtually the 
entire decline was from poor households (Atinc and Walton 1998).  
Table 9.5:  The impact of the crisis on school enrolments in 
Indonesia, 1998-99 
   Change 98/98 to 98/99 
 1997/98 1998/99 Absolute Percentage 
PRIMARY       
Enrolment (millions) 29.27 28.99 -0.28 -1%
Drop-outs (millions) 0.76 1.65 0.89 117%
Drop-out rate 2.6% 5.7%  119%
JUNIOR SECONDARY  
Enrolment (millions) 9.69 8.33 -1.36 -14%
Drop-outs (millions) 0.47 1.11 0.64 136%
Drop-out rate  5.1% 11.5%  126%
Source: World Bank (1998a). 
 
The drop in enrolment levels raises serious medium- and long-term 
growth implications for Indonesia’s economy. The development 
literature suggests strongly that basic education, skill development 
and institutional reforms are all necessary conditions for increasing 
productivity growth and taking advantage of the increased 
competition resulting from market liberalisation (Krueger, 1995; 
Rodrigo and Thorbecke, 1997; World Bank, 1998a). While measuring 
how much basic education actually contributes to economic growth 
remains part of an ongoing empirical debate, few dispute the 
fundamental role played by education in the agricultural 
development process. Schooling and basic education foster 
agricultural innovations, enhance producers’ abilities to reallocate 
resources in response to policy reforms and to adapt to fluctuating 
input and output prices, and promote the use of new technologies, 
including best practice resource management techniques (World 
Bank, 1998; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1993, 1995, 1996). 
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Crisis-induced agricultural policy responses  
Crisis-induced policy responses impact directly and indirectly on 
producer and consumer price incentives, affecting competition in 
output, input and credit markets, and the use of natural resources 
and environmental services. Moreover, agricultural suppliers, 
producers, processors, and traders are influenced directly by the 
policy response and indirectly via how producers and consumers 
respond. 
Among its many attempts to address the impacts of the drought and 
the economic crisis, Indonesia’s policymakers worked with the 
international community to establish a series of appropriate policy 
responses. The Minister For Economy, Finance and Industry 
provided periodically a letter of intent to the Managing Director of 
the International Monetary Fund which included an outline of the 
government’s policy reforms and specified the types and timing of 
the actions to be taken. 
The macroeconomic, trade and agriculture policy reforms 
implemented in response to the crisis were wide ranging. Since 
September 1997, Indonesian policy-makers have taken steps to 
reduce tariffs on more than 500 food items to 5 percent. They have 
eliminated local content requirements for dairy products and 
dismantled export controls for plywood and wood products. The 
government has withdrawn BULOG’s import and trading 
monopolies for wheat, wheat flour, garlic, sugar and soybeans, 
abolished the clove monopoly and reduced agricultural export taxes 
to 10 percent. Inter-provincial commodity trade restrictions have 
been eliminated. Other policy reforms include removing the export 
restriction on oil palm products, privatising plantations, estates and 
input suppliers, liquidating cooperatives and removing land use 
regulations restricting producer crop choices. 
The September 1998 memorandum includes an annex outlining a 
strategy for Indonesian food subsidies and another annex outlining 
a seven-point strategy for rice. Important food and agricultural 
sector reforms include eliminating BULOG’s monopoly on wheat, 
sugar and soybeans imports; suspending the VAT on rice and other 
essential commodities; eliminating wheat and sugar subsidies; 
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phasing out soybean subsidies; removing export bans on wheat, 
soybeans and sugar; eliminating import subsidies and relevant 
import duties for soybean meal and fishmeal; and for the first time 
in 30 years, allowing private traders to import rice. 
Unlike pre-crisis reforms that were often motivated by budgetary 
constraints, these price and trade reforms reflect the government’s 
inability to enforce export bans and to hold down food prices in 
local markets. Illegal exports and trader markups forced the early 
implementation of these policies. Indeed, the government’s price 
interventions have not been effective. From January to June 1998, 
BULOG raised procurement and market operation prices three 
times. Procurement prices for paddy were increased to Rp.600, then 
to Rp.700 and finally to Rp.1000 per kilogram in June. BULOG also 
attempted to lower rice prices for consumers by selling large 
quantities in the market at Rp.1750 to Rp.2000 per kilogram. Prices 
remained high, among other reasons, because the rice distribution 
system allowed speculators to buy subsidised rice and sell it at 
higher prices. In addition, large amount of rice were being exported 
illegally to neighbouring countries.4 In an attempt to curb 
speculation, BULOG raised its reference price to between Rp.2000 
and Rp.3500 per kilogram, depending on the quality of the rice.  
Due to the lower than expected second rice harvest, panic hoarding, 
and sharp rises in rice prices, the targeted rice price program 
(covering 2 million people) was expanded to cover 7.5 million 
people by October, and potentially 15 million families by 1999. In 
addition, BULOG plans to increase substantially the quantity of rice 
released into the market at below market prices and maintained a 
high release level until the main harvest. 
                                                 
4 More than 1900 tons of rice were seized at Sunda Kelapa harbour in 
North Jakarta as it was being prepared to be exported to Kuching, Malaysia. 
The rice was found in boats, containers, trucks, and warehouses at the harbour. 
The remaining 380 tons were seized from traders who tried to mixing low 
quality rice and good quality rice before selling it in open market to gain greater 
profit. 
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Making the best use of agriculture to address poverty and food 
security 
One of the most important short-term goals for improving food 
security in Indonesia was to utilise the poverty reduction potential 
of its agricultural sector. Periods of high agricultural growth rates 
are associated with falling rural poverty and increasing food 
security  (Binswanger and von Braun 1991; Timmer 1992; Bell and 
Rich 1994; Johnson 1993). Strong agricultural growth leads to lower 
food prices (for urban consumers and rural net-food buyers), 
increased income generating opportunities for food producers and 
jobs for rural workers (thus reducing rural-urban migration, with 
positive consequences for real urban wage rates), and positive 
intersectoral spillover effects including migration, trade and 
enhanced productivity (Lipton and Ravallion, 1995; Timmer 1992). 
In the past, Indonesia’s rapid agricultural growth substantially 
reduced rural poverty, improved food security in both rural and 
urban sectors, and provided a significant demand-side stimulus for 
non-agricultural goods and services. 
Much of this past progress in providing increased food availability in 
Indonesia has resulted primarily from increased domestic food 
production. Despite rapid industrialisation, Indonesia’s cereal self-
sufficiency ratio increased from 90 percent to 95 percent, with rice 
yields increasing from 3.3 kg/ha to 4.3 kg/ha during this period 
between 1979/81 to 1989/91. Martin and Warr (1993) conclude that 
technical change in Indonesia has been faster in agriculture than in 
the rest of the rest of the economy due to such programs as rice 
intensification (BIMAS, INMAS, INSUS), public investment in 
irrigation and in adaptive research and dissemination of modern 
varieties, and the subsidies for credit, fertilisers and pesticides. 
Indonesia’s rice self-sufficiency initiatives involved a range of food 
and agricultural policies aimed at boosting rice production. The 
government established public investment programs, import 
restrictions, procurement policies and price controls. Rice 
intensification provided irrigation, fertiliser, pesticides, HYV seeds, 
credit extension, technical assistance and related capital 
improvements. Irrigation alone is credited with contributing to 
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around 50 percent of the growth in rice production through 
increased yields during the 1980s and early 1990s. In total, the rice 
area under HYVs increased by 75 percent since the late 1970s, 
bringing the new technology to 3.5 million hectares and 6 million 
farmers. 
The subsidised inputs and credit, expanded marketing channels and 
extension services all contributed to sharp increases in fertiliser and 
pesticide use. Fertiliser subsidies kept the retail price 40 percent 
below its economic value and helped keep Indonesian farmgate 
prices among the lowest in Asia during the 1980s. Fertiliser 
applications increased by 500 percent in many areas, with 
applications rates more than twice those in the Philippines and three 
times those in Thailand (FAO, 1992). Subsidy programs maintained 
a prominent role throughout the 1980s. By 1987, the fertiliser 
subsidy alone consumed 35 percent of the government’s 
expenditure on agriculture. The irrigation subsidy cost about US 
$110 per hectare. Together, rice-related subsidies for fertilisers, 
pesticides, HYV seeds, credit and irrigation amounted to more than 
US $1 billion per years in the late 1980s. 
However, after three decades of steady gains in agricultural 
productivity, growth rates of food production began to lag. Annual 
rice yield growth in Indonesia has dropped from 5.2 percent in the 
1971-83 period, to 3.1 percent in 1984-90, to less than 3 percent since. 
Warning signs include declining growth of arable and irrigated 
areas, and increasing competition for resources between agriculture 
and other sectors. The use of inputs such as fertiliser and pesticides 
has declined due to environmental and health concerns. Falling 
world food prices have discouraged investment in agriculture, 
particularly agricultural research. 
Indonesia’s agricultural sector was growing relatively slowly even 
before the drought and economic crisis hit. The same trend of 
declining agricultural comparative advantage in the process of 
industrialisation experienced by structural changes in developing 
countries worldwide. The share of agricultural output in total 
production in developing countries as a group has declined from 29 
percent in 1965 to 17 percent in 1990. In Indonesia, agriculture’s 
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share of GDP has fallen from 45 percent in the early 1970s to around 
17 percent in the mid-1990s and is expected to be less than 10 
percent by 2020 (Anderson and Pangestu, 1995).  
Anderson and Pangestu (1995) examine how three sets of influences 
affected structural change in Indonesia’s agricultural sector: external 
events, domestic macroeconomic and non-agricultural policies, and 
domestic food and agricultural policies. Their study suggests that 
while petroleum sector prices represent the most important external 
event influencing the country’s economic growth pattern (both the 
boom period during the 1970s and the critical 60 percent drop in real 
oil prices between 1982-86), it has been the prudent, market-driven 
approach to macroeconomic management and the liberalisation of 
foreign trade and investment since 1985 which laid the foundation 
for the continuous rapid economic growth in all sectors.5 
Modelling the aftermath of the Indonesian crisis 
The gravity of the problems facing Indonesia makes modelling of 
crisis-related scenarios a task that is potentially trivialising. 
Nevertheless, modelling can provide insights into adjustments to 
external shocks. On this basis, we present the projections of a real 
devaluation of the rupiah here to gain some insights into effects on 
average income and its distribution.  
WAYANG is a model of real activity, without a financial sector. 
Therefore, we are somewhat restricted in what we are able to model, 
as the devaluation of the rupiah was due to a collapse in the 
financial sector. We have explored two methods of ascribing a real 
devaluation to the model. In early attempts, we imposed a sharp 
decline in the Indonesia’s terms of trade on the model to induce a 
                                                 
5 While these polices and programs have been highly successful, 
Indonesia’s economic success is also due to an abundant natural resource base. 
Oil, natural gas, coal, tin nickel and gold are all found in substantial amounts, 
along with one of the world’s riches tropical commercial forests. With more 
than 13,000  islands, the county’s marine area is six times larger than its land 
area. Together renewable and exhaustible primary resources contribute 40 
percent of GDP. Primary sector exports account for 70 percent of total exports, 
with agriculture contributing about 50 percent of non-oil exports. 
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real devaluation of approximately the magnitude that has been 
observed since 1998. But the reality is that, at least in 2000, the terms 
of trade have improved relative to pre-crisis times due to the soaring 
price of crude oil and petroleum. And at no time was there any 
sharp deterioration in Indonesia’s terms of trade, indicating the 
financial rather than terms-of-trade origins of the rupiah’s decline. A 
recovery of the rupiah has not accompanied the improving terms of 
trade. This leads to an alternative method, to shock the balance of 
trade surplus within the model, in keeping with the theory that a 
real devaluation induces an increase in the international trade 
surplus. There are differences between the two approaches. The first 
allows us to depict the full magnitude of the observed real 
depreciation. But the second depicts more realistically the impact on 
the trade balance (imposed exogenously) and household 
consumption, while capturing only a fraction of the real 
depreciation. Available trade data indicate that the balance of trade 
surplus between 1997 and 2000 increased by around 10 percent of 
GDP. Within WAYANG, a shock of this magnitude induces a real 
depreciation of around 14 percent, perhaps only one half of the 
actual depreciation. 
Table 9.6:  Key closure choices in the WAYANG model of the 
Indonesian economya 
Variable capital (national) X Variable capital 
(industry) 
N 
National labour X Industry labour N 
National land X Industry land X 
Sector-specific capital (non-
ag.) 
X Tariff rate X 
Aggregate investment X Various tax rates X 
Wage shifter X Change in budget deficit X 
Import prices X Technological change X 
Export prices X Current account deficit X 
X = exogenous; N = endogenous. 
a Differences from Table 2 of the Wayang handbook (Wittwer 1999) are: x5tot, 
x2tot_i and delbudget are exogenous instead of f5tot2, omega and f1inc_tax.  
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Table 9.6 summarises the closures used in the simulation. The 
national stocks of both labour and mobile capital are exogenous, but 
endogenous at the industry level. That is, if an industry responds 
positively to a particular shock, it attracts labour and mobile capital 
from other industries. Since WAYANG usually simulates in a short- 
to medium-term time horizon, each non-agricultural industry 
includes specific capital as a factor of production. 
On the expenditure side at the macroeconomic level, the 
government’s budget balance remains exogenous, as does real 
government expenditure. Real investment also remains exogenous. 
This implies that the only component of real absorption to vary with 
any shock is aggregate household consumption. In reality, we 
would expect real government spending to decline in the short term 
relative to a base case. We would also expect households, in 
response to the crisis at least in the short term, to sell off savings in 
response to declining incomes, in order to maintain consumption. 
The modelled closure implies the opposite in the medium term.6 
Clearly, a large increase in the balance of trade surplus will have a 
large negative impact on the only endogenous component of real 
absorption, household consumption, for a given level of economic 
activity. This implies that our measure of welfare, which depends 
only on real consumption, will be sharply negative. 
The scenarios presented here assume a degree of adjustment within 
the Indonesian economy. As noted above, the Indonesian 
government has responded to the crisis by liberalising markets and 
by removing legislative restrictions on agricultural land use. Given 
the nature and extent of the crisis, a much longer period may be 
needed before agents respond fully to liberalisation and before 
market and social institutions begin operating effectively.  
In this experiment, the economy experiences a real devaluation in 
the medium term. The rupiah in the early part of 1998 suffered from 
                                                 
6 Consider the macroeconomic identity C + I + G = S + T + M. With the 
closure, G – T is exogenous and X – M increases. Since I is exogenous, this 
ensures that S, national savings, increases. That is, in the medium term, we 
would expect real investment to be funded increasingly by domestic savings 
following a real devaluation. 
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a classic overshoot, reaching a bottom of 15,000 to the US dollar. By 
late October 1998, its value had settled at around 7,500. In 2000, the 
rupiah followed many currencies in the world in depreciating 
markedly against the US dollar.  
Given the potential array of influences, the model is used to predict 
which industries might win and which might lose from the real 
devaluation. The magnitude of the gain or loss to a particular 
industry from a real devaluation depends on a number of 
influences, including the export intensity of sales of the industry’s 
output, the import intensity of production, overall cost changes, the 
fate of other industries intensive in purchases of the output of this 
industry, and the proportion of household sales in total sales. 
We turn first to industry outcomes. To assist in explaining an 
industry’s change in output, we apportion the change to the sum of 
three effects using Fan decomposition.7 This explains total sales as 
the sum of the local market, import share and export effects. A 
pattern we might expect across all sectors in response to a large real 
devaluation is for household purchases to decline, due to falling 
household expenditures. But since imports are now more expensive 
than domestic substitutes for most commodities, we might expect 
domestic purchases to increase relative to imports. That is, domestic 
purchases of a particular commodity may increase or decline, with 
substitution of the domestic for the imported commodity. 
In Table 9.7, we have separated all primary and manufactures 
sectors into “winners” and “losers” from the devaluation. We will 
explain the outcomes for several industries. First, note that real 
consumption declines for each household by between 14 percent (for 
“Urban3”: the high income urban household) and 21 percent (for 
“Rural4”: rural households in agriculture with more than 1 hectare 
of land). This means that the expenditure effect for each commodity 
will be negative, as there are no inferior goods in the model. In 
addition, the prices of all imports rise relative to CPI, although the 
                                                 
7 Fan decomposition is named after Mr Fan Mingtai of the Beijing Institute 
of Quantitative and Technical Economics. This is explained in the WAYANG 
technical document (Wittwer 1999). 
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price rises of many domestically-produced goods are less than CPI. 
Concerning domestic demand, some goods will have a negative 
price effect and some a positive effect, depending on whether the 
domestic-import composite consumer price rises or falls relative to 
CPI. Clearly, for goods with a high import weighting, the price 
effect will be negative. For all goods in all households, the negative 
expenditure effect dominates the outcomes, so that real 
consumption declines. But domestically-sourced household 
purchases of some goods increase. Among crop sectors that increase 
output in response to the devaluation, we discuss three: rubber, 
other estate crops and palm oil. For rubber, there are two sources of 
positive growth, as is evident in the local market and export 
columns in Table 9.7. The positive local market effect is due to sales 
as inputs to manufactured rubber and plastics, an industry that 
gains significantly with the devaluation. Direct exports of rubber 
also increase. Other estate crops suffer due to the expenditure effect, 
but a large export effect more than compensates for this, with a net 
gain in output.  
Oil palm also has a positive local market contribution to output (5.5 
percent, explaining all the output increase). This crop is an 
important input into manufactured oils & fats. As the latter 
manufacturing sector experiences a net increase in output due to the 
export contribution, this implies a positive local market sales effect 
for palm oil. Among other primary inputs, wood and other forest 
products also benefit from large local market contributions. This is 
due to purchases by bamboo & wood manufactures, which has a 
large increase in exports. The increase in output of other forest 
products is also due to a substantial increase in direct exports (9.5 
percent out of total output of 20.2 percent). Coal & ores and sea fish 
are other primary industries to benefit.  
Why do some crops lose from the real devaluation? Any commodity 
reliant on households for a large proportion of sales is likely to 
suffer a substantial negative local market contribution, due to the 
negative expenditure effect. We project output declines in maize (53 
percent of total sales are to households), cassava (74 percent) and 
vegetables and fruit (91 percent), because export expansion is not 
sufficient to compensate fully for reductions in local sales. Paddy 
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rice is another loser from the devaluation, as the expenditure effect 
dominates the outcome. Among manufactures that gain from the 
real devaluation, food processing and bamboo & wood benefit from 
large export contributions to growth.  
 
 
Table 9.7:  Estimated effects of a real depreciation in Indonesia 










Crops +     Manufacturing +     
Oth. Forestry 10.4 0.3 9.5 20.2 Nonfer. metals. 6.3 -1.8 20.3 24.8 
Oth. Estate crops -6.5 2.9 21.9 18.3 Oth manu. 7.8 3.7 12.4 23.9 
     Bamboo/wood -3.6 0.1 21.7 18.2 
Rubber 11.1 0.5 2.6 14.3 Yarn 9.2 -0.1 8.4 17.5 
Other crops -5.5 19.3 0.0 13.8 Chemical 4.1 8.5 5.0 17.5 
Fibre 13.4 0.3 0.1 13.8 Food proc. -5.5 2.4 18.3 15.2 
Tobacco -10.0 8.3 10.6 8.9 Textiles -1.7 2.5 12.7 13.5 
Oth. Agri. -4.2 0.7 11.6 8.0 Nonmetals -0.6 6.6 6.2 12.2 
Oil Palm 5.5 0.0 0.0 5.6 Manu paper -1.7 8.0 5.7 12.0 
Beans -5.7 9.6 0.4 4.3 Metal prod. -2.0 7.3 5.1 10.5 
Tea -4.8 3.8 4.2 3.2 Rubber & plastic -1.0 1.7 9.5 10.2 
Crops —     Basic iron 2.2 2.6 3.9 8.6 
Coconut -6.4 0.0 1.9 -4.5 Electrical -2.6 -0.2 11.4 8.6 
Maize -8.8 0.2 1.5 -7.1 Petrol -0.8 0.6 4.7 4.5 
Coffee -7.7 0.0 0.0 -7.7 Crude oil 2.6 -0.1 1.6 4.1 
Cassava -10.8 0.0 2.1 -8.6 Manu oils & fats -8.6 2.0 9.7 3.2 
Veg. & fruit -11.8 1.1 0.2 -10.5 Transport equip -4.9 0.8 6.7 2.5 
Clove -12.6 0.0 0.0 -12.5 Cement -2.2 0.1 2.2 0.1 
Paddy rice -13.2 0.0 0.0 -13.2 Manufacturing —     
Oth. primary +     Nonfer. metals. -9.3 7.5 0.6 -1.2 
Wood  11.2 0.5 0.2 11.9 Sugar cane -2.8 0.0 0.0 -2.8 
Coal & metal 
ores 
5.1 0.2 5.4 10.7 Manu. Flour -11.1 6.0 0.9 -4.2 
Oth. Mining -1.1 2.2 1.1 2.2 Manu. Oth food -12.0 4.2 4.2 -3.6 
Oth. primary 
— 
    Fertiliser -14.1 4.4 3.2 -6.5 
Seafish -8.7 0.0 4.6 -4.1 Beverages -13.7 5.8 1.2 -6.6 
Livestock -19.4 0.1 0.4 -18.9 Cigarettes -14.4 0.1 1.5 -12.8 
Meat prod. -22.6 0.7 0.0 -21.9 Milled rice -13.9 0.2 0.5 -13.2 
Poultry -24.0 0.5 0.0 -23.5 Household Aggregate consumption 
Regional   Output Rural 1 -19.4 
Java/Bali -0.4 Rural 2 -20.3 
Sumatra 0.4 Rural 3 -20.7 
Other 0.2 Rural 4 -20.9 
 Rural 5 -18.8 
200  Indonesia in a reforming world economy   
 
 Rural 6 -15.3 
 Rural 7 -18.2 
 Urban 1 -16.4 
 Urban 2 -18.3 
 Urban 3 -14.2 
Source: Authors' WAYANG model projections. 
 
There are several different reasons why some manufactures lose 
from the devaluation. Domestic household sales account for a large 
proportion of total sales of milled rice, flour, sugar, other food, 
cigarettes and beverages, so that they lose through the adverse 
expenditure effect. Fertiliser is treated within the model as a 
substitutable primary factor in agricultural production. Farmers 
therefore substitute out of fertiliser and into other primary inputs 
whose prices are less dependent on world markets.  
As mentioned, all households suffer a decline in aggregate 
consumption, which is tied to household income in WAYANG’s 
consumption function. Finally, we note that output in the Java/Bali 
region declines by 0.4 percent, while rising in Sumatra (0.4 percent) 
and the remaining islands (0.2 percent). Two of the crops gaining 
the most in percentage terms from the devaluation, rubber and other 
estate crops, are grown mostly in provinces other than in the 
Java/Bali region. Among the losing crop industries shown in Table 
9.7, Java/Bali accounts for in excess of 50 percent of production of 
all but coffee and clove. The other primary industries gaining from 
the depreciation are relatively small in Java/Bali. We assume in the 
database that Java/Bali accounts for 73 perc ent of service industry 
activity. Services, on a cost share weighted basis, suffer a decline in 
output of 2.0 percent due to the devaluation. In summary, the outer 
islands have the potential to increase economic activity as a 
consequence of the real devaluation. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the Indonesian government (with 
World Bank support) is attempting to address the rapid 
deterioration of access to and provision of education in the wake of 
the crisis. But the problem is potentially so large that even with 
active measures, millions of future producers are likely to have 
dropped out of school. We could attempt to model a decline in 
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productive capacity. On the other hand, it is possible that with a 
partial restoration of provision and participation in schooling, the 
progress made in previous decades in Indonesia in raising literacy 
levels will continue. In some regions, escalating civil unrest since the 
crisis started makes this unlikely for some time.  
One of the disturbing aspects of the real depreciation is the rising 
cost of some essential imports. The difficulties Indonesia faces in 
maintaining health services with the spiralling cost of 
pharmaceutical items is outlined above. An important concern is 
whether the social effects of these increasing costs may be far greater 
than indicated by the model. On the other hand, the model is not a 
forecasting tool. Even if the real depreciation persists for a number 
of years, the international price of many pharmaceutical items may 
fall over time. Within the scenario, a real depreciation induces 
substitution of domestically-produced for imported goods. 
Potentially, the depreciation could encourage increased 
manufacturing of pharmaceutics within Indonesia. Alternatively, 
importers may turn increasingly to cheaper generic brands, thereby 
alleviating some of the pain of rising costs.  
Since 1997, the crisis in Indonesian has resulted in capital flight, 
rising unemployment, civil disturbances, and the loss of social and 
market institutions. Modelling of these disruptions explicitly is 
beyond the scope of the WAYANG model. The depreciation exercise 
presumes that disruption is not so great as to prevent movement of 
some resources between industries in the medium-term. This partial 
movement alleviates some of the acute symptoms of the crisis. On 
the other hand, further mobility assumptions, in the longer term, 
would act to restore the economy to a growth path.  
Conclusion 
The depth and extent of the Indonesian economic crisis suggests that 
several years are required before the economy resumes its past 
growth rates. There appears to be a restoration of sorts under way in 
the new millennium, despite continuing civil unrest in some 
provinces. There is little doubt that international financial markets 
and investors will once more consider Indonesia favourably if peace 
202  Indonesia in a reforming world economy   
 
can be negotiated in various trouble spots in the archipelago. 
Conversely, continuing strife until now appears to have hindered 
the recovery of the rupiah since its initial collapse.  
Supposing the economy, in the absence of a crisis, had continued to 
grow at more than 5 percent a year. With the contractions in 1997 
and 1998 alone, the crisis would have the effect, by 2003, of reducing 
national income by around 25 percent from the counter-factual with 
no crisis (Figure 9.3). The “slow recovery” path shown in Figure 9.3 
indicates a more grave outcome, in which real income does not 
recover its 1996 level by 2003.  
The modelling in this chapter is an attempt to understand how and 
why the Indonesian economy has altered in the wake of the crisis. 
There are, however, several difficulties in using a comparative static 
approach to model elements of the crisis. For example, with the 
collapse of the rupiah has come inflation, as modelled. Inflation 
creates uncertainty. This in turn exacerbates a loss in investor 
confidence. Partial indexation of wages in Indonesia has the effect of 
increasing the share of income accruing to certain types of labour at 
the expense of other factors and, in an inflationary environment, can 
contribute to an increase in unemployment. As mentioned above, 
there is some evidence of falling wages in the agricultural sector. 
Indexed wages within manufactures would reduce the 
opportunities for such industries to take advantage of increased 
import substitution and export sales in response to the devaluation. 
Indexed wages have not been modelled in the scenario presented 
here. 
It would appear that no Asian economy has escaped the crisis of the 
late 1990s, but Indonesia has suffered more than other nations. The 
drought of 1997 alone would have caused difficulties that might 
have lasted beyond a year or two. Even without the dramatic capital 
flight and loss of investor confidence that occurred in the wake of 
the drought, it is highly probable that the economy would still have 
contracted in 1997. The stylised ‘no drought, no crisis’ growth path 
shown in Figure 9.3 assumes away a natural event and implies a 
growth rate that, in 1997 at least, would not have been possible even 
had the most judicious of economic management been in place for 
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some time. A more reasonable counter-factual from which to 
consider policy analysis is the ‘drought only’ growth path. The 
difference between the ‘slow recovery’ income and ‘drought only’ 
income by 2003 is around 30 percent, compared with around 10 
percent between the ‘rapid recovery’ and ‘drought only’ scenarios. 
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Impacts of trade policy reform on income 
distribution and poverty in Indonesia 
JOHANNA CROSER 
Globally, markets have become much more integrated in recent 
years. Such integration creates enormous opportunities for the 
world economy, bringing vast benefits for some, but losses, and 
maybe even suffering, for others. The tendency among trade 
economists for much of the last fifty years has been to argue that 
trade is Pareto improving, increasing the national income of all 
countries engaging in trade and eventually boosting all households 
when there has been sufficient time for re-structuring and 
adjustment to the changing circumstances. However, the focus on 
Pareto improvement and the ‘trickle down’ effect of trade reform 
appears no longer sufficient to justify opening up to global markets. 
Rather, recent debate has seen the focus shift specifically to how 
poor households are affected by the opening of markets – even 
though we know from economic theory that trade is not the first-
best income re-distribution measure except under limiting 
circumstances (Corden 1997).  
Whilst a number of different groups could be harmed by changing 
commodity and factor prices, many argue that what is happening to 
poor households should be of primary importance since they are 
most vulnerable and because the re-distributive nature of trade 
policy is marginalising and impoverishing poorer people relative to 
wealthier people in many parts of the world. There are fears that 
trade policies are causing price increases for basic necessities, 
employment losses for poor people working in contracting 
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industries, and declining unskilled wage rates, all contributing to 
worsening poverty.  
A series of recent papers have sought to quantify the effects of 
increasing global integration on the poor using quantitative 
modelling and detailed household consumption and income survey 
data1. This paper considers the issue in the single country context for 
Indonesia. Indonesia has been pursuing trade liberalisation policies 
since the 1970s. Unlike some countries whose dismantling of trade 
barriers has been across the board, Indonesia’s pattern of protection 
removal has been highly selective. Well into the 1990s tariffs 
remained high in certain sectors of the Indonesian economy such as 
certain basic chemicals, motor vehicles, plastics, leather, textiles and 
cosmetics. In addition, non-tariff barriers to trade, in the form of 
restrictive licensing and marketing arrangements, remain high in 
key intermediate industrial goods and strategic food sectors.    
For decades Indonesia has been committed to poverty alleviation. 
Up until the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, Indonesia had 
experienced substantial reductions in poverty. Agricultural research, 
rural education and health policies, pricing policy for basic 
consumption goods (such as rice), and a fairly successful family 
planning program contributed to substantial improvements in living 
conditions for poor families. Due to the increase in absolute poverty 
at the time of the Asian financial crisis, awareness has been diverted 
more strongly than ever to ways in which reform and rebuilding 
could improve the welfare of poor families, who tend to be 
concentrated in rural areas, particularly on the Western islands. 
Given the commitment to liberalisation and poverty reduction, this 
paper asks how would further trade liberalisation affect poverty 
alleviation and income distributional goals. Further trade reform is 
likely to have considerable re-distributive consequences. From 
existing theories, we might expect unskilled labour to benefit in real 
terms. Indonesia’s comparative advantage lies in unskilled labour 
                                                 
1 See McCullock, Winters and Cirera (2001) and Reimer (2002) for surveys 
of the emerging literature that seeks to quantify how international trade affects 
the poor in developing countries.  
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intensive goods, whose price would be expected to rise with more 
openness to trade (Stolper-Samuelson, 1941).  Specific capital used 
intensively in benefiting sectors might also experience real gains 
(Jones, 1971). In order to get more definite answers, we need to 
know about the structure of the Indonesian economy and the 
protection schedule. The WAYANG computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model of the Indonesian economy (see Appendix 
1 of this volume) captures that information. The model has seven 
rural and ten urban household groups classed according to factor 
ownership, enabling us to study between- and within-group income 
distributional issues.  
This chapter is structured as follows: the first section describes the 
CGE model and the methodology for analysing welfare changes, 
poverty, and income distribution following a trade policy shock. 
The second section presents the base trade simulation and the 
results, under a standard and alternative closure. The third section 
considers two important model extensions, first to see some regional 
disaggregation of the results, and second to see how the results 
change when imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale 
are introduced. The final section addresses some caveats on the 
results and concludes. 
A CGE framework for analysing income distribution, 
poverty and trade policy 
This chapter employs the WAYANG CGE model, developed 
initially by Warr and Azis (1997) and adapted by Wittwer (1999). 
The particular aggregation of the model chosen for this paper has 82 
industries each producing a single commodity (listed in Appendix 
Table 10A). The advantage of the WAYANG model in its original 
form for this paper is the inclusion of ten broad household groups. 
The household disaggregation allows the determination of the 
impact of policy changes on the welfare of different households 
classed according to socio-economic categories that are recognisable 
for policy purposes and that exhibit relatively stable characteristics.  
Table 10.1 shows the household classification.  
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Table 10.1:  Classification of households in WAYANG 
Household  Household description Population share (%)
rural1 Landless 10.0 
rural2 Small Cultivator (< 0.5ha) 27.3 
rural3 Medium Cultivator (0.5 – 1ha) 6.2 
rural4 Large Cultivator (> 1ha) 6.4 
rural5 Non-Ag Labour: Low Income 8.8 
rural6 Non-Labour: Rural  13.0 
rural7 Non-Ag Labour: High Income 1.5 
urban1 Urban Labour: Low Income 12.4 
urban2 Non-Labour:Urban 11.8 
urban3 Urban Labour: High Income 2.6 
SOURCE: Warr and Azis (1997). 
 
The sources of income for the ten household groups are exogenous 
in the model, shown in Table 10.2. Unskilled labour is the most 
important factor in the rural 1, rural 5 and urban 2 households. 
Besides the non-labour households, these groups are also the 
highest recipients of transfers. As expected, skilled labour 
contributes significantly to the wealthiest four household groups. 
With few exceptions, fixed capital is the most significant income 
source for all household income portfolios. This category includes 
interest, rent other than land rent (buildings etc..), dividends, 
imputed rent on housing and enterprise income from non-
agricultural production. 
Each household group also has a consumption profile that is 
exogenous in the model. In the original WAYANG model, the 
consumption shares were identical across the ten household groups. 
The shares were revised, to be more reflective of actual consumption 
patterns, for the purpose of analysing the poverty dimensions of 
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trade policy. SUSENAS2 1993 data was used from Levinsohn et al. 
(1999) 3. 
Table 10.2: Factorial sources of income for households in 
Indonesia 
(%) 




VCAa VCN b FCNc Land Transfers 
rural1 48 1 0 8 26 1 15 
rural2 25 6 1 15 45 1 6 
rural3 14 3 1 16 54 7 5 
rural4 8 4 1 18 57 7 6 
rural5 40 6 0 8 28 5 12 
rural6 13 25 0 11 33 2 16 
rural7 5 22 1 13 47 10 3 
urban1 24 13 1 14 42 3 4 
urban2 35 18 0 6 19 2 19 
urban3 1 24 1 17 52 3 1 
SOURCE: Wayang Database.  (a) Variable Capital used in Agricultural Sectors. (b) 
Variable Capital used in non-Agricultural Industries. (c) Fixed Capital used in non-
Agricultural industries. (d) Transfers including inter-household, government and foreign 
transfers.  
Modifications to incorporate income distribution 
Examining distributional issues in a multi-household model can 
take the form of between-group studies or between-&-within-group 
studies. WAYANG contains information on between-group 
differences in consumption and factor earnings. However, the 
model reveals nothing about within-group inequality, which is 
assumed to be exogenous. Assuming distributional neutrality 
within-groups can be justified by arguing that certain types of 
economic changes affect between-group distributions whilst leaving 
within-group relative distributions unchanged (Dervis et al., 1982). 
Azis et al. (2001) provide empirical support for this proposition for 
                                                 
2 SUSENAS is an extensive household consumption survey conducted every three 
years by the Central Bureau of Statistics (Badan Pusat Statistik, BPS).  
3 The more detailed consumption profile for the 82 commodities in WAYANG, and 
how it was adapted, is reported in Croser (2002).  
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Indonesia by looking at actual distributions before and after the 
Asian financial crisis. They conclude that the overall shape of 
income distribution remains stable through periods of adjustment.  
In choosing the distributional function, the majority of household 
studies assign a Pareto or lognormal distribution to accord with 
socio-economic characteristics of households (see for example, 
Dervis et al. 1982). In recent studies, use has been made of a more 
flexible beta distribution which can take on various asymmetric 
forms (for example, Decaluwe et al., 1999). Contrary to the 
lognormal, the beta function can be left-skewed, right-skewed or 
symmetric, enabling the distribution for, say, rural landless 
households to differ markedly with that for, say, large landowners. 
Bordley et al. (1996) provide empirical support for use of the beta 
distribution as a more appropriate functional form for income 
distribution analysis. 
The functional form of the beta distribution is given by: 
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and y  is income, mn is minimum income, mx is the maximum 
income, and p and q are parameters which together determine 
whether the distribution is skewed to the left, skewed to the right, or 
symmetric. Values of p and q can be estimated by non-parametric 
methods from survey data, or derived by a method of moments 
process, provided two or more moments of the distribution are 
known. For this paper, the beta distribution parameters are taken 
from Azis (2000) who estimates the actual non-parametric income 
distribution for each of the household categories in WAYANG from 
the 1996 SUSENAS sample of over 200 000 households. Each of 
these distributions is horizontally scaled to accord with the mean 
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household income in the 1993 database4. Table 10.3 shows the 
parameters and variables for constructing the beta distributions. 
Figure 10.1 shows the resulting income distributions for the ten 
WAYANG household groups.  
Table 10.3:  Variables and parameters for constructing beta 
distributions for Indonesia 












p c q c Group 
poverty 
(%)d 
rural1 16186 0 669 2.37 60.77 32.1 
rural2 17170 0 830 3.7 110.54 29.9 
rural3 44470 1 1910 3.7 110.54 2.5 
rural4 75430 1 2430 3.7 110.54 0.5 
rural5 39612 0 1813 3.16 64.35 2.0 
rural6 16102 0 873 2.01 33.83 19.6 
rural7 54449 8 2386 2.53 53.66 1.8 
urban1 39751 10 1591 2.19 55.72 9.6 
urban2 24972 48 1488 1.59 25.33 13.3 
urban3 96168 9 4777 1.86 34.23 1.6 
Indonesia      14.0 
SOURCES: (a) WAYANG database.  (b) Horizontally scaled to accord with Azis 
(2000). (c) Azis (2000). (d) Poverty headcount rate estimated at BPS poverty 
lines (see text). 
Poverty measures 
To compare poverty pre- and post-simulation, a Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (F-G-T) poverty measure can be applied to each 
distribution. The F-G-T measure consists of a class of additively 
decomposable poverty measures that capture the headcount poverty 
rate, the depth, and the severity of poverty. It is based on the 
specification of a monetary poverty line, z, as shown below. When α 
= 0, the Pα measure captures the headcount rate of poverty up to the 
                                                 
4 Azis (2000) reports only the distribution for rural farmers combined. That 
is, small, medium and large cultivators are grouped together to estimate one 
distribution for farmers with land. Consequently, rural 2, 3 and 4 households in 
WAYANG all have the same shape distribution scaled to the WAYANG mean 
for each.  
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monetary poverty line. As α increases, the relative importance 
accorded to individuals below the poverty line increases. 











The F-G-T measures are dependent on, and sensitive to, the setting 
of monetary poverty lines. If it can be agreed where to set a poverty 
line, one can gauge the amount of poverty in populations by 
measuring the extent of poverty for each constituent household and 
totalling using a suitable aggregator function. However, setting a 
poverty line is a non-trivial exercise5. In this paper, the BPS 
monetary poverty line of 442 664 Rupiah per person per year is 
adopted for urban areas, and deflated by 18.5 percent for rural areas 
(Suryahadi et al., 2000)6. For comparison pre- and post-simulation, 
the monetary poverty line is disaggregated into a basket of n basic 
needs commodities according to shares reported in Pradhan et al. 
(2000)7. The monetary poverty line is then the sum of the value of 
each commodity in the basket of basic needs, nV , as shown below.   
Eq 3:   ∑=
n
nVz               where                n
p
nn pQV =  
and pnQ is the quantity of the nth basic need commodity, which is 
assumed invariant from one simulation to another and applies to all 
households, and pn is the price of the nth basic need commodity, 
determined endogenously in the model. In this sense, the monetary 
poverty line is a fixed basket of basic needs whose value is 
determined endogenously.  
                                                 
5 See Dhanani and Islam (2002) for a comprehensive review of the 
difficulties of specifying monetary poverty lines.  
6 Deflating urban poverty lines for rural areas is common. There is some 
controversy over what is an appropriate deflator. Dhanani and Islam (2002) 
suggest the rural poverty line is often deflated by too much and suggest that 
difference in the price of basic food commodities between urban and rural areas 
is to the order of 11 percent.   
7 See Croser (2002) for the full specification of the basket of basic needs.  
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The graphs in Figure 10.1 show the poverty line for each household 
group. For the rural 1 household, for example, 32 percent of this 
group is in poverty in contrast to the higher income household 
groups for which less than 2 percent of the group is in poverty. For 
Indonesia as a whole, 14 percent of the population is impoverished, 
which is consistent with official headcount estimates of poverty in 
Indonesia in 19938.   
The income distributions, complete with monetary poverty lines can 
now be used to determine what happens to the various groups 
under different policy regimes. The most important determinant 
underpinning the resulting income distributions is factor ownership. 
Recall from Table 10.2 the factorial sources of income for 
households. When an exogenous shock is simulated, each household 
group changes its income, because of changes in factor rewards, and 
thereby increases or decreases poverty and its position in the 
economy’s income distribution. Similarly, each household will 
change its expenditure depending on price movements. The 
consumption patterns will be important for analysing the effects of 
an exogenous policy shock on household welfare. 
CV measures 
The methodology outlined so far enables us to determine what is 
happening to between-group income distribution in the face of trade 
policy shocks. Using a small amount of additional data, this section 
of the paper relaxes the distributional neutrality assumption. In the 
earlier simulations, all individuals in a particular household group 
were assumed to have the same factor income profile. However, 
knowing something about the factor earning profile of the 
household at the poverty line can enable within-group comparison. 
 
                                                 
8 The official BPS estimate of poverty is 13.7 percent for the year of 1993.  
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This small step towards understanding the within-group changes, 
inspired by Hertel et al. (2000), is facilitated through the use of 
compensating variation (CV) measures. The aim of a CV measure in 
this study is to try to grasp how households in different parts of the 
income distribution behave in response to trade policy changes.  
Consider the most basic CV measure: 





ii pycv ϑ  
where iy is the percentage change in income, inϑ is the ith group’s 
budget share of good n and np  is the percentage change in the price 
of good n. Let us define a marginal household as a household whose 
income is equal to the monetary poverty line. For a marginal 
household, the CV measure is given by: 









m pCPIycv ∑∑ −Θ−Π−Ω+−=− )()()( λϖ  
On the right hand side, the first bracketed expression is the per-
capita change in income relative to initial expenditure. The second 
bracketed expression is the change in the marginal household 
income relative to the mean household, where mfΩ is the share of 
primary factor f in the marginal households income, fΠ is the share 
of primary factor f in per capita household income, and fϖ is the 
percentage change in the return to factor f. The third term is the 
change in the marginal household CPI relative to per capita CPI, 
where the marginal households share of each commodity is given 
Urban: H igh Income  (9000 -  20000000 Rp)
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by fnΘ whilst the mean households share is nλ . This expression can 
be reduced to the basic CV measure.   
Equations 4 and 5 represent a CV measure for the mean household 
and the marginal household in each of the ten WAYANG groups.  
The factor income profile and consumption shares for the mean 
household are in the WAYANG database, as reported earlier. The 
consumption bundle for the marginal household in each group is 
the basket of basic needs. The factor income profile for each of the 
ten marginal households comprises mainly unskilled labour. Land is 
considered important for the poor households in the medium and 
large cultivating groups. However all other groups at the poverty 
line rely exclusively on unskilled labour. Hertel et al. (2000) and 
Friedman (2002) reveal how important unskilled labour and 
transfers are for the poorest people in the Indonesian economy. This 
is unlikely to differ significantly across the household groups. 
Using the model to examine the effects of trade policy reform 
The removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade 
Given that non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are the key to Indonesia’s 
protectionist policies, the simulation performed on the model’s base 
year equilibrium comprises the complete removal of all import 
tariffs and the most widely used non-tariff barriers, import licenses. 
Import licences are modelled as tariff-equivalent barriers9. Table 
10A shows the tariff and NTB schedule. Closure is defined by a set 
of constraints that represent a short-term framework10.  
                                                 
9 Details of how the differences between a tariff and an import licence are 
handled in the WAYANG model are contained in Croser (2002). Of particular 
importance, however, is the assumption that quota rents accrue to the 
wealthiest urban households who rely heavily on capital in non-agricultural 
sectors for a significant proportion of their income. 
10 Land and fixed capital are specified as sector specific. Variable capital 
in agriculture can move between the 15 agricultural industries but the total 
stock is fixed. Similarly, variable capital in non-agriculture can move between 
non-agricultural sectors, but the aggregate stock is fixed. In the labour market 
the total employment level is fixed exogenously. However, employment in 
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The removal of all trade barriers results in real GDP expanding by 
1.4 percent, owing mainly to an expansion of exports (Table 10.4). 
The industries to experience the greatest output gains are leather, 
carpet and rope, yarn and kapok, fertiliser and pesticides, knitting 
mills and clothing. An increase in exports drives this expansion.  
Service sectors enjoy expansions as a result of the expansion of the 
local market. 
Most industries previously protected suffer when trade is 
liberalised. Households and producers substitute cheaper imported 
goods for domestic goods. Most noticeably output falls for other 
manufactures, manufactured metals, construction equipment, 
manufactured electrical, manufactured chemicals, manufactured 
non-metals and communications equipment. The most significant 
changes in agricultural industries are the fall in soy and other beans 
and ground nuts output due to the removal of very high NTBs. 
Table 10.4: Estimated effects on Indonesia’s macroeconomy and 
on factor returns 








Real GDP (Exp) 1.41 1.52 3.49 
Export Volume Index 11.11 8.92 14.01 
Import Volume Index 8.02 8.96 7.90 
Export Price Index -2.65 -2.13 -3.38 
Import Price Index -11.09 -11.04 -11.09 
Balance of Trade * 0.94 0.95 1.40 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) -3.78 -2.82 -3.28 
Employment of Unskilled Workers 0.00 -2.39 0.00 
                                                                                                                                               
individual industries and the wage rate can adjust to give some indication of 
which wage earners will be the net winners and losers from trade policy 
changes. Technical change and other shift variables are assumed to not undergo 
any change. The exchange rate is held fixed as the numeraire. The 
macroeconomic closure specifies aggregate investment as fixed, whilst private 
consumption and government spending move with real income. The trade 
balance absorbs variations in real income.  
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Real Return to Unskilled Labour 0.19 2.82 3.37 
Real Return to Skilled Labour 1.80 1.78 4.31 
Real Return to Land 1.93 2.47 4.55 
Real Return to Fixed Capital in Non-
Ag. 
3.63 3.00 5.11 
Real Return to Variable Capital in Ag. 2.01 2.47 4.54 
Real Return to Variable Capital in 
Non-Ag. 
1.75 1.17 4.87 
SOURCE: WAYANG Simulation Output. * Balance of trade is expressed as a 
fraction of GDP, not as a percentage.  
222  Indonesia in a reforming world economy   
 
Factor returns 
Industry expansions and contractions place upward and downward 
pressure on the real returns to factors used intensively in their 
production or specific to those industries. In general, firms 
experiencing increases in output increase demand for fixed factors, 
which now become relatively scarcer, placing upward pressure on 
the real return to these factors. However, at the same time, falls in 
import-competing sector outputs decrease the demand for these 
fixed factors, placing downward pressure on the real returns.  
Aggregate employment was held fixed in this simulation, even 
though labour was able to move between sectors. As expected, the 
results indicate that labour moves out of contracting sectors and into 
sectors expanding in line with Indonesia’s international 
competitiveness. The results indicate that the real return to the 
labour composite is increasing under this trade policy scenario by 
1.2 percent (Table 10.4). However, interestingly the real wage for 
skilled labour is increasing by 1.8 percent, much more than the real 
wage rate for unskilled labour, increasing only marginally by 0.2 
percent. This result appears contrary to the expected results for 
Indonesia. We would expect unskilled labour intensive sectors to 
expand, placing upward pressure on the unskilled wage rate. 
Industry results reveal that the industries which experience the 
largest expansions in output (listed above), with the exception of 
fertiliser and pesticides, are sectors that intensively employ 
unskilled labour and variable capital. Industries experiencing the 
greatest output falls are overwhelmingly the protected 
manufacturing industries, which are similarly intensive in unskilled 
labour and fixed capital. Their contraction mitigates the upward 
pressure placed on the unskilled wage rate.         
One explanation for this result has to do with the capacity for 
tradeable sectors to expand. In this model we are seeing a 
movement of resources away from the previously protected import-
competing sectors to those that are internationally competitive 
exporters. However, in the WAYANG model, modest export 
demand elasticities allow only limited expansion of overseas 
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demand11. Consequently, when the resources from inefficient 
industries are freed up they do not necessarily go to the tradeable 
export sector. Instead, some of the sectors experiencing gains are 
actually the service sectors that are non-tradeable and intensive in 
the use of skilled labour. 
The conclusion to draw is that unskilled labour does not do as well 
in the single country model context for two reasons; firstly because 
the structure of protection in Indonesia protects unskilled labour in 
manufacturing industries and secondly because unskilled labour 
intensive industries have only limited expansion potential. 
Industries selling to the domestic market experience increases in 
output because domestic demand elasticities are higher, in absolute 
terms, than the export demand elasticities.  
For landowners, the real return to land falls significantly for two 
industries; ground nuts and soy and other beans. These two 
industries were previously highly protected and the removal of 
trade barriers results in a contraction of output in these industries 
and the resulting downward pressure on returns to land specific to 
these sectors. Households producing these commodities or owning 
land employed in these sectors not only lose in the form of 
decreased demand for their goods and decreased quota rents, but 
also from the falling return land. There is upward pressure on the 
real return to land in most other sectors, especially other food and 
fibre crops and raw rubber, such that the aggregate real rate of 
return to land increases by 1.9 percent.  
For specific capital owners, those who benefit own capital specific to 
expanding industries whilst there are significant downward 
pressures on the returns to specific capital in contracting industries. 
This accords with the hypothesized results from the Jones-Neary 
specific-factors model (Jones, 1971). If we aggregate across all fixed 
                                                 
11 Armington elasticities are specified as 6 and export demand elasticities 
as –4 in line with Dixon and Rimmer (2001). Sensitivity analysis of export 
demand elasticities reveals that higher absolute export demand elasticities 
allow greater expansion of export industries. The real unskilled wage rate 
increases by more suggesting that poor households may fare better than 
reported in the base simulation.   
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capital in non-agriculture, there is a 3.6 percent increase in the real 
rate of return. Variable capital owners in non-agricultural and 
agricultural sectors experience increases in the real rate of return of 
1.8 and 2.0 percent respectively.  
Households 
The decline in the price of most imports and the follow-on decline in 
the price of most domestically produced goods forces the aggregate 
consumer price index (CPI) down by almost 4 percent. Nominal 
income similarly falls for all ten household groups. This corresponds 
to a leftward horizontal shift of the beta income distribution (shown 
in Figure 10.2 for household rural 1). The most substantial shifts 
occur for the urban 3 household, whose nominal take-home income 
falls 7.4 percent, due mainly to the decline in quota rents. The rural 
1, rural 5 and urban 2 groups also experience above average declines 
in nominal income, due to their reliance on unskilled labour as a 
source of income.  
 
Figure 10.2: The beta distribution and monetary poverty line for 
the Rural 1 household group pre- and post-trade 
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Table 10.5: Poverty headcount measures in Indonesia following 
policy reform  
(%, with improvement in poverty in parentheses) 
Household  Base simulation IRTS and imperfect 
competition
rural1 31.5 (-0.6) 30.6 (-1.5) 
rural2 28.9 (-1.0) 27.9 (-2.0) 
rural3 2.3 (-0.1) 2.2 (-0.3) 
rural4 0.4 (0.0) 0.4 (-0.1) 
rural5 1.9 (-0.1) 1.8 (-0.2) 
rural6 19.1 (-0.5) 18.6 (-0.9) 
rural7 1.8 (-0.1) 1.7 (-0.2) 
urban1 9.2 (-0.3) 8.9 (-0.6) 
urban2 13.0 (-0.3) 12.7 (-0.6) 
urban3 1.7 (0.1) 1.7 (0.1) 
Indonesia 13.6 (-0.4) 13.1 (-0.9) 
SOURCE: Author’s Calculations from WAYANG simulation output. 
 
The poverty implication of the fall in nominal income can be gauged 
by reference to new monetary poverty lines, which are 4.1 percent 
lower than the initial lines. This is a larger shift than the CPI shift, 
owing to large reductions in the price of soy and other beans and 
ground nuts. The fall in the nominal income of households coupled 
with the even bigger fall in the monetary poverty line lifts people 
from poverty in nine of the ten household groups. For households 
beginning with large incidences of poverty, rural 1, rural 2 and rural 
6, there is significant poverty alleviation of 0.6, 1.0 and 0.5 percent 
respectively. The poverty line is relatively near the mode for these 
groups, such that the sensitivity of the headcount poverty rate to the 
poverty line is quite high. Headcount poverty increases for the 
urban three household group due to the very large fall in the 
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nominal income. Overall, there is a 0.4 percent improvement in 
Indonesia’s poverty headcount rate.  
CV measures 
CV measures are reported in Table 10.6. For nine of the ten mean 
household groups the measure is negative indicating that no 
compensation is required for the household group to achieve the 
same level of utility after the trade policy shock. The urban 3 mean 
household has a positive CV measure indicating that this group 
would need to be compensated to the extent of 3.5 percent of their 
initial expenditure to enjoy the same level of utility as before the 
shock.12  
Decomposition of these measures reveals that it is factor income 
differences which drive the results. Mean households deriving their 
income from skilled labour do best under this simulation: rural 6, 
rural 7 and urban 2. Conversely, the least gain accrues to the rural 1, 
rural 2, rural 5 and urban 1 households which rely on unskilled 
labour. The other household groups, with a diversified income 
portfolio, fare somewhere in between.  The urban 3 mean household 
is the only household to require compensation to enjoy the same 
level of utility as before the liberalisation, owing mainly to the loss 
in quota rent income. Turing to the marginal household in each 
socio-economic group, the results suggest that tariff liberalisation is 
sufficient to improve the utility level of each. Taking the difference 
between the per capita and marginal household reveals that the gap 
between the two is widening for nine of the ten groups. The mean 
household has a more diversified income portfolio and therefore 
fares better when trade is liberalised. On the other hand, the 
                                                 
12 Alternative simulations were run in which the rural 4 (large landowner) 
households were assumed to be the recipients of quota rents. Macro and 
industry results do not differ substantially, however, the CV measure for the 
urban 3 household is negative and that for the rural 4 is positive. In reality, the 
loss of quota rents is likely to be shared across several socio-economic 
household groups such that we would expect those losing quota rents to be 
worse off but all other households could be expected to gain from the trade 
liberalisation.  
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marginal household, reliant on unskilled wages facing downward 
pressure, fares less well. 
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Table 10.6:  CV measures for Indonesia 
Household
d G  












rural1 -1.01 -0.68 -1.67 -1.77 -3.03 -3.17 
rural2 -1.15 -0.37 -1.20 -1.61 -3.12 -3.14 
rural3 -1.40 -0.37 -1.32 -1.61 -3.16 -3.14 
rural4 -1.73 -0.37 -1.55 -1.61 -3.38 -3.14 
rural5 -1.21 -0.68 -1.84 -1.77 -3.13 -3.17 
rural6 -1.63 -0.50 -1.40 -1.66 -3.28 -3.27 
rural7 -1.73 -0.50 -1.56 -1.66 -3.52 -3.27 
urban1 -1.22 -0.82 -1.34 -1.45 -3.20 -3.46 
urban2 -1.67 -0.82 -2.22 -1.45 -3.43 -3.46 
urban3 3.50 -0.82 4.30 -1.45 1.83 -3.46 
SOURCE: Author’s Calculations from WAYANG Simulation Output. PC HH – 
per capita household, M HH – marginal household.  
 
Alternative labour market closure 
An alternative closure swap in which the aggregate employment of 
unskilled labour is set endogenously with the nominal unskilled 
wage rate held fixed results in increased unemployment of unskilled 
workers as a result of contracting import-competing sectors which 
intensively employ unskilled workers. For those lucky enough to 
remain employed, their real wage rate increases significantly, as 
opposed to a minor improvement in the base simulation. This is 
despite a smaller fall in the price of goods which intensively employ 
unskilled labour brought about by the smaller fall in the price of 
their main primary input. The CPI falls by 2.8 percent and the basket 
of basic needs by a smaller 1.8 percent. For households, the 
alternative closure results in more favourable CV measures and a 
closing gap between nearly all marginal and mean households 
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(Table 10.6). However, one needs to consider the loss of employment 
potentially pushing many households into poverty.  
Extensions 
Regional results 
This extension of the results considers a Leontief, Morgan, Polenske, 
Simpson and Tower (1965) (hereafter, LMPST) regional 
decomposition of the results13. This provides some insight into how 
trade liberalisation affects three broad regions: the densely 
populated Java and Bali, Sumatra, and the Other Islands. The 
regional profile (Table 10.7) indicates that much of Indonesia’s 
industrialisation has taken place in Java and Bali where 75 and 73 
percent of manufactures and services are produced respectively. 
Regional poverty estimates appear fairly similar in aggregate across 
the three regions, despite poverty being very high in some regions 
such as East Nusa Tenggara and Irian Jaya, and very low in others 
like Aceh and Riau.   
The trade policy simulation results indicate that the Java and Bali 
region has the least to gain from further liberalisation  (Table 10.8). 
Gross regional product (GRP) and aggregate regional employment 
both fall in Java and Bali, whilst output and employment expand in 
Sumatra and the Other islands. The sectoral changes in output 
analysed earlier go part way to explaining this observation. Many of 
the contracting import-competing manufacturing industries are 
highly concentrated in the Java and Bali region. Consequently the 
decline in these industries output adversely effects this region. 
Whilst the expanding industries of textiles, clothing, yarn and 
kapok, leather and carpet and rope are also concentrated in Java and 
Bali, their output expansions are insufficient to boost the entire 
region.  
 
                                                 
13 The LMPST decomposition is a top-down extension; industry, 
macroeconomic, and factor return changes are identical to the base simulation 
(see Dixon et al., 1982).  
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Table 10.7:  Sectoral shares in regional output and poverty by 
region in Indonesia   (%) 
Region a JavaBali Sumatra Other 
Islands 
Population share b 62 21 17 
Urban Headcount Poverty b 11 8 8 
Rural Headcount Poverty b 25 21 27 
Total headcount poverty b 20 18 23 
Share of output c 60.8 21.9 17.3 
Agriculture 0.42 0.20 0.38 
     Tobacco 0.86 0.08 0.06 
     Tea 0.79 0.21 0.00 
     Raw Rubber 0.07 0.70 0.23 
     Palm Oil 0.01 0.80 0.19 
     Coffee 0.17 0.71 0.12 
     Forestry and 0.03 0.11 0.86 
     Wood 0.03 0.12 0.85 
Manufacturing 0.75 0.15 0.10 
Services 0.73 0.20 0.07 
SOURCE: (a) JavaBali includes Jakarta, W Java, C Java, Yogyakarta, E Java and 
Bali. Sumarta includes Aceh, N Sumatra, W Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, S Sumatra, 
Bengkulu and Lampung. The Other Islands include W Nusa Tenggara, E Nusa 
Tengarra, East Timor, W Kalimantan, C Kalimantan, S Kalimantan, E 
Kalimantan, N Sulawesi, C Sulawesi, S Sulawesi, SE Sulawesi, Maluku and 
Irian Jaya. (b) Author’s Calculations from data provided in Freidman (2002) at 
the BSP National Price Poverty Line. (c) WAYANG database. 
 
 
Table 10.8:  Estimated effects of reform on regional output, 
employment and wages (% change) 
Variable JavaBali Sumatra Other 
islands 
Gross regional product -0.14 0.36 0.17 
Aggregate regional emplt -0.25 0.52 0.41 
Regional wage bill -2.79 -2.11 -2.52 
SOURCE: WAYANG model simulation output 
 
Conversely, Sumatra and the Other Islands produce intensively 
outputs which experience significant growth. Raw rubber, palm oil 
and coffee are significant for Sumatra and experience output 
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increases of 3.5, 1.5 and 0.4 percent respectively. These increases 
tend to be due to increased demand from the domestic market. The 
other islands produce sea products, forest and hunting, wood and 
coconut intensively which all increase by between 0.4 and 2.2 
percent. The regions of Sumatra and the Other Islands combined 
also account for more than 90 percent of the production of coal, 
crude oil, natural gas and metal ore mining. All of these sectors 
expand, due to increasing export opportunities.   
In addition to the fall in output of manufacturing industries, the 
declining aggregate wage income in the Java and Bali region results 
in a decrease in regional consumption, thus multiplying the effect of 
the decline in GRP. The specification of services as local 
commodities means they must be consumed in the region in which 
they are produced. Thus, when the aggregate wage bill for Java and 
Bali falls, consumption of locally produced perishables and services 
must also decline. The result is that the decrease in GRP for Java and 
Bali is greater than the national average. 
Increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition 
It is well accepted that trade liberalisation, in the presence of 
increasing returns to scale (IRTS) and imperfect competition, might 
be more beneficial to households than reported in the base 
simulation. Trade tends to induce a pro-competitive effect that can 
reinforce the usual comparative advantage sources of a gain from 
trade. Of particular interest in this case study is that when trade in 
liberalised in the model, the decline in unskilled wages is due to 
contracting manufacturing industries. However, imperfect 
competition market structures may lead to growth of the 
manufacturing sectors due to the realisation of scale economies and 
the erosion of market power. This may offset downward pressure 
on unskilled wages to some extent. This fundamental indeterminacy 
regarding the welfare benefits of trade liberalisation for developing 
countries was first discussed by Devarajan and Rodrik (1991). 
This simulation requires first amending the WAYANG model to 
incorporate features of imperfect competition and IRTS. This paper 
uses parts of the Abayasiri-Silva and Horridge (1996) scale model. A 
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subset of 26 food processing, manufacturing and service industries 
are considered to exhibit IRTS at the firm level (denoted by * in 
Appendix Table 10A). Scale economies are generally inconsistent 
with perfect competition and therefore monopolistic competition is 
assumed to prevail in these industries also. 
The production function for these 26 sectors is re-formulated to take 
account of some fixed cost in the production process as shown 
below.  
Eq 6:  FCinputsGinputsGX ff −== )()(  
where fX  is firm output, FC is fixed costs of production invariant 
to output levels, )(inputsG f  is a scalar multiple of the original CRTS 
)(inputsG  function. The dual function of fG  is the marginal cost 
(MC) of producing a unit of output at given input prices. 
IRTS is characterised by a movement down the AC curve. Such a 
movement can be brought about by changes in firm output, fixed 
costs and the marginal cost of producing a unit as shown in the AC 
equation below.  





TCAC ).( +==  
When trade liberalisation occurs, marginal and fixed costs are 
assumed to remain constant such that the only way a firm can 
experience IRTS in the short run is to have an expansion of output, 
spreading fixed costs over greater output. International trade could 
bring about this expansion by eroding the market power of 
imperfectly competitive firms.  
The imperfect competition structure assumed to exist for the 26 
sectors is monopolistic competition14. Under monopolistic 
competition firms produce slightly differentiated products in the 
various markets in which they operate. The demand for each variety 
is less than perfectly elastic, thus firms can price as monopolists to 
                                                 
14 There exists a wide variety of potential market structures which have 
been used in the literature (see Francois and Roland-Holst, 1997). 
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exploit their market niche (equation 8). However, pricing must be at 
average cost under the assumption of free-entry and exit in the long 
run (equation 9).  






MCP          
Eq 9:  ACP =  
where P is the firm’s price and ε  is the perceived elasticity of 
demand for each variety (or each firm). Each firm’s perceived 
elasticity of demand depends on the number of varieties, N, the 
share of imports in the market, SM, the elasticity of substitution 
between its variant and other variants, γ , and between domestic 
and imported varieties, σ , as shown below.  
Eq 10:   )/11()/1( NNS M −+= γσε  
When opening up to trade, the domestic price rises relative to import 
prices and the perceived elasticity of demand increases. Thus, greater 
competition results in an erosion of each of the domestic firms market 
power and greater falls in the price of commodities in industries with 
unrealised economies of scale and imperfect competition. The 
expansion of output, in the face of a trade policy shock is generally 
larger in these industries. For industries, such as the protected 
manufacturing firms in Indonesia, there is pressure to contract due to 
increased competition. At the same time, erosion of their market 
power exerts pressure to expand output.  
Re-calibrating the model to include IRTS and imperfect competition 
features15 and re-running the base simulation reveals that many of 
the manufacturing industries experience smaller output contractions 
than in the base simulation. For these industries there are two 
offsetting effects at play. Firstly the removal of protection is 
resulting in a decrease in output since this sector is no longer able to 
                                                 
15 This required incorporating internal economies of scale by specifying 
the IRTS scale parameter as exogenous and equal to a positive value to capture 
unrealised scale economies.  
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compete with cheaper import varieties of the same good. At the 
same time however, opening up to trade is causing an erosion of 
market power, stimulating firms to expand output and move down 
their AC curve. Overall, gross domestic product of the Indonesian 
economy increases by 3.5 percent (Table 10.4).   
Manufacturing industries have larger price falls. Other industries 
tend to experience a smaller price fall that in the base simulation. 
This is because the price of factors increase by more than in the base 
simulation (Table 10.4). Overall the CPI falls by about the same 
amount as in the base simulation.  
The enhanced performance of the manufacturing industries means 
the unskilled real wage rate performs much better when industrial 
organisation features of the Indonesian economy are incorporated 
into the model. Table 10.4 shows that the real unskilled wage 
increases 3.4 percent, as opposed to 0.2 percent with CRTS. This 
results in an increase in the real income of most household groups.  
The increasing factor returns, coupled with the CPI fall of 3.3 
percent results in an increase in the nominal income of six of the ten 
household groups, with a corresponding rightward shift of the beta 
distribution. For the remaining four households, the beta 
distribution shifts leftward, but only by a small amount. The 
monetary poverty line shifts leftward 3.3 percent. Poverty levels are 
significantly lower for all household groups. Overall the poverty 
headcount rate falls by 0.9 percent with improvements in rural 
households 1, 2 and 6 experiencing reductions of more than 0.9 
percent (Table 10.5) 
The CV measures confirm that when trade is liberalised, IRTS and 
imperfect competition can bring greater benefits to those at the 
bottom of the income distribution than CRTS and perfect 
competition. The only group with lower welfare after the 
liberalisation is the mean urban 3 household due to the loss of quota 
rents. All other per-capita and marginal households gain however, 
with the gap between the mean and marginal household closing for 
six of the ten socio-economic groups. This is a more positive result 
than the base simulation and emphasises that in Indonesia, trade 
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liberalisation is likely to bring substantial gains from trade not only 
because it yields an efficiency gain but because economies of scale 
can be realised and imperfect competition structures are eroded. 
Caveats  
The results presented in this section suggest that once a new 
equilibrium is reached it is possible that average and marginal 
households in each socio-economic group will be better off, with the 
exception of households losing quota rents. However, the 
comparative static nature of the model ignores changes in poverty 
or income distribution during the transition to a new equilibrium. 
Such short-term adjustments to changes could have important 
consequences for poverty. For example, the effect of a contracting 
sector forcing household heads out of a job may result in 
impoverished circumstances and starvation for poor families before 
a new equilibrium is reached. Winters (2000a) suggests that the loss 
of a job is probably the common proximate cause of households 
descending rapidly into poverty. 
The WAYANG model is also silent on the way in which poor 
households respond to shocks. Whilst positive shocks may deliver 
great benefits if households can switch their activities to take 
advantage of them, WAYANG captures nothing about the ability of 
poor households to switch between activities and avoid 
impoverishing circumstances. On the other hand, a risk averse 
farmer may be unable to take advantage of trade liberalisation in the 
sense that they are not able to be entrepreneurial and benefit from 
switching from say subsistence farming to a cash crop. Similarly, 
they may be hampered by domestic market regulations, not 
captured in the WAYANG model, which inhibit their supply 
response. A priority area for further research is to analyse how poor 
people respond to policy changes. Under what circumstances do 
poor households take advantage of positive shocks and what action 
do households take to minimize the chances of falling into poverty?  
A further limitation of the WAYANG model is the presence of only 
two types of labour in the model. The paper considers only one type 
of unskilled labour. However, in Indonesia, unskilled labour may 
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not be completely mobile in the economy. This, for example, could 
result in workers in the textiles, clothing and footwear industries 
experiencing a higher increase in their real wage rate than the 
average for all unskilled labour. A more disaggregated labour 
profile would allow for greater insight into how trade policy 
changes are affecting different poor households. Studies for India 
reveal that rigidities in the labour market are very important in 
addressing poverty alleviation (Winters, 2000b).  
A more problematic caveat on these results is the distribution of 
wealth within the household unit. Trade policy may have some 
potential negative effects on the family household if, for example the 
benefits from higher cash crop profits are not distributed equally 
within the household. Women and children may be especially 
susceptible to exclusion from such rewards. These issues should be 
taken very seriously but they are beyond the scope of the present 
study. 
Conclusions 
The major issues addressed in this study are: what is the effect of 
further trade liberalisation on poor households in Indonesia, and is 
the gap between mean-income and poor households closing for 
different socio-economic groups and for Indonesia as a whole. Since 
the effect of trade policy on poverty and income distribution can 
operate through many transmission channels - enterprises, 
households and governments - a CGE model for Indonesia is used 
which transparently identifies the direct and indirect pro- and anti-
poor influences on these channels.  
The model simulates the complete removal of all tariffs and tariff-
equivalent import licences. The consequences for poverty alleviation 
are captured through between-group analysis using the flexible beta 
distribution and a fixed consumption bundle of basic needs. The 
beta distribution shifts horizontally to capture the effect of factor 
price changes on income distribution for the ten different household 
groups. Commodity price changes, for the invariant basket of basic 
needs, enable the monetary poverty line to shift horizontally. The 
gap between poor households and the average household in each of 
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the ten socio-economic groups is captured using basic CV welfare 
measures.  
The results suggest that trade liberalisation reduces poverty and 
improves the welfare of household groups. However, wealthier 
households may benefit by more than poorer households, thus 
widening the gap between the mean and marginal households in 
each socio-economic group. Factor price changes are the key to 
understanding this result. Liberalisation does not boost the wages of 
low skilled workers, relative to other workers and capital owners, as 
many might expect, owing to the initial pattern of protection, which 
shelters this group.  
Greater welfare gains can be made once allowance is made for 
imperfect competition and scale economies. Whilst only one 
variation of these industrial organisation features is modelled in this 
paper, it demonstrates potential pro-competitive effects of trade 
liberalisation, including falling market power and expanding output 
in imperfectly competitive manufacturing sectors.  
Further trade liberalisation would benefit the Indonesian economy 
not only through more efficient use of resources and specialisation 
but also owing to the erosion of market power and the realization of 
scale economies. All households stand to gain from such policy 
reform, except those who perhaps benefit from quota rents under 
the current protection regime. However, since the model is silent on 
the transition from one equilibrium to another, short-term 
government assistance may be warranted to offset any potential 
negative impacts of policy change.  
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Appendix Table 10A: Tariff and NTB schedule for Indonesia, 1993  




Tariff + NTB 
protection (%) 
*ManuWoodProd 9.8 33.3 43.1
*OthManu 16.3 26.5 42.8
VegFruit 11.7 27.1 38.8
*PreservFood 12.9 23.3 36.3
NonAlcBvrgs 8.4 26.0 34.5
*ManuRubbPlas 7.9 24.8 32.8
Meat 6.0 24.0 30.0
SoyOtBeans 0.6 28.9 29.5
AlcohTabac 5.5 23.2 28.7
WheatProd 1.8 25.1 26.9
Elec_Gas 25.0 0.0 25.0
*ManuMetal 6.0 18.9 24.9
SeaProduct 3.2 21.5 24.6
GroundNut 0.9 20.8 21.6
*ProcessFood 8.6 11.6 20.2
*ManuNonmetal 4.3 14.7 19.0
*CommunEquip 1.0 16.8 17.8
*Machinery 2.5 13.8 16.3
SugarConfect 1.0 13.9 14.9
*ManuElectric 4.1 10.1 14.2
*ConstrEquip 1.7 11.9 13.5
*ManuChemical 3.0 9.6 12.6
Quarrying 3.5 8.1 11.5
*ManuPaperPro 2.2 9.2 11.5
Coal 4.0 6.7 10.6
PetrlRefPr 3.3 6.6 9.9
Coconut 0.0 9.0 9.0
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*Textile 2.7 5.7 8.4
NatGas_GThr 0.0 7.3 7.3
*Clothing 3.5 3.7 7.1
AnimalFeeds 1.1 5.5 6.6
*TransRepair 4.5 1.2 5.7
LivestoProd 0.5 4.0 4.5
*CarpetRope 1.9 2.1 4.1
OilPalm 3.2 0.0 3.2
RubberRaw 1.3 1.7 3.0
OthAgric 0.4 2.4 2.8
*ManuIronStee 2.0 0.0 2.0
*Rice 0.0 2.0 2.0
CassOroot 1.6 0.0 1.6
*ManuNFBM 1.5 0.0 1.5
FertPest 1.0 0.0 1.0
MetalOreMini 0.9 0.0 0.9
*KnittMills 0.9 0.0 0.9
Yarn_Kapok 0.7 0.0 0.7
AnmVgOil 0.7 0.0 0.7
Maize 0.2 0.0 0.2
*Leather 0.1 0.0 0.1
OtService 0.1 0.0 0.1
OFooFibCr 0.0 0.0 0.0
CrudeOil 0.0 0.0 0.0
Paddy 0.0 0.0 0.0
SugarCane 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tabacco 0.0 0.0 0.0
Coffee 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tea 0.0 0.0 0.0
Wood 0.0 0.0 0.0
ForestHunt 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Agricservice 0.0 0.0 0.0
Copra 0.0 0.0 0.0
LiqNatGas 0.0 0.0 0.0
WaterSupply 0.0 0.0 0.0
Building 0.0 0.0 0.0
AgricConst 0.0 0.0 0.0
PublicWork 0.0 0.0 0.0
GasElConst 0.0 0.0 0.0
OConstruct 0.0 0.0 0.0
*Trade 0.0 0.0 0.0
RestHotel 0.0 0.0 0.0
*RoadRailTrav 0.0 0.0 0.0
*SeaAirTrav 0.0 0.0 0.0
*SrvcToTrans 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cmunication 0.0 0.0 0.0
BankInsur 0.0 0.0 0.0
BusiReales 0.0 0.0 0.0
GeneralGovt 0.0 0.0 0.0
GovEducation 0.0 0.0 0.0
GovHealtSrvc 0.0 0.0 0.0
OGovSrvc 0.0 0.0 0.0
PrvEdSrvc 0.0 0.0 0.0
PrvHealthSrv 0.0 0.0 0.0
OPrvSrvc 0.0 0.0 0.0
Simple Average 2.2 6.1 8.4
SOURCES: * indicates this firm belongs to the subset of industries which exhibit 
IRTS and imperfect competition features. (a) Author’s Calculations from the 
WAYANG Database.  (b) Estimates based on Fane (2001), Fane and Phillips 




The WAYANG Model of the Indonesian 
economy 
GLYN WITTWER 
WAYANG is a comparative static computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model. It is a linearised model in the ORANI school (Dixon, 
Parmenter, Sutton and Vincent, 1982). However, WAYANG has 
been adapted to take account of some of the specific characteristics 
of a developing, largely agrarian economy (Warr, Marpudin, da 
Costa and Tharpa, 1998). As with other recent versions of models of 
this school, it uses an ORANI-G format in the model code, within 
the GEMPACK software used to solve the model (Harrison and 
Pearson 1994). Wittwer (1999) presents a detailed elaboration of 
WAYANG, adapted from Horridge, Parmenter and Pearson (1998). 
There are 65 industries in WAYANG producing 65 commodities. 
WAYANG contains data and parameters to characterise six different 
sets of commodity sales. These are inputs to (1) production and (2) 
investment, sales to (3) households, (4) exports and (5) government, 
and (6) changes in stocks. In addition, the model includes details of 
production costs, including purchases of intermediate commodities, 
primary factors and other costs. WAYANG also includes a unique 
module capturing the distribution of incomes and expenditures 
between ten different households, who, by assumption, own all 
factors of production. The model contains a small fiscal extension 
and finally, a top-down regional disaggregation of the Indonesian 
economy. This appendix outlines the model by going through each 
of the above components systematically. 
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WAYANG’s database 
Figure A.1 is a diagram of WAYANG’s input-output database. The 
column headings in the main part of the figure (an absorption 
matrix) identify the following buyers: 
(1) producers divided into I industries; 
(2) investors divided into I industries; 
(3) ten representative households; 
(4) an aggregate foreign purchaser of exports; 
(5) a government demand category; and 
(6) changes in inventories. 
 
The entries in each column show the structure of the purchases 
made by the agents identified in the column heading. Each of the C 
commodity types identified in the model can be obtained locally or 
imported from overseas. Only domestically produced goods appear 
in the export column. M of the domestically produced goods are 
used as margins services (wholesale and retail trade, and various 
transport commodities). These are required to transfer commodities 
from their sources to their users. Each transaction includes 
commodity taxes. In addition to intermediate inputs, current 
production requires inputs of primary factors. 
The ‘MAKE’ matrix maps industry outputs to commodities. Since all 
industries in WAYANG each produce a unique commodity in the 
present database, this is a diagonal matrix. Finally, import tariff 
revenues appear as a separate matrix (‘V0TAR’), because we assume 
that tariff rates are independent of the type of buyer. 
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Figure A1: WAYANG’s database 
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Structure of production 
Inputs into production include domestic and imported 
commodities, two types of labour, land (in agricultural industries 
only), several types of capital (i.e., fixed in non-agricultural sectors 
and mobile in all sectors) and ‘other costs’. In theory, WAYANG 
allows each industry to produce several commodities, although with 
the present database, all industries are single product. We keep the 
multi-input, output production specification manageable with a 
series of separability assumptions. For example, the assumption of 
input-output separability implies that the generalised production 
function for some industry: 
 F(inputs,output) = 0      (A.1) 
may be written as: 
 G(inputs) = X1 = H(output)     (A.2) 
where X1 is an index of industry activity. At the top level, we 
combine commodity composites, a primary-factor composite and 
‘other costs’ using a Leontief or production function (i.e., all such 
demands are proportional to X1). Each commodity composite is a 
CES (constant elasticity of substitution) function of a domestic good 
and the imported equivalent. The primary-factor composite is either 
a translog or CES aggregation of the various primary factors.  
The unique system of primary factor demands within WAYANG 
The system of primary factor demands is the first of the model-
specific features of WAYANG. It contains two different sets of 
primary factors, one for agricultural and the other for non-
agricultural industries. In agriculture, there are four factors, land, 
unskilled labour, variable capital and fertiliser. In other industries, 
the three substitutable factors are composite labour, variable capital 
and fixed capital. Different types of capital are mobile between 
mutually exclusive subsets of industries. While only unskilled 
labour is used in agriculture, it is mobile between all industries. 
Fertiliser is treated as a primary input to recognise its 
substitutability with other factors of production in agriculture. In 
the non-agricultural subset, each industry uses specific capital in 
production (i.e., immobile between industries) in addition to 
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variable capital, implying a short- to medium-run time horizon in 
which there is only partial capital reallocation. 
A translog functional form for primary factor demands is available 
to utilise econometric estimates of own- and cross-price elasticities 
based on the translog form. In addition, the modeller has the option 
of using the CES form which, while more restrictive, solves more 
reliably than the translog form in large change simulations. The 
demand equations for primary factor v in industry j, for the 
agricultural and non-agricultural industry sets, are of the form: 























+=* , and β vmj  is a matrix of estimated translog 
coefficients. B = 1 for the translog form and 0 for the CES form of the equation. 
The x terms denote percentage quantity changes, the p terms percentage price 
changes and the a terms denote percentage technological changes.  
Demands for intermediate inputs 
The Armington assumption that imports are imperfect substitutes 
for domestic supplies is applicable to all commodity purchases 
within WAYANG, including those for intermediate usage. 
Composite commodity (i.e., of domestic and imported origins) 
demands are simply proportional to industry activity, except for 
fertiliser used in agriculture, which is substitutable with other 
primary factors.   
Sales to other users 
Demands for investment inputs 
The present version of WAYANG is static and therefore contains no 
linkages between year-by-year investment and accumulated capital 
stocks. Indeed, we usually assume in comparative static simulations 
that aggregate investment remains exogenous. However, total 
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investment demands by industry may change relative to the base 
case, as investment in most industries is related to rates of return. 
Since inputs to investment are proportional to total investment by 
industry, such changes in investment demands imply an equivalent 
percentage change in input demands to investment. The Armington 
assumption of imperfect substitution between sources also applies. 
Household demands 
There are ten households in WAYANG. The total expenditures of 
each household are related to after-tax and after-transfer (i.e., net 
transfers from government and foreigners, plus transfers between 
households) incomes via a consumption function. A given 
expenditure is allocated to each commodity within the model using 
a Klein-Rubin function. This is of an additive functional form, 
implying that there is no specific substitutability between 
commodities. Household expenditures on each commodity are split 
between a subsistence or committed component, regardless of 
changes in incomes and prices, and a supernumerary component. 
The aggregate percentage change in supernumerary expenditures 
(weighted by marginal budget shares) provides a measure of the 
percentage change in household utility. The Armington assumption 
allocates composite commodity demands to either domestic 
products or imports based on changes in relative prices.  
Export demands 
WAYANG’s exports are divided into two groups. First, traditional 
exports include mostly primary or downstream primary products. 
Exports account for large shares of total output for most 
commodities in the traditional-export category. The second group 
comprises non-traditional exports. Exports account for only small 
shares in total output for these commodities. Volumes of traditional 
exports are declining functions of their prices in foreign currency 
terms.  
Dixon and Rimmer (2001) derive an expression relating the export demand 
elasticity for commodity i (εi) to the own-price elasticity of demand (ηi) 
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and the foreign elasticity of substitution between Indonesian and alternative 
sources of supply of good i (i.e., the Armington parameter, φi): 
εi = {ηi(1 − S0i )  −    φiS0i}Sfobi 
where S0i denotes the non-Indonesian share in foreign purchases of good i, 
and Sfobi is the share of f.o.b price of Indonesian good i in its purchaser’s 
price in foreign countries. In virtually all markets, Indonesia’s share of 
sales is small, so S0i is close to 1. If we assume a typical margin on sales in 
foreign countries, Sfobi is 0.7. If the Armington parameter φi = 6, then the 
export demand elasticity εi equals about -4. Larger export demand 
elasticities imply larger Armington parameters that are not supported by 
econometric evidence. 
Non-traditional exports are small and volatile, but in recent years 
aggregate non-traditional exports have experienced rapid growth in 
many countries. In WAYANG, non-traditional exports comprise a 
Leontief aggregate. This means that the commodity composition of 
non-traditional exports is exogenous. Export demands are solved 
via an aggregated constant elasticity of demand equation, similar to 
the export demand equations for individual commodities that apply 
to the traditional group. 
Other demands 
The level and composition of aggregate government consumption 
may be kept exogenous. In some scenarios this is, together with 
exogenous aggregate investment and an exogenous balance of trade 
(at a constant CPI), a convenient way of directing all income changes 
in a policy simulation to changes in household demands. 
Alternatively, through a change in closure, government 
consumption may move with real aggregate household 
consumption. 
There is no theory in WAYANG to calculate changes in stocks of 
commodities. Without exogenous shifts, the percentage change in 
the volume of each commodity going into inventories equals the 
percentage change in the domestic industry’s output. 
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Prices 
Each transaction in WAYANG includes margins (retail and 
wholesale markups and various transport margins). In the absence 
of technical change, the percentage change in margins demands 
equal the percentage change in the volume of a commodity sold at a 
particular point. 
The price of each transaction to the purchaser includes the basic or 
producer price, plus margins and taxes. Purchasers’ prices in levels 
terms therefore differ between producers, investors, households, 
exports and government. 
Market-clearing equations 
WAYANG includes the usual market-clearing equations of single-
country CGE models. That is, the domestic supply of each 
commodity must equal sales to producers, investors, households 
and governments, plus changes in inventories. Supplies must also 
equal demands of imported commodities.  
In the treatment of households, WAYANG includes a number of 
additional market-clearing equations. Households own all factors of 
production. Therefore, the factors demanded by industries must 
equal household supplies of these factors. 
Income distribution by households 
Households own all income earning factors in the model and 
consequently, with each scenario we are able to observe income 
distribution effects by household. As already mentioned, household 
expenditures are tied to after-tax and after-transfer incomes by 
household. The ten households in the model include landless rural 
labourers, three groups of rural agricultural households, three rural 
non-agricultural households and three urban households. The 
landless household, for example, earns one-tenth the income per 
capita of the wealthiest urban household.  
The small fiscal extension of WAYANG contains a number of direct 
(income, value-added and corporate) and indirect (business, excise, 
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import tariff and other) taxes. Different types of taxes have different 
impacts on income distribution. For example, the value-added tax 
(VAT) applies only to non-agricultural industries, so that raising the 
VAT rate will impact most on these industries, and consequently 
impact most adversely on those households whose factor ownership 
is relatively high in these industries. The income tax rate, on the 
other hand, is imposed on each household independent of the 
industries in which they earn their income. 
The regional module of WAYANG 
WAYANG includes a ‘top-down’ regional module. In a ‘top-down’ 
implementation of regional disaggregation, the regional equations 
are simply an extension to the existing national model. This 
contrasts with a ‘bottom-up’ approach, in which every core equation 
has a regional dimension. This greatly complicates model 
modifications and is more demanding on computer memory for a 
given commodity disaggregation. A ‘top-down’ regional model 
misses out on some aspects of ‘bottom-up’ modelling. The main 
advantage of the ‘top-down’ approach is that it is relatively 
parsimonious in data requirements, notably obviating the need for 
inter-regional trade data. This approach also makes model 
modifications much simpler, in particular in the case where the 
modeller wishes to introduce dynamics to the CGE model.  
The original ORANI approach, as explained in Dixon et al. (1982), 
and modified later in the MONASH model (Dixon, Parmenter and 
Rimmer, 1998), is used in WAYANG to disaggregate the model to 
three regions. The first step in bypassing the need for inter-regional 
trade data is to impose a dichotomy between regionally traded 
(national) goods and regionally non-traded (local) goods. Local 
goods are not subject to inter-regional trade. The rationale for local 
industries producing local commodities (i.e., regional autarky) is 
that in the model, the Indonesian archipelago is divided into three 
regions with separate islands or island clusters: Java/Bali, Sumatra 
and the remaining islands. The natural separation of regions by sea 
ensures that there are some commodities and industries that are not 
traded between regions. 
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For national commodities, we assume that the regional location of 
production is independent of the location of demand. Each regions’ 
share of the economy-wide output is exogenous. In addition, the 
share of each commodity in user region r which is sourced from 
region s is the same for all r. The approach outlined simplifies the 
data requirements.  
Regional WAYANG computations are decomposed into three parts. 
In the first part (i.e., the core of the model), the economy-wide 
effects of the relevant exogenous shock are computed. In the second 
part, the economy-wide activity levels in industries producing 
national commodities are allocated to regions using exogenous 
shares. In the third part, projections of regional outputs of local 
goods are computed through a system of commodity-balance 
equations.  
We require additional data for the regional extension of WAYANG. 
For each industry in the three regions, we need to know the initial 
regional share of output and investment. And for each commodity, 
we need to know the regional share of national exports and the 
regional share of government demands. No additional data are 
needed to calculate the regional share of household consumption. It 
is assumed that the initial share of regional household consumption 
for all commodities is equal to the share of economy-wide labour 
income earned in that region multiplied by economy-wide labour 
income.  
Regional shares for each household consumption commodity move 
with regional shares in labour income multiplied by the income 
elasticity. This appears to be the appropriate assumption in 
Indonesia. In an economy in which social security benefits account 
for a significant proportion of household income, as in Australia, 
movements in regional income per household would be brought 
closer together across regions. Hence, in the MONASH model of the 
Australian economy (on which the WAYANG regional extension is 
based), regional shares of private consumption move with regional 
population shares. Regional shares of exports and government 
spending are assumed constant at the commodity level unless 
exogenously changed.  
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WAYANG includes an intra-regional sourcing constraint on local 
commodities. That is, the aggregate output of any local commodity 
is equal to aggregate demand for the commodity within the region. 
And the percentage change in output of national industries in each 
region is set equal to the economy-wide percentage change in 
output. The model also calculates regional totals of wage bills, gross 
region products and industry contributions to changes in outputs. 
Finally, the model includes equations to calculate percentage 
changes in aggregate employment in each region and total 
employment by industry in each region. 
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The GTAP Model and database 
ANNA STRUTT 
Introduction 
The Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is a global 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model1 which has its origins 
in the SALTER model (Jomini et al. 1991). Since its inception in 1993, 
GTAP has become widely used and respected by researchers and 
policy-makers around the world.  
In this Appendix we introduce some of the key features of the GTAP 
database and model, applications of which are used in a number of 
chapters in this book. We then explain how results from the GTAP 
model can be analysed and we conclude with a summary of some of 
the main advantages and limitations of global CGE analysis. 
The GTAP database 
The GTAP model and database are publicly available and fully 
documented; these features enhance the credibility of modelling 
work and facilitate comparability of analysis. The global database is 
updated approximately every eighteen months, with contributions 
coming from throughout the GTAP network of international 
organisations and country experts. Version 3 of the database 
comprises 37 commodities and 30 countries (McDougall 1997), while 
Version 4 of the database comprises 50 commodities and 45 regions 
                                                 
1 Hertel (1997). For more-updated information on the GTAP model and 
database, see www.gtap.org. 
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(McDougall et al. 1998). In both versions, Indonesia is one of the 
countries specified and there is a relatively heavy disaggregation for 
agricultural sectors. Table A1 details the countries and regions in 
recent versions of the GTAP database, while Table A2 shows the 
commodity breakdown. To aid computation and to highlight the 
implications for the regions and sectors of particular interest, the 
GTAP database is generally aggregated to a smaller number of 
regions and sectors when running simulations and interpreting 
results.  
Table A1:  Country and regional disaggregation in GTAP, versions 
3 and 4 
Version 4 Version 3 
Region  Description Region  Description 
 AUS Australia AUS Australia  
 NZL New Zealand NZL New Zealand  
 JPN Japan JPN Japan  
 KOR Korea KOR Republic of Korea  
 IDN Indonesia IDN Indonesia  
 MYS Malaysia MYS Malaysia  
 PHL Philippines PHL Philippines  
 SGP Singapore SGP Singapore  
 THA Thailand THA Thailand  
 CHN China CHN China  
 HKG Hong Kong HKG Hong Kong  
 TWN Taiwan TWN Taiwan  
 IND India IDI India  
 LKA Sri Lanka RAS Rest of South Asia  
 RAS Rest of South Asia   
 CAN Canada CAN Canada  
 USA United States of 
America 
USA United States of 
America  
 MEX Mexico MEX Mexico  
 CAM Central America & CAM Central America & 
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Caribbean Caribbean  
 ARG Argentina ARG Argentina  
 BRA Brazil BRA Brazil  
 CHL Chile CHL Chile  
 VEN Venezuela RSM Rest of South America  
 COL Colombia   
 RAP Rest of the Andean Pact   
 URY Uruguay   
 RSM Rest of South America   
 GBR United Kingdom E_U European Union 12  
 DEU Germany   
 DNK Denmark   
 REU Rest of European Union   
 SWE Sweden EU3 Austria, Finland, 
Sweden  
 FIN Finland   
 EFT EFTA EFT European Free Trade 
Area  
 CEA Central European 
Associates 
CEA Central European 
Associates  
 FSU Former Soviet Union FSU Former Soviet Union  
 TUR Turkey MEA Middle East and North  
 RME Rest of Middle East  Africa 
 MAR Morocco   
 RNF Rest of North Africa   
 SAF South African Customs 
Union 
SSA Sub Saharan Africa  
 RSA Rest of southern Africa   
 RSS Rest of sub-Saharan 
Africa 
  
 ROW Rest of World ROW Rest of World  
 VNM Viet Nam   
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Table A2: Commodity disaggregation in GTAP, versions 3 and 4 
Version 4 Version 3 
Commodity Description Commodity Description 
PDR Paddy rice PDR Paddy rice 
WHT Wheat WHT Wheat 
GRO Cereal grains nec GRO Grains 
V_F Vegetables, fruit, nuts NGC Non grain crops 
OSD Oil seeds    
C_B Sugar cane, sugar beet    
PFB Plant-based fibres    
OCR Crops nec    
CTL Bovine cattle, sheep and 
goats, horses 
OLP Other livestock 
OAP Animal products nec    
RMK Raw milk   
WOL Wool, silk-worm cocoons WOL Wool 
FOR Forestry FOR Forestry 
FSH Fishing FSH Fisheries 
COL Coal COL Coal 
OIL Oil OIL Oil 
GAS Gas GAS Gas 
OMN Minerals nec OMN Other minerals 
CMT Bovine cattle, sheep and 
goat, horse meat products 
MET Meat products 
OMT Meat products nec   
MIL Dairy products MIL Milk products 
PCR Processed rice PCR Processed rice 
VOL Vegetable oils and fats OFP Other food products 
SGR Sugar   
OFD Food products nec   
B_T Beverages and tobacco 
products 
B_T Beverages and 
tobacco 
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TEX Textiles TEX Textiles 
WAP Wearing apparel WAP Wearing apparels 
LEA Leather products LEA Leather etc 
LUM Wood products LUM Lumber 
PPP Paper products, publishing PPP Pulp paper etc 
P_C Petroleum, coal products P_C Petroleum and coal 
CRP Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
CRP Chemicals, rubbers 
and plastics 
NMM Mineral products nec NMM Nonmetallic minerals 
I_S Ferrous metals I_S Primary ferrous 
metals 
NFM Metals nec NFM Nonferrous metals 
FMP Metal products FMP Fabricated metal 
products 
MVH Motor vehicles and parts TRN Transport industries 
OTN Transport equipment nec   
ELE Electronic equipment OME Machinery and 
equipment 
OME Machinery & equipment nec   
OMF Manufactures nec OMF Other manufacturing 
ELY Electricity EGW Electricity water & gas 
GDT Gas manufacture, 
distribution 
  
WTR Water   
CNS Construction CNS Construction 
T_T Trade, transport T_T Trade and transport 
OSP Financial, business, 
recreational services 
OSP Other services 
(private) 
OSG Public admin and defence, 
education, health 
OSG Other services (govt) 
DWE Dwellings DWE Ownership of 
dwellings 
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Structure of the GTAP Model 
The GTAP model is large Johansen-style model that assumes 
optimising behaviour by firms and households, subject to the 
various constraints of the economy. Prices and quantities of 
produced commodities are endogenously determined and markets 
are generally assumed to clear. Households satisfy their budget 
constraints and firms make zero pure profits. As with most general 
equilibrium models, the GTAP model emphasises the structural 
detail of the economy. Interactions between domestic sectors and 
other economies are explicitly modelled.  
Producers choose inputs that minimize production costs subject to 
separable, constant returns to scale technologies. Constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) functions provide substitution possibilities 
between primary factors. Since substitution is possible between 
primary factors, industry inputs depend on both the scale effect of 
the level of industry output and the substitution effect of changes in 
relative prices of primary factors.2 Market clearing conditions equate 
supply with demand for each factor of production. However for 
intermediate inputs, the assumption of a Leontief function implies 
no substitution between different intermediates or between them 
and a composite primary factor. This means that firms choose their 
optimal mix of primary factors independently of the prices of 
intermediate inputs.  
The GTAP model has a relatively sophisticated representation of 
consumer demand, which is particularly important when modelling 
large income growth shocks (as in a number of chapters in this 
book). The representation of consumer demand allows for 
differences in both the price and income responsiveness of demand 
in different regions, depending upon the level of development of the 
region and the particular consumption patterns observed in that 
region. Non-homothetic preferences are captured through use of a 
                                                 
2 In the standard Version 3 of the GTAP database, three primary factors 
(land, labour and capital) are identified. For some of the work presented in this 
book we disaggregate the database to include five primary factors (land, 
unskilled labour, skilled labour, natural resources and capital). This five-factor 
split is a standard feature in Version 4 of GTAP. 
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constant difference of elasticities (CDE) function. This falls between 
the CES function that is commonly used in CGE models and fully 
functional forms (Hertel and Tsigas 1997). The advantage of this 
demand system is that non-homothetic demand can be calibrated to 
replicate a pre-specified vector of own-price and income elasticities 
of demand (Huff et al. 1997). These income elasticities can be crucial, 
particularly when projecting large structural changes in the 
economy.  
The GTAP model assumes an Armington structure for imports. 
They are distinguished by origin and aggregated at the border. At 
the border, the composite import is distinguished from the 
domestically produced commodity and the optimal mix is 
determined. For imported production inputs, CES functions 
determine first the sourcing of imports and then, based on the 
resulting composite price for imports, the optimal mix of imported 
and domestic goods. The CES function used is homothetic in total 
expenditure, implying that the choice between imports and 
domestic production is independent of the level of income (Hertel 
and Tsigas 1997).3  
Analysing simulation results 
The GTAP model can be used to address a wide range of 
comparative-static questions. In a given economic environment that 
abstracts from other factors which might affect the outcome, what 
are the implications of a given policy change? The answer is not a 
forecast of the actual expected outcome; it is a conditional projection 
of the influence of that policy change alone. Time is not explicitly 
modelled in the standard GTAP model.4 The standard GTAP model 
is fundamentally an equilibrium model and the proper time frame 
                                                 
3 Increasing the Armington elasticities was shown to lead to more accurate 
simulation results in a backcasting exercise with GTAP (Gehlhar 1997). With 
this in mind, and following previous work on projecting with GTAP, the 
standard Armington elasticities are doubled in many of the GTAP applications 
appearing in this book.  
4 There is now a dynamic version of the GTAP model available (see 
www.gtap.org for further details). 
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to use in interpreting results is the time span that it takes for all 
markets to reach a new equilibrium after being hit by a shock. 
Analysis of results from GTAP simulations can provide important 
insights into what is likely to happen to a wide range of variables 
including sectoral output, prices and international trade. The GTAP 
model is also frequently used to gauge the potential welfare 
implications of policy changes. Improvements in welfare can come 
from a number of sources including: better allocation of existing 
resources; more favourable terms of trade; and additional resources 
or improved technology. Welfare changes in GTAP simulations are 
typically measured by an equivalent variation (EV) in income. To 
assist interpretation, this measure can be decomposed into four 
effects: allocative efficiency effects; terms of trade effects; marginal 
utility of income effects; and the effects of more resources or 
improved technology (Huff and Hertel 1996).  
Allocative efficiency gains result when resources are reallocated into 
areas of more efficient production. These gains (or losses) can be 
further decomposed to find the allocative efficiency effect 
attributable to a given commodity and region, which can in turn be 
further decomposed by tax instrument. The second effect reflects 
movements in the terms of trade which can be decomposed into 
three components: contribution of changes in world prices, 
contribution of changes in regional export prices and contribution of 
changes in regional import prices (McDougall 1993). Marginal utility 
of income effects are somewhat less important than the first two 
effects, they simply reflect non-homothetic household preferences 
and are driven largely by the parameters of the CDE household 
preference function.5 Finally there is the welfare gain arising from 
better technology or increased resource availability. 
 
                                                 
5 When policy shocks increase household utility, the proportion of income 
spent on inferior goods reduces, leaving more income available for all other 
goods and a positive effect on welfare. 
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Advantages and limitations of global CGE analysis 
CGE modelling provides a powerful tool for simulating and 
analysing structural and policy changes which have economy-wide 
impacts. Many policy reforms such as trade liberalisation -- even if 
directed to just one sector -- affect other sectors of the economy, and 
this can only be captured in a multisectoral economy-wide model. 
Furthermore, most reforms are piecemeal with the impacts 
depending in part on remaining distortionary policies, again 
requiring a system-wide analysis. An important advantage of using 
a global model rather than a national one, even though the primary 
focus may be on results for Indonesia, is that the structural and 
policy changes of other countries can be incorporated explicitly into 
the modelling. 
CGE modelling helps to make explicit the implications and tradeoffs 
of alternative courses of action: it is ideal for examining the effects of 
policy changes on resource allocation and it enables us to assess 
relative gainers and losers. Interactions between sectors and 
between economies are often important. Without formal modelling, 
it is easy to miss the many complex and often indirect effects of a 
policy change which empirical modelling can help to reveal. 
Quantitative models also enable us to examine the sensitivity of 
results to key behavioural assumptions and parameter values that 
can help us to trace the source of disagreements. Furthermore CGE 
models such as GTAP have a powerful capacity to incorporate new 
theoretical and empirical evidence as it appears, in a useable and 
relatively transparent manner. 
Increasing levels of experience and improved computational 
capability have led to significant advances in CGE modelling in 
recent years. Models are becoming more powerful and more easily 
accessible; in particular, the availability of special purpose software 
such as General Equilibrium Modelling Package (GEMPACK) has 
lessened the need for programming skills. GEMPACK is a set of 
general-purpose software specifically designed to assist the 
implementation of large economic models. It is essentially an 
algebraic modelling language that permits the user to write out and 
read the model in a transparent fashion, even with no previous 
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programming experience. All of the GTAP applications in this book 
are implemented and solved using GEMPACK (Harrison and 
Pearson 1996). 
Given the inevitable data and modelling problems, results for any 
CGE model are not precise and this may be even more of an issue 
for a large global model. However, the advantage of the GTAP 
model and database is that users are often active contributors and 
researchers can collaborate to move the model and database 
forward. The GTAP model summarises and aggregates a huge 
amount of knowledge. It enables quantification of policy tradeoffs 
and it can facilitate better-informed policy debates. There are 
however large elements of subjective judgement involved in 
building and using models, and CGE models “are nothing more nor 
less than analytical tools designed to assist in reaching a better 
informed understanding of issues to which judgements must 
ultimately be applied” (Powell 1977). 
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